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ABSTRACT: 
This study addresses three distinct but interrelated areas in the micro insurance sector in Tanzania a) 
demand perspectives of micro insurance in the informal sector b) examining strengths and weakness 
of current risk coping strategies in the informal sector c) examining household‘s characteristics that 
influence demand for micro insurance. The study analyses data from a primary survey and focus 
group discussion derived from informal sector households‘ members of the VIBINDO1 society in 
three districts of Ilala, Kinondoni and Temeke in Dar es Salaam. The analysis involves three steps; 
first, household‘s major risk exposures were analysed, secondly risk coping strategies which were in 
place were examined and thirdly, a probit regression analysis was conducted to establish the 
relationship between households‘ characteristics and demand for micro insurance in the informal 
sector.   
There are three major findings from this study: Firstly, the results indicate that employment, marital 
status, use of financial services, education, risk exposure and insurance knowledge are significant 
determinants of micro-insurance demand. Insurance knowledge and trust of insurers were found to 
have a positive and significant impact on the demand for micro insurance. Contrary to expectations, 
the empirical analysis shows that income is a significant determinant with a negative impact on 
micro insurance demand.   
Secondly, the findings suggest that demand for micro insurance in the informal sector depends on 
the competitive advantage between formal insurance services and available informal techniques. 
Informal techniques have important informational advantages due to their close physical proximity 
and frequent, repeated interactions. This implies that some inferences can be drawn from the design 
and development of micro insurance. The analysis highlights different approaches to be taken by 
insurers in designing micro insurance products.   
Thirdly, there is evidence to suggest that pre-existing informal sharing networks affect demand for 
micro insurance. The low demand for micro insurance can be explained by available informal 
arrangements which are characterized by closely knit social networks and groups that provide 
security in exchange for loyalty to the group. Also, uncertainty avoidance culture is low within the 
households in Tanzania, hence households seem to be more tolerate to different situations. The 
                                                          
1  VIBINDO stands for Viwanda na Biashara Ndogondogo- an umbrella organization of small and medium economic groups in the 
informal sector in Tanzania.  VIBINDO represents group members from a variety of different economic sectors working in the  informal 
sector in Tanzania. VIBINDO represents over 300 groups’ members with over 500,000 individual members.  
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findings recommend strategies for micro insurance expansion in the informal sector, which is 
therefore useful for the expansion of financial services.    
Keywords: Micro insurance, Financial Services Inclusion, Insurance Demand, Social Protection. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
This study focuses on micro insurance demand perspectives in the informal sector within the context 
of Tanzania. Understanding of demand enhances the design of appropriate products and improves 
uptake of micro insurance services in the informal sector (see for example, Prahalad, 2005; 
Churchill, 2006; McCord, 2008). Indeed, putting micro insurance in place without thorough 
assessments of its demand may cause a limited impact or sometimes even wasting the insurer‘s 
scarce resources.  
This research is an effort to illuminate, how micro insurance can be used in the context of poverty 
reduction strategies in developing countries. The present study examines risk exposures and existing 
coping strategies in the informal sector, and identifies positive attributes that can be incorporated 
into the design of micro insurance products. This chapter presents the motivations for the study in 
section 1.1, background to the research in section 1.2, aims and objectives of the research in section 
1.3, and finally the structure of the thesis is presented in section 1.4. 
1.1 MOTIVATION FOR STUDYING MICRO INSURANCE DEMAND 
My interest in the topic area of micro insurance began in 2004; I was involved in the feasibility study 
conducted by the Ministry of Health on the implementation of a rural health financing scheme in the 
Muheza district in Tanzania. The feasibility study was aimed at assessing the impact of the health 
financing scheme for the poor households. In an effort to carry out this study, we examined the 
present state of the financial services including practice and challenges in Tanzania. With this 
regards, there was evidence in the literature to show that households requires financial services 
including insurance (see for example, McCord, 2001; Leftley and Mapfumo, 2006; URT, 2003). 
Indeed, using scenario mapping, the access to financial services in the informal sector was a critical 
challenge that financial institutions particularly in developing countries are currently facing.  
Further, my interest in the area of micro insurance was enriched by my appointment to the Insurance 
Technical Team. The Insurance Technical Team consists of members from different stakeholders of 
the insurance industry and financial sector. The main task of the team among other things is to 
advise and make recommendations to the Bank of Tanzania on issues related to access to insurance 
services in Tanzania. In undertaking these tasks I experienced the nature of the challenges facing the 
insurance industry in Tanzania which were calling for a solution. This motivated me to undertake 
this PhD project, to contribute to the body of knowledge on micro insurance in Tanzania. The next 
section gives the background to the research. 
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1.2 BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH 
The present study seeks to describe and analyse access to financial instruments in the informal sector 
in Tanzania with particular interest focusing on micro insurance services. Several studies show that 
there has been low demand for micro insurance services within the informal sector households in 
Tanzania (see for example, Monique, et al. 2003; Cohen, et al. 2005). Low access to financial 
instruments can be traced since Arusha Declaration (1967) when Tanzania had nationalized all 
financial institutions and economic system was fully controlled and owned by the state.  
The current investigation derived its rationale from the outcome of financial sector reforms 
discussed in chapter two of this thesis.  The financial sector reforms carried out in Tanzania finds its 
theoretical support from McKinnon (1991) who argued that financial controls discourages saving 
and investment efficiency and thus reduces the growth of the economy. McKinnon‘s theory supports 
liberalization of the financial sector which in turn reduces disintermediation and increases 
investments. Indeed, recent studies by Beck, et al. (2000) argued that countries with better developed 
financial markets and institutions effectively channel society‘s savings to its most productive use and 
tend to experience faster economic growth compared to those with less developed financial systems. 
This is because financial sector development helps economic growth through more efficient resource 
allocation and productivity growth. In addition, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) and Rajan 
and Zingales (1995) argued that availability of financial services helps to foster economic 
development by widening access to external financial services.  
Several empirical studies have found that better developed financial systems ease the financing 
constraints faced by enterprises, particularly small firms. Hence, there is evidence that financial 
sector development has a causal effect in stimulating economic and productivity growth (see for 
example, Moore, et al. 2006; Das and Ghosh, 2006; Iimi, 2004; Spiegel and Yamori, 2003; Honda, 
2003). Indeed, there is a further set of empirical evidences to support the effect of financial sector 
liberalization on savings, investments and access to financial services in the literature (see for 
example,  Bandiera, et al. 2000; Arestis et al. 2002; Chinn and Ito, 2002). 
In line with these studies, the impacts of financial sector reforms in Tanzania were realized through 
the increase in the number of financial institutions
2
 and aggregate economic growth from 1.7 percent 
during the 1980s to an average of 5.8 percent during the 1990s (BoT, 1990). Furthermore, the size of 
financial deepening measured through the currency to deposit ratio of monetary assets (M1, M2, and 
M3)
3
 to GDP that is M2/GDP and the ratio of extended money to GDP which is M3/GDP indicates 
                                                          
2 Before the reforms, the banking and insurance sector of Tanzania was made up of three and two insurance companies. However, after 
the reforms, by the end of 2010 there were 38 commercial banks, 6 regional banks, 24 insurance companies and 6 pensions’ funds. 
3 M1-refers to narrow money (currency in circulation outside banks demand deposits), M2-refers to broad money (M1 +Time deposit + 
Saving deposit and M3-refers to Extended money (M2 + Foreign Currency Deposit) 
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the increase after reforms. The higher the ratios are, the more developed the financial sector 
deepening, suggesting that individuals will prefer to hold monetary assets and feel it is convenient to 
keep their wealth in monetary instruments. According to the Bank of Tanzania quarterly reports of 
2005, there were also declines of M1 to M2 ratios from an average of 71.1 percent to an average of 
67.2 percent after reforms, suggesting improvements in the ability of banks to stimulate long-term 
savings. Moreover, the commercial banks credit increased considerably following reforms, total 
banking lending rose to about 1425 billion (Tsh)  in 2005 from 209 billion (Tsh) recorded in 1991s.  
These reforms have also reshaped the insurance markets
4
; the insurance industry grew in size, and by 
June 2010, there were 24 registered commercial insurers, 80 broking firms, 488 licensed agents and 
36 private health insurance schemes (TIRA, 2010). Furthermore, the insurance penetration, that is 
premium as a percentage of GDP increased to 1.02 as per 2010 reports from 0.08 prior to the 
reforms, suggesting that the deregulations of the financial services markets has positively affected 
insurance markets. As will be made clear at a later point, it appears that the financial reforms have 
less effect in the informal sector as there is poor access to insurance services and in particular to 
micro insurance. The focus on micro insurance emerged because the concept represents a useful 
financial instrument for low income households but remains largely under researched.  
Previous studies related to micro insurance raises four major issues which prompt to undertake 
current study; Firstly, Cohen and Sebstad (2005) indicate that insurance market penetration is largely 
driven by supply and not demand. Secondly, despite some progress being achieved in the formal 
sector, insurance services to informal households have been slow to develop and the access to 
insurance products has remained stunted. Thirdly, economic reforms pursued in the 1990s amounts 
to substantial government cutbacks in public expenditure which in turn incapacitated public sector 
provision of social protection needed by informal households. Thus, in seeking to address these 
variations and imbalances, several studies and government policy are in favor of micro insurance 
(see for example, Wangwe and Tibandebage, 1999; URT, 2005; Steinwachs; 2002). However, a 
fundamental gap exists on micro insurance demand perspectives in the informal sector to realize the 
intended objectives, hence the focus of this PhD study.  
Fourthly, most studies that have examined micro insurance demand in the informal sector have been 
undertaken on East Asia (see for example, Jim, et al. 2007; Churchill, 2006; Dror, et al. 2007; 
Morduch and Sharma; 2001) and the main focus appears to be on micro finance clients (see for 
example, Cohen and Sebstad, 2005; Sestad, et al. 2006; Gine, et al. 2008). This empirical deficit is 
important when one considers the size and key role of the informal sector to the economy in the 
                                                          
4 These radical financial sector reforms had affected the insurance industry during the last 20 years. As part of the reforms, the 
Government enacted the Insurance Act No.18 of 1996 (since repealed and replaced by Act No. 10 of 2009) which opened up the local 
market to local and foreign private insurers as well as insurance intermediaries. 
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developing countries. These core gaps provide the backdrop for this thesis. Based on the theoretical 
and empirical literature and the gaps identified therein, this thesis explores the micro insurance 
demand perspectives in the informal sector in Tanzania.  
1.3 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
The main objective of this study was to investigate micro insurance demand perspectives in the 
informal sector in Tanzania. Thus understanding the household behaviour concerning the desired 
micro insurance can play an important role in anticipating both private and social insurance 
demands.  In order to accomplish this objective, this research intended to provide answers to the four 
specific research questions:  
i. What are the most important risks facing informal sector households in Tanzania? 
This question seeks to examine the risks faced by informal households and determine their 
characteristics. The objective is to generate information that can be useful in identifying insurable 
and non-insurable risks.  
ii. What are the risk coping strategies in place for the informal sector households in Tanzania? 
The research seeks to examine the existing risk coping mechanisms that can help identify attributes 
of informal insurance systems which could be incorporated into the design of micro insurance 
products. The objective is to generate information that can be useful in identifying appropriate 
product attributes.   
iii. What are the biggest gaps in the existing coping strategy that can be replaced by micro 
insurance?  
The question seeks to understand the weakness of the coping systems in place and quantify its 
impact, compare the costs implications of each mechanism, and finally to analyse the strengths and 
weaknesses to determine the role of micro insurance as a risk management instrument in the 
informal sector. 
iv. How do household characteristics affect micro insurance demand?   
This question seeks to derive how opinions differ as per household characteristics. Among other 
things, the study will examine household characteristics and determine the nature of the relationship 
that exists between household characteristics and micro insurance demand. The question explores 
factors which may explain variation with respect to demand for micro insurance.  This can play a 
crucial role in designing micro insurance products. 
Saqware, PhD Thesis July 11, 2012 
  
19 
1.4 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
This thesis is composed of nine chapters; they are structured as follows, Chapters 1; presents 
introduction to the study. The background to the research, aims and objectives of the study were 
presented.  
 
Chapter 2; focuses on the provision of financial services in Tanzania including insurance services. 
The developments of financial services were tracked, documented and the main challenges are 
identified. The chapter discusses the access to financial services within the population, challenges 
and its linkages to the demand for micro insurance.  Further, certain characteristics of the financial 
sector industry that are related to subsequent analyses are discussed. This chapter establishes the 
basis and rationale for carrying out this study.  
 
Chapter 3; reviews the literature on micro insurance demand and discusses gaps in literature which 
warrant the current study.  It provides a conceptual reference to construe the demand for different 
types of insurance in the informal sector. 
  
Chapter 4; theoretical and conceptual frameworks were developed. The chapter critically revisits 
insurance demand theories perspectives discussed in the existing literature. Discussion includes 
expected utility theories and effects of short term income risk, long term trajectories associated with 
the life cycle and bequests. This chapter explains and justifies the conceptual framework adopted. 
The framework depicts the unique process of understanding micro insurance demand perspectives in 
the informal sector. 
 
Chapter 5; discusses the philosophical position of the research, and research design and methodology 
are presented. Further, the detailed descriptive information on sampling framework and sampling 
techniques, research instruments, measurement of variables and statistical software used are 
provided.  
Chapter 6; provides documentation on the statistical analyses that were conducted in the study. The 
chapter examines the risk exposures in the informal sector and identifies the impacts of such risks. It 
further explores various understanding of risk events from respondents. A key contribution of this 
chapter is an attempt to answer the first research question and identifies potential risks which are 
insurable. This chapter also provides a description of data and a framework for analysis.  
Chapter 7; discusses the findings related to risk coping strategies used in the informal sector in 
Tanzania. The chapter focuses on the second and third objectives of the research by examining the 
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strengths and weaknesses of risk management techniques in place. A key contribution of this chapter 
is to highlight the gaps and establish the attributes of the informal techniques that can be applied in 
micro insurance product design.  
Chapter 8; the empirical findings on the relationship between household characteristics vis. micro 
insurance demand were elaborated in detail. The chapter targets the fourth objective of the study by 
examining household‘s understanding and perceptions of insurance products. The main contribution 
of this chapter is to highlight factors that influence demand in the informal sector.   
Finally, Chapter 9; this chapter provides the summary of the major findings and conclusions drawn 
from the data. It discusses the major policy implications and recommendations of the research. The 
chapter also provides the major contributions and limitations of the study.  Finally areas for further 
research were established. 
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CHAPTER TWO: THE REVIEW OF TANZANIA’S FINANCIAL AND INSURANCE 
SECTOR 
This chapter assesses the status of the financial sector in Tanzania. It focuses on the provision of 
financial services including insurance services. Investigation on micro insurance demand requires a 
review on the status of the financial sector in Tanzania, its development and the main challenges 
facing the sector. The purpose of the financial sector review was to explore the level of access to 
financial instruments in Tanzania. In this context, the research problem and rationale for research 
were addressed. Further, certain characteristics of the industry that are linked to the demand for 
micro insurance were analysed.  
 The chapter is divided into five sections. Section 2.1 is devoted to an overview of the current state 
of the economy. Section 2.2 provides a description of the financial sector and formal financial 
institutions in Tanzania. Section 3.3 provides a description of micro finance services in Tanzania 
followed by section 2.4 which discusses provision of insurance and social protection services; 
finally, section 2.5 provides the rationale of the study and summarizes the chapter.  
2.1 STATE OF THE ECONOMY:  AN OVERVIEW 
Tanzania adopted a socialist development strategy through the Arusha Declaration (1967); this 
strategy treats the state as a key agency of direct economic planning and management, and allocates 
resources according to priorities established by the state rather than through mechanisms provided 
by the market.  Hence, it allows the state to control all economic sectors. As a result of the state 
controlled nature of the economy, Reinhart and Tokatlidis (2003) and Maxwell (2007) find out that 
Tanzania‘s economy was characterized by extensive administrative controls and suffered from 
severe internal and external imbalances, and the economy experienced negative growth of GDP as 
production and exports declined and capacity utilization fell
5
.  
Thus, these critical economic circumstances in the 1980s gave rise to the adoption of structural 
adjustment programs supported by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
Hence, in close cooperation with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, a three year 
Economic Recovery Program (ERP) was launched.  The ERP was followed by a sister program, the 
Economic and Social Action Program (ESAP) launched in 1989. The World Bank and the IMF were 
instrumental in the preparation and actual financing of this program. The ESAP carried over all the 
policies introduced under the ERP with the following objectives i) to improve the quality and 
                                                          
5 Further, these studies show that inflation was high, averaging over 30 per cent per year, the balance of payment registered large 
deficits and the country faced a severe shortage of foreign exchange reserves leading to an accumulation of external payments arrears. 
Per capital income growth dropped steadily from 2.09 per cent in 1968 to -5.55 per cent in 1983.  
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quantity of social services; ii)The restructuring of the publicly owned banks and insurance 
institutions and iii) establishment of new financial institutions.   
As a result of the reforms outlined above, the BoT (1995) report indicates that significant progress 
was made to create a more stable economy. Indeed, Bardhan and Udry (1999) indicated that 
reorienting the economy to a market-based operation creates space for exploiting the potential of 
private sector initiatives. Hence, according to the IMF 2011 country report
6
, Tanzania‘s GDP per 
capita 2010 (est.) fall at US$1423 was the second largest economy among five East African 
countries after Kenya. The GDP‘s composition by sector 2010 (est.) indicates that agriculture 
comprises 28.4%, industry 24% and services 47.6% and that GDP growth rates in 2010 (est.) 
indicated that the  economy grew at 7.3%, 6.7% and 6.5% in 2008, 2009 and 2010 respectively.  
It can be argued that the improvement in the policy environment and a market-friendly institutional 
framework established in Tanzania resulted in the increase of GDP. For example since 2008, the 
GDP at the current price has been on the rise as indicated in graph 2.1 below.  Tanzania‘s real GDP 
grew at an annual average rate of 7.2 percent with good performance being recorded in construction 
and services, and particularly in real estate and business services (IMF, 2010 est.).  Nevertheless, in 
2009 Tanzania experienced a slowdown in annual economic growth to 5.4 percent on account of the 
global financial crisis. Despite the slowdown in growth as a result of the global financial crisis, the 
fundamentals of macroeconomic stability have been well preserved, and the gains from two decades 
of strong reform measures were not eroded. The external position of the Tanzanian economy 
remains strong, and   the level of reserves for June 2010 was enough to cover about 5.6 months of 
import of goods and services (BoT, 2010). The current account deficit is projected to remain at 13% 
of GDP due to higher imports as a result of strong economic activities and a construction boom. For 
Tanzania‘s economic performance indicators see Appendix A. 
                                                          
6 http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/en/countries/east-africa/tanzania/ 
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Graph 2.1: Tanzania’s GDP increase over time 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance (Tanzania) 
According to the Ministry of Finance‘s economic review bulletin 2010, Tanzania's political stability, 
sound macroeconomic management and considerable resources are major strength to achieve 
sustainable growth. Despite these gains, the troubling part of Tanzania‘s growth performance is the 
widespread corruption and bureaucratic barriers to investment, with a rudimentary physical 
infrastructure. New investments on roads, railways and harbour redevelopment are necessary for 
immediate growth.  The performance can be weakened by pressure from energy and food prices. 
2.1.1 Challenges to the Tanzanian Economy 
The Tanzanian economy challenges are indicated in the URT (2010) economic survey. The survey 
indicates that administrative capacity to use public resources more efficiently by removing 
corruption and bureaucratic barriers are major economic challenges. Over the medium-term, the 
main policy challenge is to raise living conditions and improve public infrastructure such as roads, 
schools and wages. This will require high per-capita economic growth over a long period, which in 
turn will require ensuring both sound macroeconomic policies and raising potential output growth. 
Hence, substantial improvements in human capital over the longer term are of paramount 
importance. Indeed, Lipumba and Ndullu (1989) suggest that structural reforms to product markets 
and financial pressure for social insurance schemes to cover informal sector households are major 
economic challenges. Generally by enlarge a combination of appropriate economic policies, 
financial sector reforms and improvements in risk management within the population can reduce 
poverty.   
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2.2 FINANCIAL SECTOR   
2.2.1 Outcome of financial sector reforms 
The social contract philosophy which governed the Tanzanian economic structure prior to the 
reforms mentioned in section 2.1, undermined growth of the financial sector.  Prior to these reforms 
there were three state-owned banks, which were the National Bank Cooperation, the CRDB bank 
and Zanzibar People‘s Bank and two insurance companies which were the National Insurance 
Cooperation and Zanzibar Insurance Cooperation. These state institutions were charged with the task 
of providing regular financial services to the business (public) sector, often with an administratively 
set agenda. Other financial institutions such as development, housing and pension funds carried out 
specialized business activities. Generally, all financial institutions operated as fiscal agents of the 
government for all practical purposes, rather than as providers of services to clients. As a result, the 
quality of financial services provided was poor and largely based on non-commercial criteria. This 
restricted financial sector activity, undermined competition, efficiency and access to financial 
services. 
To improve the access to financial services, the financial reforms governed by the Banking and 
Financial Institutions Act (BAFIA) of 2006 were introduced. This Act regulates financial institutions 
in Tanzania and emphasizes private participation, with the main purpose being to increase savings-, 
and improve the allocation and operational efficiency of the financial system which was 
characterized by state-owned financial institutions. Since then, the financial sector in Tanzania had 
been transformed, with the banking and insurance industry leading this dynamism through an 
expanded branch network, scope of operations and number of institutions. Detailed information on 
the outcome of the reforms is presented in sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3 below. 
The liberalization of the financial sector finds its theoretical support from McKinnon (1991) and 
several empirical studies have found that financial sector development has a causal effect in 
stimulating economic and productivity growth (see for example, Moore, et al. 2006; Das and Ghosh, 
2006; Iimi, 2004; Spiegel and Yamori, 2003; Honda, 2003 Beck, et al. 2000; Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic, 1998; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Bandiera, et al. 2000; Arestis et al. 2002; Chin and 
Ito, 2003). The outcome of the financial sector reforms elsewhere demonstrated a similar trend, for 
example, Das and Ghosh (2006) investigated the performance of the Indian commercial banking 
sector during the post reform period of 1992–2002.  The results of their study showed that medium-
sized public sector banks performed reasonably well and were more likely to operate at higher levels 
of technical efficiency. Also, Reinhart and Tokatlidis‘s (2003) study revealed that financial 
liberalization had delivered on realizing higher real interest rates, financial deepening and savings 
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mobilization in Sub-Saharan Africa countries. However, this study could be criticized on account of 
‗fallacy of composition‘ in that what may be true for the whole may not be true for the parts.  
2.2.2 Formal Financial Institutions 
Formal financial institutions discussed in this section are commercial banks and non-banking 
financial institutions regulated by the Financial Institution Act of 2006. Commercial banks are 
money deposit banks that incur liabilities in the form of deposits payable on demand and transferable 
cheques or otherwise in making payment. They lend and provide other banking services to the 
public. The financial sector reforms led to the transformation of the Tanzanian banking sector, 
placing it at the centre of economic policy management and private sector led growth. The banking 
sector has witnessed marked growth; the expansion in the number of banks, increased competition in 
the banking sector in particular the diversification of financial services and introduction of 
technological infrastructure. For instance, the number of private banks increased from zero in 1994 
to 38 in 2010 (see BoT, 2010). By June 2010 there were 38 registered commercial banks
7
, 
institutions authorized to receive money on current account subject to withdrawal by cheque, 
operating in over 395 branches in the country. There were 8 regional banks
8
, institutions licensed to 
operate as a regional unit bank; they may receive money on current account, subject to withdrawal 
by cheque.  
The non-bank financial institutions include thrift institutions, and medium and long-term finance 
institutions (development banks and other financial institutions). The thrift institutions are non-bank 
financial institutions which accept deposits (excluding demand deposits) from the public. They are 
made up of two categories: - a) Deposit taking institutions, which are deposit taking but occur in 
forms other than demand deposits, for example, time and savings deposits. They mobilize deposits 
offering various types of deposit schemes, providing banking services and participate in a money 
markets operation; there were four financial institutions
9
 licensed and authorized to engage in 
banking business not involving the receipt of money on current account subject to withdrawal by 
cheque.  b) Non-deposit taking financial institutions, which can be grouped excluding insurance and 
pension funds
10
, as institutions offering lease hire purchase services and institution offering 
development finance. They provide long term finance to the public and private sectors in the form of 
                                                          
7 National Microfinance Bank (132), National Bank of Commerce (56), CRDB Bank 56), Barclays Bank (31), Standard Chartered Bank (7), 
KCB Bank (7), Akiba Commercial Bank (10), Stanbic Bank (10), Citibank (1), FBME Bank (4), Bank of Africa (7), Diamond Trust Bank (8), 
Exim Bank (20), The people’s Bank of Zanzibar (3),  International Commerce Bank (5), Habib African Bank (2), Banc ABC (2), 
Commercial Bank of Africa (6), I & M Bank (3), NIC bank (3), Azania Bancorp (7), Bank of Baroda (2), Bank M (4),  Access Bank (4), 
Bank of India (1), United Bank of Africa (1), Mkombozi Commercial Bank (1), Ecobank (2), Advans Bank (1), Amana Islamic Bank (1). 
8 Kilimanjaro Cooperative Bank (1), Dar es Salaam Community Bank (2), Mbinga Community Bank (1), Kagera Farmers Community Bank 
(1), Uchumi Commercial Bank (1), Tandhimba Community Bank (1) and Njombe Community Bank (1), Mwanga Community Bank (1) 
9 Tanzania Postal Bank, Tanzania Investment Bank, Efatha Bank, Tanzania Women Bank 
10 Insurance and pension funds are discussed exclusively in section 2.4 of this chapter. 
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loans for medium and large scale investments. According to the Bank of Tanzania, by June 2010 
there were eight 
11
non-bank financial institutions operating in Tanzania.  
2.2.3 Access to formal financial services 
The financial services access survey held by IMF (2009) indicates that developed countries had an 
average of 45 bank branches per 100,000 adults, compared to an average of 6 banks branches per 
100,000 adults in low-income countries. In addition, the Fin-Scope Survey which was conducted in 
2006 in Tanzania indicates that the proportion of the adult population who use banks and other 
formal financial institutions was 12.4 percent; the survey projected a growth to 14 percent in 2010. 
This survey shows that about two million adults out of the estimated twenty million have access to 
financial services. Efforts to improve financial literacy in order to enhance financial inclusion are 
part of the Second Generation of Financial Sector Reforms spearheaded by the Bank of Tanzania. 
The financial literacy program aims at empowering more individuals to make informed financial 
choices, which in turn contributes to the demand for financial services and facilitates more efficient 
allocation of resources and risk management in the financial system.  
Hence, in the Tanzanian context, it can be argued that financial reforms have improved access to 
formal financial services; with a total of 38 banks and a reasonable number of non-banking financial 
institutions, and the market is characterized by a few big players and several small banks. Indeed,  
the BoT (2000) annual report measuring banking efficiency by collecting data on bank interest rate 
spreads before and after financial sector reform, indicates that reforms have led to the reduction of 
interest rate spreads between lending and deposit rates. A decrease in bank spreads encourages a 
greater mobilization of financial savings and demand for credit or loans for investment and growth. 
The liberalization of the financial sector has led to some reduction in gross interest rate spread for 
the largest borrowers and a fall in the lending interest rates from 20 percent in early 2000-01 to 13.8 
percent in 2003-04.  
Meanwhile, there has been a substantial increase in bank credit to the private sector, from about 2.5 
percent of GDP in 1996 to about 12 percent at the end of 2010. Although the percentages are low, 
they represent a marked improvement in the Tanzanian context in view of the non-market economy 
conditions that prevailed prior to the reform period. These by enlarge have increased banking 
penetration and bank account holders in Tanzania as indicated in table 2.1. The bank branches are 
concentrated in the economic heartland of the country, mainly in the capital Dar-es-Salaam and in 
the regional centres of Mwanza, Arusha, and Mbeya.   
                                                          
11 National Development Credit Agency, Diamond Jubilee Investment Trust, Tanganyika Development Finance, National Development 
Corporation, Mwananchi Development Corporation, Industrial Promotion Services, Tanzania Finance Company, National Housing 
Corporation. 
Saqware, PhD Thesis July 11, 2012 
  
27 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Bank Scope and authors calculations 
However, the major limitations for household‘s access to formal financial services seem to be related 
to Beck, et al.‘s (2008) survey which documented barriers associated with deposit, credit and 
payment services. The survey shows huge cross-country variations in hurdles associated with 
physical access (services being delivered in fewer and less convenient ways), eligibility (documents 
and other requirements to process services), and affordability (minimum balance requirements and 
fees). This survey suggests that hurdles are hard to overcome for large parts of the population in the 
developing world.   
 
The main problem lies in the concept of adverse selection which occurs when banks are unable to 
ascertain the types of borrower prior to providing the loan. Saving propensities are too low and few 
households have much to put up as collateral. In this sense, lenders or banks are unable to 
distinguish between ‗risky‘ and ‗safe‘ borrowers. In the case of lending to informal households, this 
problem becomes even greater, in that the  households  are not susceptible to the usual measures of 
risk assessment used by banks, for example if households have never before received a loan it is 
impossible to assess their previous default rate. Formal lenders overcome the problem of adverse 
selection by lending only to people who have sufficient assets to act as collateral on the loan. This 
way, only ‗safe‘ borrowers or investors will take the loan, since they will not be willing to lose their 
assets should they be unable to repay the loan. Therefore, borrowers sort themselves, with only 
attractive candidates taking on the loan. Since informal household have limited or no assets, the 
lender must shoulder all of the risk of the possibility of involuntary default on behalf of the 
Table 2.1: Banking penetration in Tanzania 
 Year 2008 2009 2010 
Number of Banks 31 35 38 
Bank Account holders Increased 9% 12.4% 14% 
Bank Loans Provided (bil. at CP) 5,98,460.06 6,014,436.10 7,735,639.2 
Banks Assets (bil. at CP) 15,337,510 18,234,058.9 22,093,22.1 
Bank Cust. Deposits (bil. at CP) 9,585,085.4 11,660,612.4 20,399,834.3 
 Borrowers frm CB per 1,000 adults 23.96 29.73 - 
Outstanding loans frm CB (% of GDP) 16.54 15.78 - 
No. of depstrs with CBs per 1,000 adult 122.27 130.93 - 
Outsts. deposits with CB (% of GDP) 25.23 27.03 - 
No. of CB  Branches per 1,000km^2 0.45 0.49 - 
No.  of CB branches per 100,000 adults 1.68 1.81 - 
Number of ATMs per 1,000km^2 0.67 0.97 - 
Number of ATMs per 100,000 adults 2.51 3.3 - 
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borrower. This becomes costly if many borrowers default on the loan, a very possible outcome for 
those very poor borrowers.  
 
Also, the moral hazard problem needs to be considered, which refers to any unattractive actions 
partaken by the borrower after the loan has been provided. Since informal households have limited 
or no assets to put up as collateral, which is they suffer from limited liability; their costs in choosing 
to partake in risky endeavours with their loan are low, since failure costs nothing. Predicting this 
lack of incentive to repay, formal banking institutions will not want to lend to the informal 
population. On the other hand, wealthy borrowers who are able to put up satisfactory collateral 
against their loan will not wish to act in a dishonest or ‗risky‘ fashion, since failure on their behalf 
will cost them in the form of the withdrawal of their collateral. In this sense, there is a prejudice 
against the informal sector; formal lending institutions find it unprofitable to lend to informal 
households due to the problems of asymmetric information and limited liability.   
2.3 MICRO FINANCE SERVICES 
Micro finance services in Tanzania continued to grow with the increased success of micro finance 
internationally. Micro finance services are linked to poverty alleviation (Hossain and Rahman, 
2001). The services include provision of small loans usually provided to informal households, to 
help them purchase capital, to purchase durable goods or to smooth consumption. These loans are 
formulated exclusively to serve clients that have been excluded from the formal financial institutions 
discussed in section 2.2.2 above. Households with limited or no assets, mostly those working in the 
informal sector, access micro credit from lenders who use innovative methods in order to secure 
repayment as opposed to the formal forms of collateral as required by formal banking institutions.  
In essence the objective of lending to the household is that it allows them to use the money to 
partake in some productive activity that should lift them out of poverty, or else allows them to 
smooth consumption in the presence of hard times.   
 
Islam and Mammun (2006) argued that the availability of micro finance has demonstrated that it is 
possible to provide cost-effective financial services to the poor. Indeed, Hossain and Knight (2008) 
indicate that micro finance has undeniable relevance to poverty reduction. In Tanzania, the 
expansion of financial services to the informal sector was done through an established micro finance 
policy. The implementation of the National Micro finance Policy in 2001 has significantly improved 
the operations of micro finance in Tanzania
12
.  Micro finance was officially recognized as a tool for 
                                                          
12 The micro finance policy 2001 provides an enabling environment for access to different schemes in the informal sector. The policy 
encourages the establishment of SACCOs at ward level in Tanzania. The government has approved the National Micro finance Bank and 
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poverty eradication and with its increased use and exposure in the country:- banks have taken an 
interest in offering micro finance. There are basically four types of MFI‘s service providers in 
Tanzania; Banks and Non- Bank financial institutions, Government credit schemes, NGO‘s and 
member based schemes. Each of these schemes is discussed hereunder.   
2.3.1 Financial institution’s micro finance schemes 
These institutions are the only ones, subject to licensing, regulation and supervision under the 
provision of the Bank of Tanzania Act (1995) and Banking and Financial Institutions Act (2006). 
There are four major commercial banks which provide micro finance services
13
. These banks have 
successfully developed individual and group lending methodologies and have special departments 
providing services to Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs). Among other rules, individual micro 
finance use chattel mortgages as collateral for loans and have strict rules on management of 
delinquency. Regional and rural bank units such as Mufindi Community Bank, Kilimanjaro 
Cooperative Bank and Mbinga Community Bank continue to mobilize deposits from the informal 
households through savings passbooks. On the savings mobilization side, Tanzania Postal Bank 
(TPB) has a strong outreach to informal household‘s clients through their network of 76 functional 
branches and more than 170 deposit taking outlets. TPB is working in conjunction with Micro Save 
Africa in new product development and improvement of customer service. Table 2.2 below shows 
the micro finance services provided by financial institutions. 
Table 2.2: Financial Institution micro finance penetration in Tanzania 
Commercial Bank  NMB CRDB Akiba TPB other 
No of Branches /Units  132  56  10  76  50 
No of inst/group. Clients  450  270  150  240 80 
No of indiv. Clients/customers  200,000+  140,000+  15,000  1690 100,000+ 
Total outst. loans (Mil.Tsh) 90+ 70+ 40+  50+ 100+ 
Total of MFI clients (inst.)  *** 270  ***  ***  *** 
Total MFI Indiv. beneficiaries  *** 140,000  ***  ***  *** 
            Source: Extracted from MFI Reports (note: *** refuse to disclose) 
                                                                                                                                                                                                  
CRDB Bank as its agents to channel the funds to individuals through SACCOs.  Records by BoT indicate that by 2010 Tanzania has a total 
of 2899 micro finance institutions. This includes 8 banks, 6 non-bank institutions,  53 NGO’s, 1 financial service association, 105 
government programmes, 2635 SACCOs, 93 member based schemes.  
13 Which includes: Akiba Commercial Bank, National Microfinance Bank, CRDB Bank and Tanzania Postal Bank 
Saqware, PhD Thesis July 11, 2012 
  
30 
2.3.2 Government micro finance schemes 
These are government initiatives to support the micro finance program, and they provide loans to 
SME‘s in the informal sector that constituted the majority of the active population of the country. 
Government credit scheme‘s main objectives are to promote the small industries sector14 in 
Tanzania.  They are involved in supporting the micro finance sector to better reach the informal 
households and empower them for increased income generating opportunities. These schemes plan, 
coordinate, promote and offer every form of service to small industries. They provide opportunities 
to access loans and participate in economic activities so as to increase income and eradicate poverty. 
Moreover, in collaboration with other stakeholders they support the establishment of SME 
associations to empower the private sector. Some of those associations include the Tanzania Small 
Industries Organization (TASISO) and ‗Vikundi vya Biashara Ndogo‟ (VIBINDO). These 
associations have been useful in involving the members in issues related to advocacy, accessibility to 
market, information, and raw materials, packaging and micro credit services.  All types of SMEs can 
be supported by government‘s schemes if compliance criteria are met with borrowing limit of Tshs 
6,000,000 (£3000). Types of disbursement employed normally comply with their lending and 
borrowing criteria. Credit payment is based on the contract loan repayment schedule.  The major 
government micro finance schemes includes: the Small Industries Development Organization 
(SIDO), Small Entrepreneurs Loan Facility (SELF), and Presidential Trust Fund (PTF).   
2.3.3 Non-Governmental Organization micro finance schemes 
These are registered but unregulated and unsupervised providers of micro finance services. The 
financial NGOs are the pioneers of the development of the micro finance sector in Tanzania. They 
are able to reach a segment of the market which banks failed to reach.  They fall into two 
categories:- based on the micro lending methodology employed: (i) individual lending, and (ii) 
solidarity or group-based lending.  Operations are generally centered on regions selected by the 
institutions or their donor-supporters. None of the NGOs take voluntary savings; some take 
mandatory savings as security for microloans extended. All are dependent on donor support
15
 for 
loan capital and technical assistance in operations.  Most of the NGO‘s MFI‘s have taken a lead in 
addressing access to finance for both the rural and urban population. The NGO-MFIs are not subject 
to any regulation with respect to the micro finance services they provide which mainly focuses on 
                                                          
14 The first major attempt was undertaken in 1966 by establishing National Small Industries cooperation’s which later set up the  Small 
Industries Development Organization (SIDO) in 1973. SIDO remains the main government arm for promoting SMEs in the country. Apart 
from financial services, these schemes involve construction of small industries, offer skill based training, hire and purchase of machines 
and working tools, rendering advice on setting up new industries, new technology and marketing SME’s products. These schemes have a 
mandate to operate throughout Tanzania.  
15 None of the financial NGOs have entered the threshold for being fully financially self-sufficient. The major players include Promotion of 
Rural Development Enterprises (PRIDE), Foundation for International Community Assistance (FINCA), Small Enterprise Development 
Agency (SEDA), BRAC Tanzania, Easy Finance, Youth Self Employment Foundation (YOSEFO), and Credit for Productivity activities for 
Women (CREW), Women Entrepreneurship Development Trust Fund (WEDTF), Poverty Africa, SELFINA, and Mennonite Development 
Associates (MEDA). 
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credit and compulsory saving, even though a number of governmental authorities are involved in the 
registration of both international and local NGOs like:- The Registrar of Societies under the 
Societies Ordinance; the Administrative General under the Trustees Incorporation Ordinance; the 
Registrar of Companies (the Business Registration and Licensing Agency, (BRELA) for companies 
limited by guarantee, under the Companies Ordinance (Cap 212).   
2.3.4 Member Based Micro finance Schemes 
Member based financial systems dominate the financial sector particularly among the informal 
sector households. Informal financial systems practices reflect the diversity of landscape and 
population density in Tanzania. These forms of financing can be registered under the Cooperative 
Act or Associations Ordinance. There are three major players in this category of financing: - 
Rotating Saving and Credit Associations (ROSCAs), Savings and Credit Societies (SACCOS)
16
 and 
Village Community Bank (VICOBA). The theory behind member based schemes is a sense of 
ownership and solidarity among the community. They provide a wide range of savings and loan 
products to their members and these schemes are self-sustainable. The loan repayment methods are 
decided on at the member‘s meetings (Besley, et al. 1983). They commonly require compulsory 
savings, but also offer individual or group saving products and deposits. The defaults on loans are 
found extremely rarely (Chiteji, 2002) because each member has sufficient information on each 
other member‘s financial constraints, circumstances and characteristics, in particular their honesty. 
Morduch (1999) indicates that members based schemes combine the scale advantages of a standard 
bank with mechanisms long used in traditional, group based modes of informal finance.  Apart from 
building their business and escaping poverty through credits: - households have the opportunity to 
learn how to manage money and how best to make a living.  
2.3.5 Access to Micro finance Services in Tanzania 
Steel, et al. (1997) indicates that several years after the implementation of financial sector reforms, 
the informal financial services remain an important financing mechanism for households; the 
rationale for the existence of the large informal financial sector in Tanzania was the repressive 
financial system that prevailed. The Finscope survey held in 2006 shows the urban households have 
more access to MFI‘s and by enlarge households use informal financial systems. Table 2.3 below 
depicts the picture. 
 
                                                          
16 There are over 2635 Saving and Credit Cooperative Societies country wide; most of them are weak in capacity, they have limited range 
of products and always run out of cash for lending. 
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 Table 2.3: Micro finance penetration in Tanzania 
Institution 
G-MFI 
  
NGO-MFI 
  
MBO-MFI 
  
Year 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 
Nos. of 
schemes 99 105 50 53 2550 2728 
Nos. of 
borrower 344,000 410,000 345,000 489,000 560,000 1,067,000 
G.  loans 99,000,000 178,000,000 100,890,000 112,000,000 222,000,000 
590,000,000 
 
Source: Micro finance reports and authors calculations 
Beck, et al. (2008) suggest that the continued importance of informal finance may be explained by 
push and pull factors. The collateral requirements, minimum balance and other operational 
procedures hinder access of informal households to the formal financial institutions. In addition to 
constraints on physical access because of limited geographical coverage, there is also the issue of 
economic access to banks. TIB (2010) report provides further evidence to explain why a large 
proportion of the population may not have access to banks even when physical distance is not a 
problem. The report suggests that the minimum amount needed to open a bank account and 
operational procedures required are beyond the reach of poor households.  
2.4 INSURANCE AND SOCIA PROTECTION SERVICES 
Our approach understands insurance as a form of financial service incorporating both elements of 
financial services and social protection. The point of intercept is protection against risks. They 
manifest basically in two forms; social insurance (government schemes) or private initiatives 
towards risks.  
2.4.1 Social Protection Services 
Tanzania‘s social protection provisions are structured on three pillars which are a) Mandatory Social 
Insurance b) Social Assistance and c) Private insurance and voluntary Community schemes. This 
system implies that an individual safety net can be obtained by one or a combination of three 
schemes as illustrated in figure 2.1 below:- 
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Figure 2.1: Social Protection Services provision in Tanzania 
 
Source: Author Individual Household Risk Protection System in Tanzania 
The first pillar, Mandatory Social Insurance, covers the workers under formal employment with 
compulsory membership. There are six schemes
17
 which operate concurrently, covering different 
categories of employees and providing different types of benefits. The unique characteristic is that 
they both cover formal workers and a limited number of informal households. The major 
membership base comes from the formal private sector, civil servants, non-pensionable government 
employees, parastatal organization employees and workers working in government agencies. The 
law allows voluntary membership for informal sector households for all schemes. However, there is 
still a very limited number of informal sector households joining the program due to high 
contribution rates of twenty percent of monthly earnings.  The schemes are financed by a tripartite 
system that includes state subsidies, and employers‘ and employees‘ contributions. Schemes are 
allowed to maintain and manage their surpluses: - and to operate as a self-funded system. The major 
benefits provided are based on International Labour Organization (ILO) provision of social security 
benefits standards, which are retirement pensions, maternity, health, death, survivors, employment 
injury and invalidity. 
The second pillar is the social assistance system; this program is coordinated and administered by 
the Prime Minister‘s Office Disaster Interventions Department and Social Welfare Service 
Department under the ministry of youth, labour, culture and sports. These departments, in 
                                                          
17 This includes the National Social Security Fund , 34% target market, Parastatal Pension Fund, 7% of target market, Public Service 
Pension Fund, 25% of target market, Local Authority Pension Fund, 5% of the target market, Government Employees Provident Fund, 
2% of the target market, and National Health Insurance Fund,  27% of the target market. 
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collaboration with other stakeholders including domestic and foreign NGO provide services to very 
needy and vulnerable groups in the society. The level of services and support ranges from capacity 
building in knowledge and skills, to direct material support such as food aid, access to basics and 
essential needs, as well as small scale emergency aid, to start income generating activities. The 
available statistics under the ministry of labour shows the social assistance is provided primarily to 
persons with disability and over 900,000 persons are beneficiaries, as shown in graph 2.2 below.  
Graph 2.2: Social Assistance Services Provision in Tanzania 
 
Source: Social Welfare Department (SWD) 2009/10 Report 
The third pillar, in addition to mandatory and direct government assistance, is solidarity mechanisms 
within the society that reduces risk for the people. In this aspect, the basic unit of risk share and 
diversification is the family, complemented by friends and helps from relations other non-family 
members. Traditional protections rooted in culture, custom and tradition are still stronger in rural 
areas than urban areas, though the latter have evolved new forms of mutual aid adapted to urban 
conditions.  Table 2.4 indicates the general characteristics of a voluntary community organized in 
Tanzania. 
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Table 2.4: Voluntary Social Insurance Schemes Characteristics in Tanzania 
Membership Founding members plus those who joined by application, payment of  
membership fees, some group have membership restrictions e.g. 
women, religion, etc. 
Insurance schedule Benefit  payment is conditional on relationship of the deceased to a 
member 
Forms of pay out In cash, In kind (food, capital goods and labour) 
Rules and regulation Written rules, and book keeping, fines for non or late payment or no 
show in case of labour contributions 
Governance structure Elected committee 
Spread Large numbers of groups per community with some people belonging 
to several groups 
Source: Social security policy report (URT 2003)  
2.4.2 Access to social protection services 
Social protection in Tanzania is primarily focused on workers in the formal economy, even though 
within the formal sector, considerable disparities exist between public workers and private sector 
workers in terms of benefit packages. Social assistance schemes have a number of shortcomings, as 
described in the ILO report of 2002; many of the potential beneficiaries were not aware of the 
schemes and the constraints seem to be related more to implementation and control mechanisms than 
to the basic concept. Schemes provide inadequate benefits because they were under budgeted; 
community grants or loans were faulted, the objectives were not well understood, the government 
lacked an adequate administrative network; as a consequence, many target groups did not receive the 
benefits of the social assistance system. Closer attention to targeting, administrative control and 
good governance (including better coordination between ministries) could improve delivery and 
enable better access to benefits and services.  
Informal households do not access any formal work-related measures of social protection. These 
suggest that the informal sector offers an important opportunity for micro insurance product demand. 
Many small informal organizations are already trying to provide cover for their members, although 
this is often insufficient to cover the costs. Informal workers, whether self-employed or waged are 
excluded from contributory schemes; they may be included in social assistance schemes, such as 
cash transfers but these are usually designed to go to target groups of a non-working age, such as 
younger children, and elderly people, or those who cannot work, such as people with severe 
disabilities.  
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2.4.3 The insurance services  
Insurance practice in Tanzania entails the involvement of many key players; like other financial 
services there are commercial insurance companies, micro finance institutions and NGO‘s. There are 
four categories of insurance service providers in Tanzania as shown in table 2.5 below:- 
Table 2.5: Categories of Private Insurance Services in Tanzania 
C:1 Organization regulated 
under insurance law 
Commercial Insurers, Brokers/Agents and Private Health 
Insurance providers  
C:2 Organization licensed 
under laws other than 
insurance 
Micro Finance Institutions, SACCO‘s, NGO‘s, Provider based 
health schemes, Health insurance schemes under health 
authorities, Cooperative or mutual insurers (member-based) 
under the cooperatives authority. Banks under banking act 
C:3 Informal groups 
(entirely unregulated) 
Funeral Associations, Informal groups, Community 
associations 
C:4 Government scheme Voluntary Community Health Funds 
Source:  Compiled from National Insurance Reports 
In the first category, the country has over 24 registered commercial insurers
18
, 80 broking firms, 488 
licensed agents and over 36 registered loss adjusters and private health insurance providers. With the 
exception of one insurance company, this category does not serve informal sector households.  The 
number of insurance service providers under this category has grown over the past five years of 
liberalization, as shown in Appendix B. 
In the second and third categories, insurance service provision is dominated by micro finance 
institutions (MFI‘s), Non- Government organizations (NGO‘s) and Savings and Credit Cooperative 
Societies (SACCOS). MFI‘s occupy a large percentage of the provision of micro insurance, as they 
have extensive networks and are already offering financial services to informal household clients.  
Most of the customers fall into the base of current micro finance borrowers, organized religious 
groups, informal communities and associations. The benefits payable to members in most cases are 
health and life insurance. 
In category four, the  Community Health Funds (CHF) were established as an alternative to access 
health services through being prepaid rather than out of pocket. Currently, only 29 districts out 72 
have access to this program. Membership is voluntary; schemes are based on a prepaid amount 
                                                          
18 Zanzibar Insurance Corporation Ltd, Jubilee Insurance Co. Ltd, Tanzidia Insurance Co. Ltd, Tanzania Reinsurance Corporation, 
Strategies Insurance Ltd, Star General Insurance Ltd, Reliance Insurance Co. Ltd, Real Insurance (T) Ltd,  Phoenix of Tanzania 
Assurance Ltd, Niko Insurance Co. Ltd, National Insurance Corporation, Milembe Insurance Co. Ltd, Mgen Tanzania Insurance Ltd, 
Maxinsure Tanzania Co. Ltd, Lion of Tanzania Insurance Co. Ltd, Insurance Group of Tanzania, Heritage Insurance Co. Ltd, Golden 
Crescent Assurance Ltd, Century Insurance Co. Ltd, Bumaco Insurance Co. Ltd, Alliance Life Insurance Co. Ltd, Alliance Insurance 
Corporation, African Life Assurance Co. Ltd, AAR Insurance Co. Ltd. 
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which is determined by the local government authority. The funds are deposited in a CHF account 
administered by the Council Health Board. Members‘ benefits are limited to health services at the 
government dispensary level and are defined or are selected services at the government district level 
in cases of referral. 
Table 2.5: Distribution of Different Micro-Insurance Schemes in Tanzania 
Type of scheme No. of schemes Distribution 
Health 306 7.9% 
Life 1832 47.2% 
Business loan 1743 44.8% 
Livestock 2 *** 
Property loss 1 *** 
Total 3884 100 
Source: (NIC 2006)  
2.4.4 Access to insurance services  
The TIRA
19
 annual report (2010) indicates that private insurance demand is growing in the formal 
economy,  fuelled by a combination of factors, including: macroeconomic growth, on-going mineral 
and gas exploration which involves large investments in infrastructure, and growing trade 
internationally and across the region which ultimately creates demand for insurance coverage. 
Government policy that obliged insurance of property served as a catalyst for the development of the 
insurance sector, since entities that were formerly self-insured were required to purchase insurance 
coverage. Furthermore, the growth of financial services, asset-based financing, such as housing and 
auto motors loans, leads to an increase in the demand for insurance products to mitigate the risks 
associated with the underlying assets. However, the report indicates that there was low access to 
insurance for informal households in Tanzania. The report suggests that low access was the result of 
delay in adopting new distribution methods and lack of public awareness.  
2.5   RATIONALE OF THE STUDY   
The review of the financial sector in Tanzania reveals challenges facing mainstreaming informal 
households into the formal financial system. Three issues manifest themselves from the review; 
firstly, access to formal financial services in the form of banking, social protection and private 
                                                          
19 TIRA stands for Tanzania Insurance Regulatory Authority 
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insurance is limited to households in the formal sector, suggesting informal household‘s access to 
financial services is poor. 
 
Secondly, effectiveness of traditional and informal social protection has been impaired by economic 
and political changes that have taken place since the colonial period (Mchomvu, et al. 2002). In 
addition, informal risk management strategies applied offer limited protection: - a low return to 
households and are ineffective during emergencies (see for example, Battamishra and Barret, 2008; 
Maleika and Kuriakose, 2008). Indeed, World Bank (2000) poverty studies acknowledge that 
economic and political liberalization, and globalization among other forces, increases informal 
household‘s vulnerability to facing more risks in developing countries. To address the problems, 
several studies and government policy are in favour of micro insurance (see for example, Wangwe 
and Tibandebage, 1999; URT, 2005; Steinwachs; 2002). In view of these facts it is worth 
investigating the micro insurance demand perspectives in the informal sector in Tanzania.  
 
Thirdly, though the concept of insurance is a formalization of the mutual help which exists in all 
cultures, the use of micro insurance can improve well-being of informal households by enabling 
them to manage risks. Furthermore, the insurance market in Tanzania is generally small and much of 
the untapped markets are in the informal sector. The development of micro insurance may also 
support insurance industry stability since the insurance sector depends on a few commercial policies 
which serve small groups. Given the size of their markets, insurers lack critical mass and typically 
have to place most of the risk with reinsurer.  
 
Undeniably, the review indicates that micro finance institutions provide a valuable link to 
mainstream informal households into formal financial services, including provision of micro 
insurance. Most micro insurance products that are available are mandatory. If a client takes out a 
loan, they are also required to pay an extra fee (the premium) for insurance protection. This works to 
the advantage of the MFI. Presumably, the availability of insurance reduces loan losses. However, it 
is hard to know: - if people would voluntarily choose to use these services and whether they are 
designed to meet the customers‘ needs. Hence, a customer-centered insurer need to conduct market 
research to understand what types of insurance customers might want (if any) and what product 
features are important to them (Cohen, et al. 2005). Therefore, to improve access to micro insurance 
services the investigation on demand perspectives is important. Now that the basis and rationale for 
the research have been explained, the next chapter reviews the literature and identifies the gaps that 
this study intends to fill. 
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CHAPTER THREE:  LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter is devoted to the literature review and gaps that this research attempts to fill. The 
purpose of which is to disentangle what is currently known about insurance demand and underscore 
unresolved issues on micro insurance demand in the informal sector which calls for further 
investigation. The chapter conceptualizes issues related to financial services access in the informal 
sector. Section 3.1 addresses the conceptual analysis on demand for financial services: - through 
review of the pertinent theories related to access to financial services. It critically analyses theories 
that explain low demand for financial services. Section 3.2 examines the insurance services in the 
informal sector, and this section explores the meaning of micro insurance and examines the 
importance of micro insurance services in the informal sector. Understanding the importance of 
micro insurance provides the basis for addressing the problem. Section 3.3 establishes the gaps in the 
literature on micro insurance demand in the informal sector by highlighting key areas of exploration 
in the present research. Finally, section 3.4 summarizes the chapter. 
3.1 THEORIES INFLUENCING DEMAND FOR FINANCIAL SERVICES 
The demand for financial services is the function of economic and financial sector growth. Theories 
related to economic growth suggest that poor access to financial services generates income 
inequality and poverty. They argued that access to financial services promotes growth, reduces 
poverty and makes redistribution more effective and sustainable. Indeed, Aghion and Bolton (1997), 
Banerjee and Newman (1993),  Galor and Zeira (1993), Aghion (et al. 1999), and Rajan and 
Zingales (2003) indicate that given financial market imperfections, poor households who have high 
marginal productivity of investment cannot invest in their education  and their occupational choices 
are limited because choices are determined by their initial endowments. The policy conclusion 
drawn by economic growth theories was to address financial market imperfections, without causing 
adverse incentive effects. They argue for financial sector reforms that promote financial service 
inclusion are the core for households‘ development and poverty reduction. 
 
On the other hand, Robinson (1952) argued that financial sector growth occurs when financial 
markets and financial institutions improve the effect of information, enforcement and transaction. 
Thus, the well-developed financial sector may be reflected through its efficiency and 
competitiveness, the range of financial services that are available, the diversity of institutions 
operating in the financial sector, the amount of money that is intermediated through the sector and 
the number of people having access to financial services. Studies by Lucas (1988) and McKinnon 
(1991) defined Robinson‘s view as a ―growth-led finance‖ hypothesis. The hypothesis states that 
high economic growth creates demand for certain financial instruments and financial markets 
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effectively respond to these demands and changes. In the demand following pattern, economic 
growth establishes demands for financial services, which is passively satisfied by a growing 
financial sector. Hence, rapid economic growth should increase the demand for financial services. 
According to this view the more rapid the growth of national income, the greater will be the demand 
by enterprises for external funds and other financial services. As the economy moves from 
traditional subsistence production; - and grows more complex, demands for financial services are 
generated. However, the impact on financial sector growth is not equally the same for the informal 
sector households (Beck et al. 2004; McCord, 2008; Rajan and Zingales, 1998). 
 
Financial services inclusion in insurance or any other financial service is achieved when all 
consumers, particularly informal households, can access and on a sustainable basis use financial 
services that are appropriate to their needs. The aim of financial inclusion is not only to ensure that 
users are not excluded from the formal sector, but that they actively use financial services. The 
empirical evidence which suggests a robust relationship between access to financial services and 
economic growth can be seen in Levine (1997, 1998 and 2005), Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic 
(1998), Rajan and Zingales (1998), Beck, et al. (2000), Townsend and Ueda (2006). Several other 
studies have shown that access to financial services is beneficial for poor households; it reduces 
income inequality (Beck, et al. 2004; Demirguc-Kunt, et al. 2008; Honohan, 2004).   
While theory focuses on the importance of broader access to financial services, there is relatively 
limited empirical evidence linking access to micro insurance in the informal sector and little 
guidance for policies on how best to promote access. Understanding micro insurance demand 
perspectives in the informal sector will fill the gap. Recently, Wachtel (2001) indicates that financial 
services promote economic growth through an efficient allocation of resources. First, the financial 
services act as fund-transferring mechanisms to channel the excess funds from surplus units to 
deficit units. Second, financial services encourage the mobilization of savings, which in turn 
promotes higher saving rates. Finally, financial services provide risk management instruments that 
enable risk-sharing. 
3.1.1 Role of financial services to the household wellbeing 
The attempt to establish inclusive financial services access was conducted by Beck, et al. (2008) and 
the results show that access is correlated with financial depth, but this correlation is not perfect, 
suggesting that there is no a one to one relationship between depth and access.  In a parallel effort, 
Peachey and Roe (2006), CGAP (2005) and Honohan (2005) collect information on the penetration 
of saving accounts on banks and MFIs across countries and present estimates of the share of 
households with access to financial services for over 150 countries. The study helps to produce 
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cross-country aggregate indicators for financial services access by households and document barriers 
that prevent expansion of this access. The results underline huge cross-country variations in hurdles 
associated with physical access, eligibility and affordability. 
However, Demirguc-Kut, et al. (2008) suggests that there are important demand-side factors that 
determine whether people access formal financial services. This finding provides experimental 
evidence showing the high returns on investment for micro entrepreneurs in the informal sector, thus 
suggesting that informal households are potentially profitable customers of banks. Indeed, CGAP 
(2005) describes dispersed demand for financial services as a constraint for access to financial 
services in the informal sector. Hence, carefully conducted household surveys can provide in-depth 
information on access to specific financial services for specific groups and countries.      
The lack of access to financial services for informal households is a fundamental flaw in the formal 
financial systems, since financial services play a significant role in efforts to reduce poverty. 
Rutherford (2000) argues that poor households need access to financial services, suggesting that 
households can benefit from credit savings, insurance services and money transfer facilities. In 
addition, Beck, et al. (2004) and Honohan (2004) show that countries with better developed financial 
systems experience faster reductions in income inequality and poverty levels. These studies indicate 
that even for the same average income, societies with deeper financial systems have lower levels of 
poverty. Micro insurance services help the poor manage their risks and improve their standards of 
living (ADB, 2005; Helms, 2006; United Nations, 2006). Thus, access to formal financial services 
can profoundly impact the quality of life of informal households (Rajan and Zingales, 2003; Yakub, 
2002). However, a significant proportion of people are excluded from the formal financial service in 
the informal sector.  Hence, the current investigation recommends design and policy interventions to 
build more inclusive micro insurance products in the informal sector.    
3.1.2 Low access to formal financial services in the informal sector 
This section highlights several issues regarding micro insurance demand in the informal sector. It is 
evident from the empirical studies (Preker, et al. 2002; McCord, 2008; ILO, 2002; Bendig and Arun, 
2011; Churchill, 2002) that the households in the informal sector lack effective risk management 
strategies to avoid the seasonal fluctuations in their earning levels due to risks. There were 
significant variations in the provision of financial services and access barriers in the informal sector. 
The concept of the informal sector in developed and developing economies remains analytically 
distinct. ILO (1991) argues that the informality in developed economies is part of capitalist search 
for flexibility in the use of labour and stems from the need to reduce or avoid the costs associated 
with the employment of formal labour. This is because informal economic activity in developed 
economies mainly relates to evading government taxes, control and regulations.  
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However, the informal sector is a phenomenon associated with survival strategies of the poor in 
developing countries (ILO, 1972, 1996, 1998). This thesis adopted the broader definition of the 
informal sector as introduced by ILO (1999) which understood an informal households to be; 
enterprises or units that are engaged in the production of goods and services, which are not 
constituted as separate legal entities independent of the household or household members that own 
them. They do not have a complete set of accounts which would permit a clear distinction between 
the production activities of the enterprises and the other activities of their owners, or the 
identification of any flows of income and capital between the enterprises and owners. The informal 
sector comprises informal own-account enterprises (self-employed) and enterprises of informal 
employers (employing one or more employees).  
 
The limited access to formal financial services in the informal sector is explained in terms of market 
failure. Firstly, the view that there is little profit in the informal sector; hence, market-based 
solutions cannot lead to improved financial services for informal households and that the private 
sector has no significant role in this market segment (Schrieder and Cuevas, 1992; Adams, 1992; 
Zeller, 1994). The same case has also been reported by surveys of credit markets in Kenya (Alila, 
1991; Daniels et al., 1995; Meyer, 2002). Besley (1994), analyses the rationale for interventions in 
the presence of market failure. He argued that as constraints vary across countries and are influenced 
by a host of factors, country investigation provides useful information. Host factors include but not 
limited to, the stage of financial sector development, perceptions of dominant financial institutions 
regarding the business case for providing financial services in the informal sector, financial policy 
and regulatory systems, and the institutional composition of the financial system. 
 
Secondly, established formal financial institutions seldom attempt to serve low-income households 
because the relative contribution that such a move can make to profit is smaller (Braverman and 
Guasch, 1986; Chipeta and Mkandawire, 1992; Aryeetey and Udry 1997). The long-held, deep-
rooted presumption that low income households demand for financial services is the primary 
responsibility of the governments and charitable organizations seem to have reinforced this incentive 
asymmetry. However, Beck and Demirguc-Kut (2008) suggest that the existence of alternative 
informal finance systems in the informal sector, providing services to their clients indicates that 
households are potentially profitable customers. 
 
Thirdly, the absence of formal financial institutions in close proximity to the informal households, 
hence households living in the areas where such facilities are not available within a reasonable 
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distance, tend to rely more on informal markets. Moreover, the available institutions which are in 
close proximity may not have a core business which includes products and services that low-income 
households demand. This suggests that formal institutions are not committed to serve the low 
income market, taking it as a business proposition. Empirical research by Aryeetey (1996) indicates 
that there are significant obstacles to the transformation of potential demand into revealed demand. 
The absence of supply creates a lack of demand expressed in low revealed demand. Again, due to 
market failure in the financial market, the transaction cost involved in obtaining a financial product 
is considered greater than the utility, prompting households to rely on informal systems as a way of 
financing working capital and managing risks. 
 
Fourthly, the established formal financial institutions have not been established and organized to 
serve the informal households. They do not have access to low-cost information on the potential 
clients. Their organizational structures, cost structures, and products are geared to serve formal 
sector clients. Given the higher costs generally associated with serving low-income clients, these 
financial institutions find that the impetus to serve the formal sector market is more powerful than 
moving to the low income market. Bell (1990) demonstrates that financial markets are characterized 
by imperfect information and high costs of contract enforcement that generates access problems. 
This is displayed in the form of complicated application procedures and restrictions (Schmidt and 
Kropp, 1987). Schmidt and Kropp argued that the type of financial institution and its policies will 
often determine the access problem, for example where credit duration, terms of payment, required 
security and the provision of supplementary services do not fit the needs of the target group, 
potential customers will not apply for financial products even where they exists and when they do, 
they will be denied access.  
 
Indeed, Eswaran and Kotwal (1990), Conning (1999) and Besley and Coate (1995) argued that 
incomplete markets could use partially functioning financial markets to provide insurance against 
income shocks mainly by trading insurance. However, due to incomplete information about the 
nature of the risk faced by each individual and possible change in the private behaviour of other 
individuals, insurance arrangements are only partial or are totally absent (Aryeetey, 1996; Aryeetey 
and Udry, 1997). Hence, managers of formal financial institutions who would like to introduce 
innovative products to serve poor clients for profit will often find it difficult to get their proposals 
through the resource allocation processes and systems within their institutions. The incompatibility 
of services and products offered by the suppliers with the requirements of those in the informal 
markets has aggravated the access problem. The incompatibility may stem from a number of factors, 
Saqware, PhD Thesis July 11, 2012 
  
44 
for example; the products may have features that are not in line with the socioeconomic 
characteristics of clients.  
 
This creates the fifth relevant issue that many households who belong to the informal sector tend to 
self-exclude from formal financial markets and rely on self-savings or reciprocal arrangements to 
meet their demand for financial services. Informal finance has been defined as referring to all 
financial services occurring outside the regulation of a central monetary authority, while the 
semiformal sector has the characteristics of both formal and informal sectors. It involves the  
operations of savings and credit associations, rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs), 
professional moneylenders, and  employers, relatives and friends, as well as cooperative societies 
(see for example, Aryeetey, et al. 1997; Aryeetey and Udry, 1997). The types of informal financial 
units vary mainly because they are purpose oriented and mostly developed to meet the demand for 
specific financial services, responding to the demands of a client group, defined by their use of 
various socioeconomic criteria. These types of informal systems are savings mobilization units with 
little or no lending; lending units that do not engage in any savings; and those units that combine 
deposit mobilization and lending (Aryeetey and Udry, 1997). Institutions that combine both are 
relatively new.  However; they respond to the need for direct financial intermediation and mostly fall 
under self-help organizations.  
 
Rajan and Zingales (1998) recommended two measures towards improved access to financial 
services. Firstly, to recognize the importance of inclusive financial services, as such recognition 
significantly influences and encourages a more proactive set of measures than otherwise would be 
the case. Secondly, eliminate financial exclusion in order to reduce poverty. These measures suggest 
that it is important to define the problem for successful provision of financial services in the informal 
sector. They further argued that defining the problem and recognizing informal sector households as 
potential clients for market-based financial services plays a significant role. Risk-sharing occurs 
through all financial services, but most explicitly to those identified as insurance products. The 
usefulness of insurance instruments especially for a household‘s poverty reduction strategy is the 
aim of this research. Hence, the next section provides an insight to access for insurance services.   
3.2 ACCESS TO INSURANCE SERVICES IN THE INFORMAL SECTOR 
Insurance provision against uncertainties is present in several dimensions of people‘s lives, with 
such provisions being related to, inter alia, diseases, unemployment, accidents, robbery and death. 
Formal insurance provisions can be organized in different forms. Popular insurance products are 
commercial private insurance, social protection (Public/State insurance) and micro insurance.  In 
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addition to these, there are traditional informal systems that act as important risk reducers for many 
people. In the latter form of insurance, the basic unit of risk share and diversification is the family, 
complemented by friends and help from relations and other non-family members. The various types 
of insurance are exemplified in more detail in figure 3.1 below; 
Figure 3.1: Various types of insurance provision 
Source: Author from availabe insurance services in Tanzania 
  
3.2.1 Social Protection (Social insurance and social assistance) 
Social protection is a term evolving with time, recently Holzmann and Jorgensen (2004) proposed 
the expanded view of social protection to emphasize the double role of risk management instruments 
protecting the livelihood as well as promoting risk taking. The World Bank (2001) defines social 
protection as a collection of measures to improve or protect human capital; it is the interventions that 
assist individuals, households and the community to better manage the income risks that leave 
people vulnerable. The social protection concept according to ILO (1997, 1998 and 2008), denotes 
any of the measures established by legislation to maintain and provide individuals‘ with  income 
when some or all sources of income are disrupted, or terminated or when exceptionally heavy 
expenditure has to be incurred. Nevertheless, the ultimate and overall goal of social protection is to 
improve welfare and reduce poverty.   
 
Social protection systems are a world-wide phenomenon usually in the form of social insurance and 
social assistance. The social protection goal can be achieved mainly in two ways; firstly measures 
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are directed at helping people escaping poverty and second measures aimed at providing a certain 
minimum income to those in poverty. These two measures are thought to belong to three conceptual 
areas; social assistance, social insurance and labour market institutions. Social assistance and social 
insurance (like health insurance, unemployment insurance, pension insurance) provide people with a 
minimum income. Some labour market regulations, for instance minimum wage and trade union 
activities have the same goal to provide people with a certain income above the minimum level or a 
level considered to be fair, but this is beyond our discussions. However, it is estimated that more 
than two billion people in the world are covered by any type of social protection, neither by a 
contribution-based social insurance scheme nor by tax-financed social assistance (van Ginneken, 
1997, 1998). While state or state initiated organizations cover most of the labour force in the 
organized sectors of public and industrial employment, the vast majority of the unorganized rural 
population and people in the informal urban sector are left out (Jenkins, 1993; Singh, 1994; Mesa-
Lago; 1991). 
 
Different efforts were made to bridge gaps by exploring the possibility of providing insurance to the 
informal sector households through social assistance and social insurance schemes. Studies by 
Beattie (2000) and Midgley (1984) admit that there are problems that limit the usefulness of social 
assistance programs to manage risks in the informal sector in developing countries; these are a lack 
of government resources, lack of appropriate policy making and administrative capacity as well as 
stigmatization of claimants. With regard to access through social insurance, Mesa-lago (1994) 
challenged the use of social insurance schemes and argued that three main factors can hinder using 
this technique which includes the  high cost of detecting, inspecting and collecting contributions 
from the large numbers of self-employed, both domestic workers and wage earners in micro 
enterprise and the fact that benefits available for them are irrelevant to their needs and are usually 
very small which reduces incentive for affiliation even more.  Indeed, the latest studies by Bailey 
(1994), Van Ginneken (1997, 1999), Midgley and Tracey (1996) and ILO-SAAT (1996) confirm the 
difficulties in extending risk management options to the informal sector households in developing 
countries in the form of social insurance and social assistance.   
Beside low coverage rates, social protection systems face serious financing and management 
challenges (Trecy, 1996). In most developing countries only a limited proportion of the population 
works in the modern sector in which employment contracts can be monitored and assessed for the 
purpose of contributions. The alternative, which is to use the tax base for personal enterprise income 
taxes and indirect taxes, is also limited, because it is difficult to collect direct taxes from informal-
sector workers and indirect taxes are generally insufficient to fund a generalized social protection 
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system. In addition, the effectiveness and efficiency of the organizations, which are in charge of 
collecting contributions and paying benefits, are often criticized. The administration of social 
protection systems is highly complex; keeping the records, ensuring the compliance of employers 
and employees, organizing an effective control of the agencies and in terms of the regulatory 
structure demands a well-functioning administrative structure. As indicated in Gillion (1997) and 
Holzman and Jorgenesen (1999) in many developing countries these arrangements are far from 
functioning properly. 
Economic and financial reforms in which several developing countries were found at the end of the 
1980s
20
 prompted governments to undertake strong measures to alleviate their budgetary difficulties. 
As a result, the proportion of the population which could be covered by social protection declined 
due to an expansion of the informal sector and the growth of public debt (Koptis, 1993). In this 
context there is a heated debate, as to whether a revision of the common social security type (as seen 
in Europe, for example a pay-as-you-go system) is adequate, or if one has to make a radical shift 
towards mandatory retirement saving schemes (World Bank 1994; Feldstein 1996; Diamond 1996; 
Siebert 1998). The overview of the tremendous problems of state based schemes clearly 
demonstrates the need to look for alternatives. This study therefore investigates, whether market 
based schemes can at least solve some of the problems raised above.  As discussed in chapter 2;- 
literature in Tanzania suggests that compulsory social insurance coverage is limited to formal sector 
employees and they are fragmented with low benefits to its members (Tungaraza, 1994; URT, 2003; 
Wangwe and Tibandebage, 1999). They provide predetermined benefits to members of the schemes 
including formally employed households and a limited number of informal households. Social 
assistance is provided by central government to households affected by covariate risks on a one off 
basis, usually those affected by natural disasters like hunger, flooded and epidemic diseases, and 
benefits are provided using a means test method. 
3.2.2 Traditional informal system  
The second type of insurance service is a traditional informal system characterized by private 
savings and group arrangement provision. They raise money only when idiosyncratic risk occurs 
through support from relatives, friends, loans from informal systems and sales of assets in their 
possession. The literature on traditional informal systems on the organization and administrative 
structures suggest that over-time, socio-economic reforms have slowly resulted in the disintegration 
of family-based structures. For example Bossert (1988), Bakari (1988), Mataba (1983), Tungaraza 
(1994), and Benda-Beckmann, et al. (1988) have shown that social relations among the family, the 
kinships, and neighbourhood and community groups operate in both urban and rural areas however, 
                                                          
20 See chapter two of this thesis for more detailed information. 
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they are decreasing due to socio-economic changes and in fact they have failed to promote equitable 
economic growth. Indeed, Morduch (1999a), Roth (2001) and Maleika and Kurikose (2008) indicate 
that households rely on informal mechanisms such as gifts or loans provided by family, friends or 
employers in times of crisis, nevertheless, most of this protection is inadequate. These schemes are 
characterized by their non-governmental, non-profit nature where often informal households 
voluntarily pool resources towards protection against one or more types of risk. They argued that 
informal risk management approaches available within the informal sector offer limited protection, 
low returns for households and are ineffective during emergencies.  
3.2.3 Private insurance 
As noted in 3.1.3, the studies highlighted that the protection available for informal households from 
the market based systems is marginal. However, risk protection based on market principles is 
gaining importance world-wide, especially in the health sector. A study by Berman (1998) shows 
that, in the case of health care provision, it is acknowledged that the private sector contributes to 
better access, efficiency and quality of  services. Because neither the state nor the market can 
provide sufficient risk protection to informal households in developing countries, member based 
organizations and self-insurance act as complements or as substitutes for the government and the 
private sector (Lam 1996; Ostrom 1996; Uphoff 1993; Thorbecke 1993; Gurenko, 2004).  
 
 Recognizing the limited range of formal risk management arrangements in the informal sector, 
countries have instituted various types of insurance, price stabilization and safety net programs, 
often at great cost and with modest success. Such innovations focus overwhelmingly on covariate 
risks for example prices, drought, and floods. However, a growing body of empirical evidence 
suggests that idiosyncratic risk may be as important and dominant within informal households (see 
for example Udry, 1990; Townsend, 1995b; Deaton, 1997; Lybbert, et al. 2004; Morduch, 2005; 
Dercon, 2005; Kazianga and Udry, 2006). The high incidence of idiosyncratic shocks faced by 
households in the informal sector raises the possibility of untapped potential demand for micro 
insurance in developing countries.    
3.2.4 Micro insurance 
The preceding discussion suggests that, both state and market-based systems as well as member and 
private household-based systems have intrinsic - albeit different - strengths and weaknesses. The 
question arises as to what extent the provision of risk management instruments can be organized in a 
complementary way. The idea of organizing synergy, partnership and coproduction in the provision 
of insurance has for some time been a major component in the discussions of welfare reform in 
industrialized countries. Recently, the debate has been extended to apply to developing countries 
Saqware, PhD Thesis July 11, 2012 
  
49 
(Robinson and White, 1997; UNCDF, 2000; URT, 2001) and micro insurance was the preferred 
option. Loewe, (2002, 2006) consider micro insurance as a social security instrument that improves 
wellbeing of the low-income households. In this case, micro insurance focuses on extending social 
protection to the informal sector households in the absence of appropriate government schemes. 
However, Churchill (2006) defines micro insurance as a risk management technique for households 
against specific risks in exchange for regular premium payments in proportion to the probability and 
cost of the risk involved. 
 It appears that there are two dimensions of the micro insurance concept derived from the definition, 
first the concept of micro insurance as a social protection instrument. The proponents of these 
arguments argued that informal households have little or no security of employment, and have low 
earnings and their incomes do fluctuate. Whenever they are unable to work for whatever reason they 
have no income security. A brief period of incapacity can leave the worker and her/his family 
without enough income to live on. The sickness of a family member can result in costs which 
destroy the delicate balance of the households‘ budget (Milinga, 2002; Cohen, et al. 2005; Cohen 
and Sebstand, 2005). To reduce poverty and vulnerability of low income households there is an 
emerging consensus among IADB (2000), ADB (2005), World Bank (2001), ILO (2000) and 
Holzmann (2001) to include micro insurance within the social protection framework.  
The  major motivation for social protection interest in micro insurance is that certain households 
have been excluded from existing insurance schemes because  (i) formal insurers have done little to 
reach out to those segments which are outside the formal economy (for example low income 
households, informal sectors, rural households and some formal sector employees (ii) the excluded 
group lack the empowerment and capacity to access formal insurance (iii) there is the need to extend  
and strengthen risk and resource pooling at different levels to help excluded households take 
advantage of potential benefits of risk and resource pooling.  Micro insurance is essentially a variety 
of strategies to overcome these obstacles. However, micro insurance demand perspectives has been 
limited by a small research base and much of the existing literature on micro insurance focuses on 
supply and institutional issues (McCord, 2001; McCord and Osinde, 2005). 
Secondly, the concept of micro insurance focused on developing an appropriate business model that 
enables the poor to be a profitable (or sustainable) market segment for commercial or cooperative 
insurers. In this case insurance companies have to design a micro insurance product for households 
who are engaged in informal sector activities (Van Ginneken, 1997). This means that commercial 
insurers perceive micro insurance as a potential instrument to reach underserved markets. Arun and 
Steiner (2008) argued that commercial insurers in Ghana regard micro-insurance to be a way to 
expand their market reach and secure future profits, but not in Sri-Lanka. The definition of micro 
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insurance is essentially the same as private insurance except micro insurance is clearly for a 
prescribed target market. McCord and Churchill (2005) indicates a distinction between private 
insurance and micro insurance on six points i) clients ii) distribution models iii) policies iv) premium 
collection, v) control of insurance (moral hazards and adverse selection) and vi) claims handling.  
Regardless of which dimension to view micro insurance, the intention is to provide protection to an 
uninsured population. In essence, micro insurance has the same purpose as conventional insurance, 
to allow the customer whether an individual or a business entity to transfer risk and purchase the 
security they need to grow their business. Micro insurance demand in the informal sector with the 
promise of profits and welfare gains to households has to find ways of balancing three competing 
objectives a) provide coverage to meet the needs of the target population b) minimize operational 
costs to the insurer c) minimize the price including the transaction costs for clients to enhance 
affordability and accessibility. For the present discussion we adopt a broad definition of micro 
insurance as an aspect of insurance for managing risks among low-income households in the 
informal sector. The study considers micro insurance to play a dual role that is both developing an 
ideal business model and a valuable social protection instrument for informal sector households.   
3.2.4.1 Why are micro insurance services needed in the informal sector   
The developments in insurance reforms (see discussion in chapter two), were found to have less 
effect in the informal sector. As a result Churchill (2002), Hess and Sykora (2005),  and Hochrainer 
et al. (2007) pointed out that informal households throughout the world face twin disadvantages; 
first is the difficulty in generating regular income while the second is vulnerability to economic, 
political and physical downturns. Indeed, Ahuja and Jutting (2004),  Hoeppe and Gurenko (2006) 
and Linnerooth-Bayer and Mechler (2006) argued that informal households are more vulnerable to 
risky events than the formal sector workers given their working environment, their economic 
activities, and these risks impede their efforts from breaking the vicious cycle of poverty. Thus, any 
risk management strategy will reduce poverty and improve the informal household‘s wellbeing.   
 
Studies by Brown and Churchill (1999, 2000), CGAP (2003a, 2003b), CPRIC (2004) and MRF 
(2006) considered micro insurance as one of the financial risk management strategies that can help 
the low income household to deal with risk effectively. The presence of risks strongly influences 
household economic behaviour; they engage in low-productive activities because they are less risky 
and the potential consequences of failure are lower (Wood, 2003).  In this way, households are 
frequently constrained to a basic livelihood or subsistence approach for survival which, in turn, 
promotes the development of poverty traps. An effective risk management tool is necessary for 
household development. The effects of access to micro insurance services are twofold; access to 
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insurance services increases the risk bearing capacity of the households. Insurance covering sickness 
or death of a working family member can help to avoid severe shortfall on household earned income, 
and also decreases the use of costly informal self-insurance techniques. Figure 3.2 illustrates the 
effect of micro insurance to the household wellbeing.  
Figure 3.2: Effect of micro insurance to the household wellbeing  
 
 
Source: Author synthesis of the effect of micro insurance service 
This underscores the critical importance of micro insurance in the informal sector. Micro insurance 
reduces poverty by reducing income swings, fostering long-term investment in human capital and 
compensating against risk exposures. Studies by Young (2006), Besley (1995a), Townsend (1995),  
Morduch (1995; 1999b), Bardhan and Udry (1999),  Dercon, (2002; 2005), Osgood and Warren, 
(2007) and De Waal, et al. (2004) argued that insurance reduces vulnerability as households replace 
the uncertain prospect of large losses with the certainty of making small, regular premium payments.  
It is within this context that Tanzania needs to extend micro insurance cover to informal sector 
households. To do so, there is a need to understand the micro insurance demand perspectives in the 
informal sector. The next section provides unresolved issues in the literature which warrant further 
investigation.  
3.3 GAPS IN THE LITERATURE 
Previous studies on micro insurance demand in the informal sector have their own limitations and 
challenges. Firstly, there is no study on the literature that comprehensively covers the micro 
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insurance demand perspectives in Tanzania. The evidence that micro insurance techniques can 
improve informal household well-being indicated by Wangwe and Tibandege (1999), URT (2005), 
and Steinwachs (2002) is a key starting point of this thesis. However, Brown (2000) and Brown and 
McCord (2000) argued that before developing micro insurance products, demand aspects must be 
well understood. Micro insurance demand studies undertaken by Dercon (2002), Brown (2001) and 
Hulme and Shepherd (2003) discuss the risk and vulnerability, and their link with poverty. These 
studies attempt to determine people‘s livings conditions and opportunities to escape poverty. The 
studies summarize effects of shocks to the household and suggest new strategies. However, these 
studies do not have sufficient quantitative data to support the argument. Indeed, Churchill‘s (2006) 
publication represents the most extensive analysis of micro insurance practices around the world. 
The book was prepared under the auspices of the Micro insurance Consultative Group to Assist the 
Poor (CGAP) initiated by the International Labour Organization (ILO). Generally this publication 
reveals that micro insurance is indeed viable and even profitable under certain circumstances, but 
argued that a number of difficulties must be overcome for it to succeed in any given country.  
 
Park and Lemaire (2011) argued that factors linked to the culture of the nations are more important 
in explaining demand for insurance. In fact, Hofstede (1995; 2001) point out that the level of 
insurance within an economy depends on the national culture and the willingness of individuals to 
use insurance as a means of dealing with risk. In addition, Treerattanapun (2011) investigates the 
impact of culture on non‐life insurance consumption and finds out that nations with a low degree of 
power distance, a high level of individualism, and a high degree of uncertainty avoidance tend to 
have a high level of non‐life insurance consumption. The empirical results suggest that consumers 
may respond to insurance solicitations according to their cultural belief, not only according to 
economic rationality hence the need to investigate micro insurance demand in the context of 
Tanzania. 
 
Moreover, Esho, et al. (2004) argued that increased national income influences insurance demand. 
The study tested the impact of national income on the demand for property and life insurance by 
analysing data from developed and developing nations. They detect a strong positive relationship 
between national income and non-life insurance demand. Similarly, Enz, (2000) developed a logistic 
model to describe the relationship between insurance penetration and GDP per capita. Under these 
growth models, the regression curves for insurance depict an S-shaped relationship and have been 
referred to as the S-curve model.  The insurance penetration rises with the GDP per capita, but 
different levels of GDP are assumed to be accompanied by different growth rates of penetration. 
After the GDP reaches a certain level, the insurance penetration tends to plateau. This hypothesis 
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cannot easily be visualized on a cross-section of countries, hence Enz emphasized that the estimation 
requires a very long time series and the model neglects all factors influencing the demand for 
insurance other than GDP per capita.  In Tanzania, following economic reforms in the 1990s to-date, 
there are noticeable increases in national income as well as an expansion of the financial sector (as 
discussed in chapter two). Despite this, insurance penetration in the informal sector is at minimal 
level suggesting that national income alone cannot determine insurance consumption. 
 
Secondly, there is evidence that previous studies have constantly shown variations in the results on 
micro insurance demand from country to country (Magnoni, and Zimmerman, 2011; McCord, et al. 
2011; Sebstad, et al. 2006; Dalal and Morduch, 2010). It appears from the studies that some factors 
influencing the demand for insurance have been extensively studied, while some have not; there are 
also conflicting conclusions on how various factors affect the demand for micro insurance such as 
age, family size and education. These contradicting conclusions result from different datasets, 
variable measurements and methodology used; hence there is room for further investigation. Indeed, 
most studies that have examined micro insurance demand in the informal have been undertaken on 
East Asia (Churchill, 2006; Dror and Jacquir, 1999; Morduch and Sharma; 2001) and the main focus 
appears to be on micro finance clients (Dror, et al. 2007; Cohen and Sebstad, 2006; Sebstad et al. 
2006; Gine et al. 2007). Cohen and Sebstad (2005) highlight the need to examine clients‘ insurance 
needs, specific products and the size of the potential market. Analysing demand studies from nine 
countries they found that the most prevalent risks relate to health or loss of the wage earner. 
However, despite these patterns, households‘ priorities regarding demand for insuring certain risks 
are nevertheless context specific and solid research is essential before entering any market.  The 
study finds huge variations on clients‘ needs from one country to another. This thesis probes this 
matter with regard to Tanzania.  
Garven (2003) explored the demand for insurance in the context of the logarithmic utility function. 
The result shows that the level of wealth, the probability of the occurrence of risk, the severity of 
loss due to the occurrence of risk, and the insurance premium determine the demand for insurance of 
an individual. However, in the case of the informal sector households, a disadvantaged sector in 
many societies, other demand factors are more compelling than the determinants outlined in this 
study. For example a study by Wagstaff (2009, 2010) and the World Bank (2000) which compiled 
literature on poverty, describe additional concepts that influence demand for insurance, and they 
suggest that households are increasingly risk averse as they move closer to poverty, as any further 
drop in income can push them below the survival point. According to these findings households with 
a higher value for future protection than current consumption are more likely to purchase insurance. 
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The work by Outreville (1996) emphasizes that education promotes an understanding of risk and 
hence insurance demand.  In line with Baek and DeVaney (2004) who examined the effect of human 
capital bequest motives and risk on term and cash value life insurance purchased by households. The 
authors explained that higher educated people believe that inflation often decreases the cash value of 
insurance from a savings standpoint and hence decline their need for insurance. Indeed, Leftley and 
Mapfumo (2006) and McCord (2001, 2008) identified that lack of understanding of insurance 
products is a constraint in selling insurance to poor households. More educated households have 
been found to be the ones who are more likely to take up insurance (Chankova, et. al, 2008; Gine et. 
al, 2007) while Anderson and Nevin (1975) found a negative relationship between education and the 
amount of life insurance purchased by households. These contradicting results suggest the same 
factors may provide different results when applied to different countries. Radermacher, et al. (2006) 
argued that constraints in the uptake of insurance products relates to the issue of trust, as unlike 
micro credit where lenders have to trust the borrowers; in micro insurance, insurers have to be 
trusted by the client. Hence, McCord (2008) suggested that trust of individuals and communities can 
be built by education programs or through careful marketing and sales strategies.  
 
Thirdly, the literature on micro insurance demand appears to have an overwhelming focus on micro 
finance clients (see for example, Morduch, 1999b, 1998; Morduch and Sharma, 2001; Siegel, e al. 
2001; Cohen and Sebstad, 2006; Sebstad et al. 2006; Gine et al. 2007; Sebstad and Cohen, 1999). 
Micro finance introduces risk management products that can protect their clients and save their own 
interests. Household individual demand perspectives with respect to demand are not given much 
attention. This significant gap between need and want creates a number of issues for micro insurance 
providers. For example, they might estimate the need and likely resultant demand, for insurance by 
identifying a large population that lacks formal risk coping mechanisms and examine insurable risks 
faced by that population. Yet without developing a good understanding of the factors that influence a 
household‘s demand for micro insurance, these estimates commonly have no link to reality 
(McCord, et al. 2011). This study had gone one step further to analyse demand beyond micro 
finance clients and therefore include household survey for both members and non-members of 
MFI‘s. 
 
Moreover, Cohen and Sebstad (2005) argued that market penetrations are largely driven by supply 
and not demand. This finding employs qualitative methods and primarily clients of micro finance 
institutions (MFI‘s) were interviewed. The team spent nearly two weeks in each country, studying 
demand through focus group discussions and interviews with key stakeholders. The findings have a 
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methodological inadequacy, and the number of people interviewed and time limits the outcome.  
Indeed, this study argued that effective demand is more subjective and  many factors can influence a 
client‘s decision, these includes; the extent to which the needs are felt, self-evaluation of capacity to 
pay, preferences of specific product features, previous experience and altitude towards insurance. 
This research presented three generic micro insurance products to respondents which ultimately 
allowed the author to analyse the contribution of each of the decision making characteristics.   
 
Fourthly, another problem inherent in the literature on micro insurance is the challenges related to 
mainstreaming the informal sector into the formal financial system. The available empirical studies 
are limited to banking services (Levine, 1997, 2005; Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998; Rajan 
and Zingales, 1998; Beck, et al. 2000; Wachtel, 2001). Indeed, literature on access to insurance 
services has looked at access through social insurance and social assistance schemes (Mchomvu, et 
al. 2002; Battamishra and Barret, 2008; Maleika and Kuriakose, 2008; World Bank, 2000). There is 
relatively little empirical evidence linking access to micro insurance in the informal sector and little 
guidance for policies on how best to promote access.  This is a remarkable situation considering the 
importance of access to insurance services to the households‘ wellbeing as shown in several studies 
(see for example, Besley, 1995c; Townsend, 1995a; Morduch, 1995; 1999a; Bardhan and Udry, 
1999; Dercon, 2002; 2005; Beck, et al. 2004; Honohan and Beck, 2007;  Wangwe and Tibandege, 
1999; URT, 2005; and Steinwachs, 2002).  The current investigation fills the gap.  Moreover, the 
literature has shown the insurers‘ view that there is little profit in the informal sector (Schrieder and 
Cuevas, 1992; Adams, 1992; Alila, 1991; Daniels et al., 1995; Besley, 1994; Braverman and Guasch 
1986; Chipeta and Mkandawire, 1992; Aryeetey, et al. 1997). This dominant thinking has 
contributed to a business failure in serving this market problem. Hence, the need for a market-based 
empirical study that can lead to improved access to financial services in the informal sector.  
 
Fifthly, the literature has identified inadequacy of informal strategies with significant gaps in full 
protection. For example, De Weerdt and Dercon (2005, 2006) and Mataba (1983) suggest that 
households devised a number of ways to mitigate their impact and cope with risk. These studies 
documented risk-coping strategies employed by households; they find that risk-sharing in the form 
of private gifts, labour transfers, loans and help through local community-based organizations are the 
main coping strategy. The dependence on informal arrangements to tide them through periods of 
hardship brought on by frequent and often severe risk exposure indicates the absence of appropriate 
formal insurance products and suggests the potential for micro insurance demand. Similarly, Zeller, 
et al. (1997) and Sebstad and Cohen (2001) indicate that micro insurance products can be 
appropriate to assist capital accumulation, to help smooth consumption, and improve risk-bearing in 
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the informal sector. However, Brown (2001) argued that it is important to consider the nature of the 
risk facing informal households, and compare and contrast risk management techniques in place and 
examine the demand for micro insurance services in the informal sector. 
   
3.4 SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER  
The chapter has established the gaps in the literature on micro insurance demand, and different 
conceptual understanding of micro insurance and its importance in the informal sector were 
examined. The current study argues that previous empirical studies present with some important 
methodological gaps; most of the available empirical findings are based on qualitative information 
concerning possible solutions, through a simplified representation of the problem. This gap in 
literature on micro insurance demands inhibits informal household protection and goes untapped.  
 
Recently, Msuya, et al. (2007) explicitly provides empirical evidence of the efficacy of micro 
insurance in Tanzania. In addition to the weaknesses of informal strategies to manage risks indicated 
in Mchomvu, et al. (2002), Battamishra and Barret (2008), Maleika and Kuriakose (2008) and the 
World Bank (2000). This evidence from the field validates further research on micro insurance. 
Indeed, the micro-insurance market is new and not well researched in Tanzania.  As a result, insurers 
are often most interested in understanding the factors that may or may not influence micro insurance 
demand.  
 
This PhD thesis on micro insurance demand perspectives in the informal sector has the potential to 
close the gap, as it addresses the important research questions; why people buy or do not buy micro 
insurance products, for which risks and for whom can micro insurance provide better value in terms 
of appropriateness (coverage demanded) and convenience compared to, or in combination with, 
other risk management options. The gaps in literature outlined in this chapter provide an important 
conceptual framework to be adopted. The next chapter discusses and rationalizes the conceptual 
framework used to analyse the findings.   
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CHAPTER FOUR: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
The main objective of this chapter is to explain and justify the conceptual framework adopted. The 
framework offers a re-conceptualization of the nature of micro insurance demand in the informal 
sector by critically revisiting the traditional insurance demand theories.  This is a significant part of 
the research, as it brings about issues related to insurance demand. As observed by Morduch and 
Sharma (2001b), Siegel, et al. (2001) and Lee (1999) there is a growing recognition of the need for 
insurance in the informal sector.  
The chapter is divided into three main sections. Section 4.1 addresses the pertinent theories related to 
insurance demand. Section 4.2 discusses and critically analyses the framework for understanding 
micro insurance demand; - In this section the conceptual framework is presented, the purpose of 
which is to properly contextualize the processes in understanding micro insurance demand. In 
section 4.3 a summary of the chapter is provided. 
4.1  INDIVIDUAL DEMAND FOR INSURANCE 
The theory underpinning the individual demand for insurance has received considerable scholarly 
attention. An extensive review goes beyond the aims of this research. Instead we touch on the more 
important works to establish the framework for this study. The purpose of this research is to suggest 
consideration of an alternative description of choice behaviour by informal households. Several 
studies have indicated that the individual purchase of insurance can be explained by three theoretical 
concepts. 
 Firstly, individual demand for insurance may come from bequest reasons. Studies by Ando and 
Modigliani (1963), Friedman (1957) and Modiglian (1992) shows that the consumption pattern of 
consumers is expected to fluctuate over their lifetime and income is expected to drop substantially 
during old age. Hence, precautionary savings occur in response to uncertainty regarding future 
income. This suggests that the demand for life insurance and annuities can further smooth 
consumption. Life insurance can absorb all fluctuations in lifetime income. Hence the same effective 
consumption pattern could be achieved through the appropriate use of life insurance as could be 
achieved if the time of death were known with certainty. If the primary bread earner dies 
prematurely, the insurer pays a lump sum (the death benefit) representing the present value of the 
human capital of the primary bread earner to the beneficiaries. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that 
the individual human capital, such as their education and employment status, would influence the 
demand for insurance. Moreover, Modiglian (1975, 1976) and Modigliani and Brumberg (1990) 
indicate that individual level of income motivates certain types of insurance products. An individual 
starts with a low income during the early years of one‘s working life, then income increases until it 
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reaches its highest point before retirement, and income during retirement is substantially lower. 
Therefore, young households with a lower income may desire a lower cost term life insurance. In 
contrast, older households may be less risk averse and want less life insurance because they have 
already accumulated a certain amount of wealth.  
Secondly, individual demand for insurance can be explained by the impact of risk to individual 
wealth as indicated in expected utility theory (Yaari, 1965). Expected utility theory suggests that 
choices are coherently and consistently made by weighing outcomes (gains or losses) of actions 
(alternatives) by their probabilities (with payoffs assumed to be independent of probabilities). 
Expected utility theory is based on three fundamental tenets about the processes that occur during 
decisions made under risk and uncertainty; (1) consistency of preferences for alternatives; (2) 
linearity in assigning of decision weights to alternatives; and (3) judgment in reference to a fixed 
asset position. This theory indicates  three  elements; first the nature of utility which is directly 
related to the individual‘s degree of risk aversion, and the higher the degree of risk aversion, the 
greater the premium an individual will be willing to pay in excess of expected loss. Second are the 
size of the losses relative to initial wealth and the probability of loss.  An individual will pay a larger 
risk premium to eliminate losses as a percentage of wealth than for small losses to cover a higher 
probability of loss. The third element is initial wealth, usually presented from the perspectives that 
wealthy people may be less willing to buy insurance as their utility curve is fairly flat at their level of 
wealth.  It appears from expected utility theory that the choice to purchase insurance is associated 
with certainty and a higher level of expected utility.  
Thirdly, individual demand for insurance can be explained by expected gain from use of insurance 
products as indicated by Tversky and Kahneman (1992). This study challenged expected utility 
theory, and states that the choice is about the prospect of gains or losses, and not the level of 
uncertainty. According to prospect theory, choice is a two-stage process. In its first phase (framing), 
alternatives are edited and values are attached to outcomes and weights to probabilities. Choices are 
adjusted to their current wealth from a personal reference point. They tend to be risk averse toward 
adjustments seen as gains, and risk seeking toward adjustments seen as losses from this point.  In the 
second phase, similar to expected utility theory, the edited alternatives are evaluated. In this case 
decision makers tend to overweigh unlikely events and underweight likely events when assigning 
probabilities and they do not adequately distinguish between large numbers. When losses are at 
stake, however, individuals prefer uncertainty. That is, when given a choice between a certain loss 
and an uncertain loss of the same expected magnitude, individuals tend to prefer the uncertain loss. 
Indeed, prospect theory differs from expected utility theory because it replaces the notion of ―utility‖ 
with ―value.‖ Whereas utility is usually defined only in terms of net wealth, value is defined in terms 
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of gains and losses (deviations from a reference point). Moreover, the value function for losses is 
different than the value function for gains.  
These differences lead to several noteworthy results. For instance, a loss of £500 is felt more than a 
gain of £500. Unlike expected utility theory, prospect theory predicts that preferences will depend on 
how a problem is framed. If the reference point is defined such that an outcome is viewed as a gain, 
then the resulting value function will be concave and decision makers will tend to be risk averse. On 
the other hand, if the reference point is defined such that an outcome is viewed as a loss, then the 
value function will be convex and decision makers will be risk seeking. The point from which an 
individual perceives gains and losses to occur influences the choice, which means additional factors 
need to be included as  insurance decisions may not only be affected by risk aversion but also by the 
access motive of insurance. 
 
The risk management literature examining purchase of insurance assumes the underlying sources of 
individual demand for insurance is risk aversion. Although risk aversion is unquestionably at the 
heart of the demand for insurance by individuals, it provides an unsatisfactory basis for analysing the 
demand for micro insurance in the informal sector. As mentioned above, this assumption is 
frequently made by researchers who model the demand for insurance, (see for instance, Mayers and 
Smith 1983; Mossin, 1968; Borch, 1960; Doherty and Schlesinger, 1990; Kunreuther, 1996; Zietz, 
2003). The literature is based on the assumption that those insured‘s form more accurate estimates of 
the probability of loss parameters than insurers (see for instance, Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976; 
Wilson, 1977; Miyazaki, 1977; Pauly, 1974; Smith, 1968; Kunreuther, 1984). These models, while 
leading to different results in some aspects, all suggest  that a low risk for those insured‘s will result 
in the purchase of less insurance in a market with adverse selection than in a market free of 
adversity.  
4.2  UNDERSTANDING MICRO INSURANCE DEMAND IN THE INFORMAL SECTOR 
The analysis of the demand for micro insurance by informal households becomes significantly more 
complicated than traditional insurance theory conveys (Islam and Mamun, 2005).  The demand for 
micro insurance requires an analysis on the dynamics of the individual income process and an 
evaluation of the complementary and substitute institutions that determine their financial behaviour. 
The divergence from traditional insurance demand theory and practice results from five areas, the 
first on the supply and demand side, the second is risk exposures, culture and informal schemes in 
place, mistake and incomplete hypothesis and growth in micro finance schemes. The five areas 
identified are useful in developing a conceptual framework. This framework is a contribution to 
Saqware, PhD Thesis July 11, 2012 
  
60 
theories for understanding of micro insurance demand. The framework is presented in figure 4.1 
below. 
  Figure 4.1: Conceptual framework 
   
Source: Author derived from various literature reviews  
4.2.1 DEMAND AND SUPPLY FACTORS  
Analytically, factors that influence micro insurance demand can be divided into supply-side and 
demand-side factors. Whether a households demands and is willing to buy insurance depends on the 
perceived difference between the level of expected utility with insurance and expected utility 
without insurance (Kirigia, et al. 2005). Moreover, consumer theory assumes that if consumers are 
perfectly informed, they maximize their utility as a function of consuming various goods, given 
relative prices, their income and preferences.  
 
However, due to uncertainty about the unknown, future insurance choice is not made based on utility 
alone, but on consumers‘ socio-economic characteristics (Cameron, et al. 1988; Doherty and 
Eeckhoudt, 1995). A household‘s socio-economic factors include income level, age, marital status 
and family size. Most of the research indicates that there is a strong relationship regarding certain 
demographic characteristics of the household and use of micro insurance. For example, Bendig and 
Arun (2011), Browne and Kim (1993), Outreville (1996) and Giesbert, et al. (2011) studied the 
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relationship between demand for insurance and level of income; they claimed that the capacity to 
afford an insurance premium is directly connected to one‘s level of income. Demand for micro 
insurance is determined by the ability to pay membership contributions or premiums. They argued 
that lack of money is indeed a major reason why households do not purchase micro insurance 
products.   
  
Indeed, Matul (2005) pointed out that education has a remarkable impact on the access to micro 
insurance. Households with a low level of education think that they do not require insurance, 
probably due to lack of confidence in insurers and poor understanding of the risk-pooling concept. In 
some cases, the views of poor people about insurance are negative. They see it as the reserve for the 
rich; something that is irrelevant, too expensive or even unfair (McCord and Osinde, 2005; Cohen 
and Sebstad, 2005; Churchill and Manje, 2002; Matul, 2005; McCord, 2008). These studies argued 
that people‘s limited understanding affects negatively the acceptance of the insurance rationale.  
 
They further indicate that people join micro-insurance arrangements based on the principle of 
‗balanced reciprocity‘. This means that members expect a roughly equal return from their 
contribution or payment, rather than being guided by a true logic of mutual insurance, with winners 
and losers through income redistribution being thought of as ‗lucky‘ and ‗unlucky‘ individuals.  
Moreover, Osei and Gemegah (2011) and Norton (2000) assert that problems of limited consumer 
rationality limit demand for insurance. For example, individuals may have difficulty understanding 
low-probability, high loss and/or simply avoid having to think about the unpleasant possibility of 
ending up with financial losses. This view argues that limited financial literacy serves as an 
important barrier to demand for services; if individuals are not familiar or comfortable with 
products, they will not demand them. 
 
On the supply side, insurance product features encourages informal household demand for micro 
insurance. Indeed, Sinha (2002) and Sebstad, et al. (2006) argued that product characteristics are a 
crucial element for micro insurance demand. These features include but not limited to; proximity, 
household expectation and the flexible payments and collection of affordable premiums. Since most 
of the informal households do not have a regular income, providing insurance to them requires the 
proper structuring of its price (premiums) in terms of cost, flexibility of payments and ease of 
collection. Similarly, even if the potential benefit of micro insurance is seen, there is no utility in 
insurance if an informal sector household has no geographical access to health facilities.  The non-
availability of quality health care services (including lack of drugs and other quality deficits) 
negatively affects demand for health insurance (Carrin, et al. 2005; Blumberg, et al. 2001). Thus if 
Saqware, PhD Thesis July 11, 2012 
  
62 
informal sector workers perceive quality of health care as a problem, health insurance membership 
will be less attractive to them. In addition, issues such as trust, including prompt payment of claims 
and the expected benefits or value of micro-insurance products, remains very important variable that 
influences the decision of households to subscribe to micro insurance. For instance, if low-income 
earners trust that insurers will honour their legal responsibilities by making prompt payments for 
claims when necessary, then they will be encouraged to buy micro-insurance products (McCord, 
2008; McCord and Osinde, 2005).  Therefore it can be argued that lack of credibility and trust in the 
insurance business negatively affects demand for micro insurance.  
4.2.2 RISK EXPOSURE   
Risk exposures are of first-order importance in the informal sector, particularly when its occurrence 
causes poverty or disrupts household‘s wellbeing. Riskier individuals are more likely to purchase the 
insurance given a premium and benefits (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976). The comprehensive review 
of development literature provides empirical and theoretical descriptions of risk exposure and its 
consequences to household‘s wellbeing. These include studies by Alderman and Paxson (1994, 
1995), Besley (1995b), Townsend (1995), Morduch (1995; 1999a), Bardhan and Udry (1999), and 
Dercon (2002; 2005).   
Indeed, Azariadis and Stachurski (2004) argued that the poverty traps hypothesis carries important 
implications for the study and management of risk exposures. The hypothesis increasingly draws 
attention as an explanation for persistent underdevelopment of households. It indicates that 
households below a certain income or wealth threshold may remain trapped in a low-level 
equilibrium. Thus, if this sort of poverty trap exists, the households may not recover quickly, or at 
all, from risk exposures.  The empirical research finds considerable persistence in the effects of risk 
exposures, especially among the poor, (see for example, Alderman, et al. 2006; Carter, et al. 2007; 
Dercon, et al. 2006; Jalan and Ravallion, 2005; Dercon, 2005). These studies indicate that recovery 
from major risk exposures is commonly slow or non-existent. They argued that health risk exposures 
appear to have especially important effects; they are overwhelmingly the most frequent cause of 
descents into long-term poverty. Risk exposures and their effects create demand for micro insurance 
techniques to reduce poverty especially among informal sector households. 
Studies by Bardhan, et al. (2000), Carter and Barrett (2006) indicate that there exist several distinct 
relationships between risk and poverty. They argue that if household‘s exhibit decreasing absolute 
risk aversion that is, if aversion to risk decreases as wealth increases, then households will pay a 
relatively greater premium to avoid risk than will wealthier people. In equilibrium, this leads to 
divergence in expected incomes as the poor households choose lower risk, and lower expected return 
portfolios than does those who begin with greater wealth.   Due to the non-convex asset dynamics 
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that characterize systems with multiple equilibria, households may prefer to smooth assets rather 
than consumption in response to risk exposure (Barrett, et al. 2006; Carter, et al. 2007; Carter and 
Barret, 2006). In other words, households who are near the asset threshold may be unwilling to 
liquidate productive assets in order to smooth consumption, if doing so would push them below the 
threshold, resulting in further asset loss and a descent into a low-level asset (and income) trap. 
Multiple equilibria associated with non-convex asset dynamics could also lead to seemingly 
excessive risk-taking behaviour among a poor informal households subpopulation who might find it 
attractive to take chances when a safer strategy is unlikely to break them out of poverty.    
 
Lybbert, et al. (2004) highlights the crucial distinction between asset risk and income risk. They 
emphasize the role of asset accumulation, as asset ownership determines income generation 
processes. When income is endogenous, asset risk can have a more permanent impact than income 
risk. In particular, uninsured asset risk has the potential to drive a household onto a path of sustained 
asset loss, as a result of which the household falls below a critical asset threshold from which it is 
unable to recover, suffering persistent income poverty thereafter. 
 
 Moreover, McPeak (2004) and Yakub (2002) demonstrate that households that face asset risk may 
be more vulnerable to falling into persistent poverty. Hence, households consciously trade off asset 
smoothing and consumption smoothing objectives when faced with correlated asset and income risk, 
as in the case of rainfall shocks that affect both herd mortality (i.e., asset risk) and productivity (i.e., 
income risk) among livestock producers in northern Kenya. Indeed, Adato, et al. (2006), Barrett, et 
al. (2006) and Lybbert, et al. (2004) found that risk exposure that depletes a household‘s asset stock 
leads to long-term poverty. 
 
The distinction between idiosyncratic and covariate risk is important because micro insurance 
techniques can handle idiosyncratic risk while covariate risk makes a case for social protection 
measures. As Alderman and Paxson (1994) demonstrate with a full insurance model
21
, covariate risk 
exposures cannot be insured by risk-sharing, as all members of the insurance pool would require 
payouts at the same time. Thus, the relative magnitude of covariate risk exposures is important to the 
design of appropriate social protection policy interventions. However, there is increasing evidence 
regarding the importance of idiosyncratic risk. Empirical studies have found that the idiosyncratic 
income risk is relatively large (see for example, Udry, 1993; Townsend, 1994; Deaton, 1997, 2005; 
Lybbert, et al. 2004; Dercon and Krishnan, 2000). These studies indicate that many risks have both 
                                                          
21 Alderman and Paxson (1994) also however show that a full-insurance model can accommodate consumption smoothing in the 
aftermath of a covariate risk exposure. For example stocking behaviour can be used for inter-temporal consumption smoothing within 
the community. 
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idiosyncratic and covariate components but idiosyncratic risk dominates covariate asset risk among 
the households. 
  
The evidence on the importance of idiosyncratic risk for households underscores the need for a 
continuing discussion on the efficacy of the strategies available for mitigating the impact of random 
risk exposures. Therefore, demand for micro insurance need to take into account the household‘s 
nature of risks; the household has multiple sources of risks each with its own distribution of losses 
and the ability to manage and insure differs greatly. This study is enriched by evaluating insurable 
and non-insurable risk exposures with their associated costs or impacts. These separations enlighten 
the individual ability to manage risks, possibly via informal or formal mechanisms.   
4.2.3 CULTURE AND INFORMAL SCHEMES 
The availability and dependability of informal schemes provided by individuals, the local 
community and social network determines demand for micro insurance. The access differs based on 
a household‘s social and economic background. The protection provided via the individual extended 
family or a community based system may create an expectation for some level of support in the 
event of loss.  It is evident that the extension of traditional insurance theory to adjust for the 
existence of informal systems will reduce the maximum premium that those who are risk averse will 
be willing to pay. This will reduce demand for micro insurance. The insurer must understand the 
existence and vulnerability of informal systems if they are to design optimal policies for informal 
sector households. Pauly (1990) indicates a major factor that may limit demand for private insurance 
is the availability of imperfect but cheaper substitutes. He noted that these may come in the form of 
government assistance, financial transfers from children, or unpaid care provided directly by family 
members in lieu of formal paid care.     
Indeed, not everyone is risk-averse, and there are many factors that lead to people taking up or not 
taking up insurance. For example, national culture can explain why in some countries there is a 
higher demand for insurance policies than others. Hofstede (1980) explained four dimensions of 
culture that explain individuals as (i) Individualism and collectivism, (ii) Uncertainty avoidance, (iii) 
Power distance (iv) Masculinity and femininity. Two relevant cultural dimensions to this study are 
individualism and collectivism, and uncertainty avoidance. 
Individualism and Collectivism is a dimension that explains how individuals relate to each other. 
Individualism refers to the existence of loose knit social networks in which people focus primarily 
on taking care of themselves and their immediate families (Adler and Gundersen, 2008; Francesco 
and Gold, 2005). In an individualistic society everybody looks after his own interests, and may be 
the interests of his family, behaviour made possible by the large freedoms available to individuals. In 
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many western countries most people are happy to live away from members of their family (Dowling, 
et al. 2008). According to Adler and Gundersen (2008), one of the attributes of an individualist 
culture is that of free-will and self-determination.  People with individualistic perspectives on life 
tend to rely more on insurance for protection than on informal agreements within their group to 
provide financial security. Therefore, countries with an individualism cultural behaviour will have 
high demand for insurance consumption.  
In a collectivistic society ties between individuals are tight, and everyone needs to care for his 
extended family or group. Collectivism is characterized by closely knit social networks in which 
people strongly distinguish between their own groups, for example relatives, clans and organizations 
(Adler and Gundersen, 2008; Francesco and Gold, 2005; Hofstede, 2001). Collectivists hold 
common goals and objectives, therefore, people from collectivist cultures expect members of their 
groups to look after them and provide security in exchange for loyalty to the group (Adler and 
Gundersen, 2008).  
Uncertainty avoidance evaluates how people react to the uncertainties of life, and tries to avoid 
ambiguous situations; it is the search for greater certainty and predictability (Adler and Gundersen, 
2008; Hofstede, 1980). Cultures with a high uncertainty avoidance prefer more structure resulting in 
explicit rules of behavior, either written or unwritten. Countries with high uncertainty avoidance 
have a high degree of preference for well-structured situations and clear rules about ways to behave; 
they place considerable concern on strict laws with severe penalties for offenders, a high degree of 
security, and great respect for experts (Hofstede, 2001). However, countries with low uncertainty 
avoidance adopt fewer rules, individuals are more easy-going, tolerate different behaviors and 
opinions more easily, and avoid excessive laws and regulation.  These allow individuals to have 
strong feelings of personal competency and entrepreneurial behaviour (Francesco and Gold, 2005; 
Adler and Gundersen, 2008; Hofstede, 2001).  
Given the examples above, it is likely that cultural dimensions that are individualism, collectivism 
and uncertainty avoidance may impact on micro insurance demand in the informal sector. Also, 
households demand behaviours can be affected by an individually-motivated consumer and a 
community-motivated consumer. While an individually-motivated consumer is comfortable deciding 
to purchase insurance alone, community-motivated consumers rely on community input before 
making a final purchase decision. Undeniably, understanding of the concept of insurance can be 
explained by national cultures and the variations in insurance demand from country to country reveal 
significance in understanding micro insurance demand in Tanzania.   
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4.2.4 MISTAKE AND INCOMPLETENESS HYPOTHESIS 
Schwarcz (2010a) argued that it has become increasingly clear that expected utility theory is a 
remarkably poor theory of how and why individuals purchase insurance. He observed that deviations 
from expected utility theory are likely to be the result of mistakes, in the sense that consumers would 
act differently than they do if they possessed perfect information and cognitive resources. From 
these perspectives, regulatory interventions designed to improve consumer decision-making about 
insurance are potentially desirable. At the same time, he argues that some deviations from expected 
utility theory may actually reflect sophisticated consumer behaviour. In some cases, seemingly 
puzzling insurance decisions may help consumers manage emotions such as anxiety, regret, and loss 
aversion, while in other cases they may represent valuable commitment strategies.  
 
Given these conflicting explanations for expected utility failure as a descriptive theory of consumer 
demand in insurance markets, he argued that regulatory strategies that aim to encourage 
presumptively welfare-maximizing insurance decisions without restricting individual choice 
represent a promising and normatively defensible opportunity for improving consumer behaviour in 
insurance markets. According to the mistake hypothesis, consumer insurance decisions reflect the 
fact that time is scarce, cognitive resources are finite and information is limited. If these obstacles 
could be overcome, consumer insurance decisions would better reflect the predictions of classical 
theory discussed above. In other words, according to the mistake hypothesis, risk aversion is 
perfectly defensible as a normative theory of insurance purchasing, even though it largely fails as a 
descriptive theory. 
 
The second explanation for low insurance demand can be labelled as the incompleteness hypothesis, 
which is premised on the notion that classical theory, with its focus on the decreasing marginal 
utility of wealth, fails to fully capture the benefits of insurance (Schwarcz, 2010b). Consumer 
behaviour, from these perspectives is the results of consumers‘ complete knowledge of risks and 
insurance. Households generate systematically incorrect probability assessments and estimates of 
risk exposure; therefore they invoke incorrect analytical constructs to measure the value of 
insurance.  Households tend to employ a sequential threshold approach to insurance decision-
making.  Under this approach, they refuse to consider the desirability of insurance when they 
perceive the probability of the underlying risk to be below a threshold level. This threshold is 
different for different people depending on their characteristics. These mechanisms for household 
decision-making about insurance provide strong support for the mistake hypothesis. Insurers need to 
exploit a household‘s salient risks to sell micro insurance, and in particular, household‘s 
informational or cognitive limitations.    
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4.2.5 GROWTH IN MICRO FINANCE INSTITUTIONS  
According to Morduch (1998) and  Morduch and Sharma (2001) the outcome of the perceived 
successes of micro-finance programs such as Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, The Bank Rakyat of 
Indonesia and BancoSol in Bolivia stimulated the use of insurance by informal sector households.  
Furthermore, Siegel, et al. (2001) argued that there are strong links between the micro-finance 
institutions and micro-insurance schemes. Similarly, the micro credit summit campaign held in 2003, 
argued that the low-income markets which were previously regarded as not worth spending time 
developing products for, are big emerging markets. Any insurer would be well advised to give it 
focus, to study their needs, and develop the products. The summit reports that there are 235 million 
families around the world who could potentially be micro insured if efficient outreach mechanisms 
were available.  
 
 Moreover, Tucker (2007) reports that of the world population four billion people live on $2 a day 
and the lack of formal insurance choices does not stop them from mitigating risks. He argued that 
profitability in micro insurance is earned by offering products to masses of people in an efficient 
manner since micro insurance products have very low margins.  If these products are sold to large 
numbers of people, the accumulated income will be substantial. The key to product profitability 
seems to lie in the type of products, the quality of the risk premium calculation and operational 
efficiency.  A Swiss Re 2010
22
 report on the future market for insurance products suggests that India 
and China are emerging markets which will be at the front of insurance in the 21
st
 century. While 
China and India will provide a disproportionate amount of this growth, dramatic expansion is also 
likely in many other developing countries. This growth will cover a much wider range of 
household‘s incomes. Micro insurance will be the instrument for insurers who want to access to 
these markets.   
4.3 SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER  
This chapter has described the conceptual framework adopted in this study. It depicts a unique 
process of understanding micro insurance demand perspectives in the informal sector. The 
framework shows that, although standard insurance demand theory provides a strong starting point 
for the analysis of micro insurance, additional factors were necessary to understand informal 
household demand perspectives.  
 
Tanzania relies on a reasonably developed financial system, but one that is not intended for the 
informal sector, especially in insurance and the public protection networks are constantly expanding 
                                                          
22 See Swiss Re website at www.swissre.com; Swiss Re Sigma study on growth potentials puts emerging markets in the spot light.  
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and changing. This requires a private micro insurance industry, well-adjusted to the new business 
opportunities of people with rising mobility who require protection to keep their standards of living. 
This overlap of effects and changes in opposite directions requires empirical work to guide the 
companies that aim to explore the micro insurance market in Tanzania. There are multiple sources of 
risks faced by households in the informal sector hence careful attention needs to be focused on the 
riskiness of informal based systems for effective design of micro insurance products.  
 
The literature review and theories discussed in this chapter are an important aspect of the 
methodological and research design adopted in this research. The framework will be used as an 
interpretive framework in order to analyse the study‘s findings. A step by step research approach that 
discusses and rationalises the strategies used for the entire research will be presented in the next 
chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Saqware, PhD Thesis July 11, 2012 
  
69 
CHAPTER FIVE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This chapter seeks to explain the research design and processes used to achieve the objectives of the 
present study. The chapter addresses the key methodological concepts of this research: the 
philosophical position, design and sampling framework. Section 5.1 begins by contextualizing the 
philosophical positions of social science research. Section 5.2 describes the pragmatism research 
approach, giving details and justification for the various stages by which the objectives of the study 
were met. Section 5.3 deals with the research design and sampling framework. Section 5.4 describes 
data collection procedures and issues related to reliability and validity of instruments. Section 5.5 
presents discussions on data analysis and ethical considerations in conducting the research. Finally in 
section 5.6 a summary of the chapter is given.  
5.1  PHILOSOPHICAL UNDERPINNING  
According to Saunders, et al. (2007) research philosophy relates to the development of knowledge 
and the nature of that knowledge. There are two philosophical positions which explain the nature of 
knowledge: ontological and epistemological. It is important to explain these philosophical positions 
because they inform the methods adopted for collecting and analysing data. Blaikie (1993) notes that 
the root definition of ontology is the science of being, which necessitates asking questions about the 
nature of existence. In social science, the main focus in the ontological philosophical positioning is 
the question of whether social entities can and should be considered as objective entities that have a 
reality external to social actors, or social constructions built up from the perceptions and actions of 
social actors referred to as objectivism and constructionism respectively. Objectivism asserts that 
social phenomena and their meanings have an existence that is independent of social actors (Bryman 
and Bell, 2003). 
 
Epistemology refers to ideas about what counts as knowledge: the known and set criteria, rather than 
beliefs (Blaikie, 2001). There are two main epistemologies of what counts as knowledge within the 
social sciences: positivism and interpretivism. According to Bryman and Bell (2003), in positivism 
knowledge is associated with observable facts that exist independently from the mind; that is 
theoretical terms that are not directly open to observation are not considered legitimately scientific. 
The researcher acts as a natural scientist (Saunders, et al. 2000), interpreting data that have been 
collected in a value-free manner. Positivism places emphasis on a highly structured methodology to 
facilitate further replication (Saunders, et al. 2007) and is characterized by quantitative, objectivist, 
or experimentalist methods. The main focus of the positivist paradigm is, therefore, to produce 
generally accepted universal laws based on observable facts independent of the mind. 
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The second epistemological positioning is interpretivism which takes the view that people and their 
institutions as the subject matter of social sciences are fundamentally different from those in the 
natural sciences (Bryman and Bell, 2003). This is because the meanings of the concepts or the 
phenomena under investigation are derived from the lived experiences of individuals interpreted by 
the researcher. Thus the researcher constructs the world view, based on an understanding of the 
investigated individuals perceptions and experiences. 
The present study aims to develop the understanding of micro insurance demand in the informal 
sector by mixing the elements of both positivism and constructivism, whereas in positivism the focus 
is on establishing universally accepted laws, the interpretivist approach aims at understanding a 
concept within its context. The researcher in this approach is regarded as an insider, because data in 
this study have been collected through structured and semi-structured interviews with selected 
informal households. Most writers on research methodology acknowledge that neither of the two 
approaches is better. Consequently the choice depends on the nature of the research (Blaikie, 2001; 
Hussey and Hussey, 1997; Saunders et al., 2007). Given the nature of the phenomena under 
investigation, the pragmatism approach has been adopted in this thesis.  
5.2 PRAGMATISM RESEARCH APPROACH 
The pragmatism research approach applies mixed research methods (Johnson and Gray, 2010). For 
the purpose of this the research pragmatism paradigm is deemed suitable, because the researcher is 
of the view that the phenomena under investigation may not be considered legitimately scientific. 
Micro insurance demand as an economic behaviour is specific to individuals and is said to be a 
changeable thing. In addition, the concept cannot be separated from the mind, a product of 
competitive advantage. Knowledge about it can be constructed from individual characteristics, thus, 
the application of both methods yield meaningful understanding of micro insurance demand. 
Pragmatism as a philosophical paradigm has elements of both positivism and constructivism.  It is a 
philosophical underpinning for mixed methods studies (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998, 2009, 2010; 
Morgan, 2007; Patton, 1990; Burke and Onwuegbuzie, 2004). This conveys its importance for 
focusing attention on the research problem in social science and then using pluralistic approaches to 
derive knowledge about the problem. Within this framework, both qualitative and quantitative 
methodologies are appropriate (Healy and Perry, 2000; Burke and Onwuegbuzie, 2004), implying 
that methods such as unstructured or semi-structured in-depth interviews are acceptable and 
appropriate within the paradigm, as are statistical analyses, and other techniques.  
The researcher deemed mixed methods appropriate for four reasons. Firstly, this research is an 
economic problem about making choices or decisions. Economics is a problem solving, decision 
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oriented discipline by the nature of its focus. It is a study of human activities in the allocation of 
limited resources in satisfying human want; focus is on allocating these resources among the 
competing uses. Economic research is expected to be relevant to understanding and dealing with 
current and future societal problems.  The phenomenon of micro insurance demand has different 
interpretations among households in the informal sector. Consequently the meaning resides in the 
minds and contrasting experiences of the individual (Creswell, 1998). In addition, there is a 
considerable variation regarding the findings.  Saunders et al. (2007) and Creswell (2010) noted that 
the approach focuses on describing subjective meanings, social phenomena and drawing attention to 
(a) the details of the situation, (b) the reality behind the situation and (c) the subjective meanings that 
motivate actions. Therefore, it is necessary to question the social, rather than the physical 
phenomenon. Given this lack of clarity surrounding micro insurance demands a research approach 
that allows for an in-depth exploration of both subjective and inductive aspects of the phenomena 
under investigation is appropriate.  
Secondly, the concept of micro insurance demand is socially constructed by stakeholders, mainly for 
the purpose of improving individual well-being with the expected end being improved productivity.  
In this context, several authors note that micro insurances have an indisputable value as risk 
management instruments in the informal sector (De Weerdt and Dercon, 2006; Zeller, et al. 1997; 
Sebstad and Cohen, 2001). Given this background, it is undoubtedly clear that micro insurance is a 
concept which cannot be regarded as being independent of the involved social actors. Thus, taking 
pragmatism perspectives, this research views micro insurance as a construct that is dependent on 
human experiences, perceptions and interpretations. Accordingly, Miles and Huberman (1994) 
argued that the social phenomena exist not only in the mind but also in the objective world and that 
some lawful and reasonably stable relationships are to be found among them. This study describes 
micro insurance demand perspectives and critically analyses risk management practices in the 
informal sector.  
Thirdly, given that there is a scarcity of empirical studies on micro insurance demand in the informal 
sector in Tanzania, mixed methods allows the researcher to explore the experiences of those 
individuals in considerable depth. According to Bryman (2006), mixed methods enables the 
generation of an understanding in the perspectives of the research participants. Therefore, engaging 
in FGD discussions with research informants implies that the researcher can also enter into the social 
world in which he/she is interested in order to gain an understanding of the participants‘ experiences 
of the phenomena under investigation (Shaw, 1999). Thus, because the researcher using the 
pragmatism approach tries to establish the meanings of individual experiences, the results are subject 
to an element of interpretation (Creswell, 2007). Therefore, micro insurance demand is a socially 
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constructed phenomenon which has a reality to a collective group of social actors within the 
informal sector. 
Fourthly, the research goal is not to replace either of these approaches but rather to draw from the 
strengths and minimize the weaknesses of both in a single research study. Hence, the two opposing 
philosophic positions are more or less important according to the type of research. The study is 
designed to identify existing social phenomena and behaviours while acknowledging the 
consequences of social conditions and accepting the assumption behind relativist research that truth 
requires concession between different viewpoints (Easterby- Smith, et al. 2002). Visualizing a 
continuum with qualitative research anchored at one pole and quantitative research anchored at the 
other, this research covers the large set of points in the middle area. Those who rely heavily on 
quantitative method to understand social phenomena and individual decisions may believe that 
increasing numbers of groups and geographic diversity will start approaching the stability of 
quantitative testing. However, they forget that screening and recruiting usually are highly 
exclusionary, and the very act of being in a discussion group affects attitudes and reported 
behaviours.  
 
Regardless of paradigmatic orientation, all research in the social sciences represents an attempt to 
provide warranted assertions about human beings and the environments in which they live and 
evolve (Biesta, 2010). In the social and behavioural sciences, this goal of understanding leads to the 
examination of many different phenomena, including holistic phenomena such as intentions, 
experiences, attitudes, and culture. This thesis argue that researchers and research methodologists 
need to be asking when each research approach is most helpful and when and how they should be 
mixed or combined in their research studies. As Green (2008) and Howe (1988) indicated, although 
there are many important paradigmatic differences between qualitative and quantitative research 
there are some similarities between the various approaches that are sometimes overlooked. For 
example, both quantitative and qualitative researchers use empirical observations to address research 
questions. Both methodologies describe their data, construct explanatory arguments from their data, 
and speculate about why the outcomes they observed happened as they did. Additionally, both sets 
of researchers incorporate safeguards into their inquiries in order to minimize confirmation bias and 
other sources of invalidity or lack of trustworthiness that has the potential to exist in every research 
study (Sandelowski and Happ, 2010).  
 
Taking a pragmatic position allows this research to mix and match design components that offer the 
best chance of answering specific research questions. As noted by Onwuegbuzie and Teddlie (2003), 
the logic of justification does not dictate what specific data collection and data analytical methods 
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researchers must use. Mixed research makes use of the pragmatic method and system of philosophy 
is an attempt to legitimize the use of multiple approaches in answering research questions, rather 
than restricting or constraining researchers‘ choices. It is inclusive, pluralistic, and complementary, 
and it suggests that researchers take a diverse approach to method selection and the thinking about 
and conduct of research (Tashakkori and Creswell, 2007; Lieber and Weisner, 2010).  
 
Using this principle, the study collects multiple data using different methods in such a way that the 
resulting mixture or combination has resulted in complementary strengths and non-overlapping 
weaknesses (Morgan, 1998).  Our mixed methods research process model comprises the following 
distinct steps: (1) determine the research question; (2) determine whether a mixed design is 
appropriate; (3) select the mixed method or mixed-model research design; (4) collect the data; (5) 
analyse the data; (6) interpret the data; (7) draw conclusions and write the final report. These steps 
are displayed in Figure 5.1 below.   
Figure 5.1: Mixed methods research steps 
     
5.3 RESEARCH DESIGN AND PLAN 
This section outlines the steps taken in conducting the research design and the process underpinning 
the present study. It describes and defends the logic of the steps taken. According to Yin (2009), a 
research design that is aimed at building an understanding of the phenomenon under investigation is 
vital to the process of social science inquiry. As there are limited empirical academic studies on the 
subject of micro insurance, a cross- sectional design, where information about the present existing 
conditions at a single point of time was gathered in order to collect a body of quantitative data in 
connection with two/more variables was used as suggested in Creswell (1994) and  Brayman and 
Bell (2003).  
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Figure 5.2: Graphic summary of the research design and process. 
 
 
In this study the demand was understood as willingness to use micro insurance products, therefore 
the research assumes that households who are not willing to use the micro insurance techniques 
either: - i) Have no access to it, ii) Do not demand it iii) or cannot afford it iv) or all three factors. 
Further research assumes that households which do not demand particular formal service, use 
informal techniques for different reasons such as requirements for certain procedural specifications 
that leads to rationing and restricts some people from using formal services or other services,  such 
as lower transaction costs and greater flexibility, affordability/price of services and/or ignorance. 
The research rules out the possibility that the households may not demand the particular services at 
all, as it considers it to be unlikely that the households demand neither formal nor informal insurance 
mechanisms over time.   
5.3.1 Sampling Framework 
The study population is the informal sector households in Tanzania; the study was conducted in 
three administrative districts of Ilala, Temeke and Kinondoni in Dar es Salaam. The main reason for 
selecting this area was that; - Dar es Salaam is one of the leading regions with highest number of 
urban informal sector households. Further, there is little research done on micro insurance and the 
area guarantees a higher access to micro finance services in the country.  In consultation with the 
local government authority the respondents were drawn from members of VIBINDO
23
 an umbrella 
                                                          
23 VIBINDO stands for Viwanda na Biashara Ndogondogo- which is an umbrella organization of small and medium economic groups in 
the informal sector in Tanzania.  VIBINDO represents group members from a variety of different economic sectors working in the 
informal sector in Tanzania. VIBINDO represents over 300 groups’ members with over 500,000 individual members. The primary 
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organization representing the interests of workers in the informal sector in Tanzania. The VIBINDO 
society represents micro and small enterprises in the informal sector. The micro and small 
enterprises are not only an important means to generate income; they are also an important entry 
points for the development of a strong private sector in the country. As such, it is important to 
consider their risk exposures and risk management techniques used before the process and transition 
into the formal insurance sector can be facilitated.  
5.3.2 Sample Size and Sampling Technique 
A proportionate stratified sampling method was applied in selecting a sample size because it reduces 
the sampling error and provides greater or better precision (Sapsford and Jupp, 1996). Where 
appropriate, a purposive or non-probability sampling was applied in identifying clients of micro 
finance institutions. With reference to the population and housing census (PHC, 2002), the number 
of households interviewed for each district was determined. The sample was stratified into three 
stratums (i.e. districts) with the sampling weight assigned to each district being determined by the 
number of micro finance schemes available in the districts and then random sampling was used to 
select sufficient numbers of subjects from each stratum. 
Table 5.1: Calculation of study sample population  
District/ Population size 
(NBS 2002) 
 HH‘s 
interviewed 
MFI‘s Identified MMFI‘s interviewed 
Ilala 937,573 94 103 48 
Kinondoni 1,088,867 123 75 35 
Temeke 771,500 87 62 29 
Total 2,697,940 304 240 112 
Source: Author‟s calculation  
5.3.3 Instrument Validity and Reliability 
According to Bryman and Bell (2003), reliability is determined by the extent to which the results of 
a study are repeatable. For a qualitative study, reliability is concerned with the degree to which the 
features of the study's design are congruent with the research inquiries. In order to ensure that the 
results are reliable, the same sets of questions were asked.  Therefore, since all informants were 
interviewed separately, subject bias was controlled to a large extent. 
As regards to validity, Bryman and Bell (2003) noted that any research should be concerned with the 
integrity of the conclusions it generates. Therefore, the researcher considered construct validity to be 
                                                                                                                                                                                                  
objectives of the society is  effective representation, and to be an advocate and lobbyist for a better working environment for its 
members so that they may grow, eradicate poverty and create sustainable jobs for others. 
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of great importance. According to Yin (2009), to meet the test of construct validity, an investigator 
must be sure to cover two steps; (a) to define the phenomenon in terms of specific concepts, thereby 
relating them to the objectives of the study, and (b) to identify operational measures that match the 
concepts with the academic literature and other publications. The definition of the main concepts 
formed the first part of the literature review. The interview questions were not only grounded in the 
literature, but were also piloted and checked by the researcher‘s supervisors in order to enhance their 
reliability. To maintain validity of the instruments, the following measures were taken; related 
literature was reviewed, research supervisors were consulted and a presentation was made to 
different research workshops and finally the constructive feedback was incorporated. To maintain 
reliability of the instruments, a preliminary test was performed on ten percent (10%) of the total 
sample size prior to the actual research.   
5.3.4 Pre-testing of the Instruments  
For validation purposes, a sample of the set of survey questionnaires was initially submitted for 
approval, after which the questionnaire was tested to on 10% of the expected total respondents. The 
instruments were pre-tested for ten percent (10%) of the total sample size in similar setting in three 
districts.   After pre-testing instruments, all necessary changes and modifications were made as 
required such as changing words, adding and deleting a few questions to improve the content of the 
questionnaire and for the case of the FGD, a discussion guide was used.   
5.4 DATA COLLECTION PROCEDURE  
5.4.1 Steps followed 
The following steps were used for the data collection procedure:  Firstly, the formal permission was 
requested from the authorized persons in the study area and at the VIBINDO society headquarters. 
Secondly, verbal consent was obtained from each respondent and a face to face interview technique 
was used to collect data by the researcher himself. Thirdly, inclusion criteria were maintained while 
collecting data and the obtained information was filled and recorded for future analysis. Finally, to 
minimize bias, the questionnaires were prepared and respondents were selected without any 
discrimination of sex, education, and socioeconomic status. 
5.4.2 Ethical Consideration  
Anonymity and confidentiality were guaranteed to all participants both at the beginning and the end 
of the interview. According to Remenyi et al. (1998), in business and management studies it is 
essential to understand the context within which the research is being conducted by considering 
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social or cultural factors that may impinge on the research problem. Regarding this study, all ethical 
norms were considered and followed throughout the study. Every precaution was taken to protect the 
rights of the respondent. The following steps were considered for this purpose: Firstly, formal 
permission was obtained from the authority in the study area and from group leaders. Secondly, 
verbal consent was obtained from each respondent and finally, privacy, anonymity and 
confidentiality were maintained by using code number and interviewing each respondent separately.   
5.4.3 Data Collection instruments 
The study used both qualitative and quantitative research methods. The application of both methods 
has philosophical roots (see section 5.2) which emphasizes the importance of understanding social 
and cultural processes in shaping human behaviour. The Swahili language was used for discussions, 
as is common for most studies in this area. Structured, semi structured and unstructured 
questionnaires were prepared with simple, understandable English and the interview was conducted 
in the Swahili language by the investigator on a face to face basis.  The instrument contains three 
parts. Part I; a questionnaire related to socio-demographic characteristics Part II; a questionnaire 
related to risks and risk management mechanisms and Part III; a questionnaire related to financial 
services and insurance choices. These instruments are presented in Appendix C. Table 5.2 below 
summarizes the research methods, outlining the description and objectives of each approach. 
Table 5.2: Research Methods descriptions and objectives 
Research method Description Objectives/key questions 
Unstructured 
interview (personal 
stories 3 people  
from each of FGD 
(done prior to FGD) 
Researcher stimulated 
respondents to discuss 
and analyse information 
about their lives and risks 
they face. 
The key issues for this research method were: 
 To investigate what sort of crises and risks 
informal households face. 
 To understand how households change their 
risk coping strategies depending on their life 
stage. 
 To understand demographic status and their 
effect on the choice of risk coping mechanism. 
 To understand the existing use of insurance as 
a coping mechanism (if any) and any biases or 
preconceptions that people have regarding 
insurance 
Focus Group 
Discussions 6-10 
people; 2 FGD each 
district 
Researcher stimulated 
the group dynamics to 
elicit responses and 
capture diverse 
perceptions from both 
MFI clients and non MFI 
clients on the core 
research variables. 
The main objective of this research method was to 
collect information from participants in groups on 
the following: 
 Common socio-economic risks 
 Common coping strategies 
 Factors that might determine the choices of 
coping mechanisms 
 Knowledge and experience (if any) of 
insurance 
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 Household expenditures 
Structured survey 
questionnaire (Face 
to face): Flexibility 
was allowed for 
open-ended 
question.  
A structured 
questionnaire provided 
quantitative data from 
MFI and non- 
MFI clients. 
The main objective of this research method was to 
collect information from participants on the 
following: 
 Demographic household information 
 Common socio-economic risks 
 Household socio-economic conditions 
 Common coping strategies 
 Household income sources and expenditure 
 Knowledge and experience on financial 
services (if any) for  insurance 
Source: Author (2011) 
5.4.4 Sample per method 
At the end of the study, after merging the data files and checking for missing information, the final 
sample consisted of 304 people including 246 heads of household for the structured survey 
questionnaire and 18 households participated for the unstructured interviews (personal history). The 
other 40 respondents participated in 6 focus group sessions 2 from each district; the group sizes 
varied between 6 and 10 participants. 112 MFI clients participated in this research which represented 
roughly 36 percent of the total sample population. The sample size per method is presented in table 
5.3 below. 
Table 5.3: Sample Size per Research Method 
Method Sample Size 
 
Survey Structured 
Questionnaire 
MFI Clients Non-MFI clients Total 
 
112 
 
192 
 
304 
Focus Group 
Discussion 
 
12 
 
28 
 
40 
Unstructured 
Interviews 
 
6 
 
12 
 
18 
5.5 DATA PROCESSING AND ANALYSIS 
The analysis provides insights into business potential of micro insurance. The following steps 
(processes) were taken while analysing the data; daily editing was done after collecting data to 
maintain accuracy and completeness. The collected data were entered into SPSS statistical software.  
The data were analysed using simple descriptive statistical methods in terms of number and 
percentages.  The findings were presented in tables, pie charts, and bar graphs. Interpretation of the 
findings was made descriptively on the basis of the analysed data. A probit model analysis was 
conducted to investigate household‘s characteristics that influence micro insurance demand in the 
informal sector. The probit equation model was established indicating independent variables and the 
probit results were presented in chapter eight of this thesis. Qualitative data analysis was based on 
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field experience. Familiarization of data was done by listening to the audio-taped information and 
reading through the notes and transcripts. Codes were developed and both pre-determined and 
emerging themes were identified for content analysis.  
An attempt was made to capture data through the structured questionnaire on frequency of 
occurrence for the pronounced risks and particularly death, illness and theft for the last 3 years. Most 
respondents could not give a historical account. During data analysis the period of reference was 
restricted to the current year 2011, and previous year 2010. Incidences of death and prolonged illness 
were easier to capture than incidences of short illnesses. A significant effort was made to crosscheck 
information to ensure data integrity. Many research questions were approached from different 
perspectives, and through different research methodologies, to see if similar results indeed emerged. 
Where possible, results were also compared to the relevant literature.  Focus group discussions 
composed of 6-10 people were used to provide qualitative insights into the data collected and a 
questionnaire was used to collect quantitative information.   
5.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY  
This chapter has covered a variety of issues that influenced the methodological approach and design 
of this study. The philosophical position regarding the researcher‘s ontological and epistemological 
standpoints has been presented. As a consequence, a pragmatism approach which reflects belief in 
the existence of an independent reality has been adopted. The combination of research methods 
allows the richness of the information collected from the respondents. In conclusion, therefore, this 
study was based on the qualitative and quantitative approach on multiple stages of data collection, 
both of which are complemented by the methodical procedures used to analyse the data.   
 
There is little doubt that the choice of methodology has been an important contribution to the study 
of micro insurance demand in the Tanzanian context. Indeed, micro insurance demand in the 
informal sector is a complicated phenomenon which needs this research methodology. In 
accomplishing the objectives of this research study, mixed research methods were useful.  To date, 
no comparable empirical research has, to the best of the researcher‘s knowledge, utilized such a 
distinctive approach to obtain knowledge on micro insurance demand in the informal sector. After 
reviewing the literature in chapter 3 and justifying the conceptual framework in Chapter 4 and the 
methodology adopted to accomplish the aim of this study in this chapter, the researcher is now in a 
position to move forward to the results stage. Chapters 6, 7 and 8 present the four research objectives 
findings respectively.  
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CHAPTER SIX: RESULTS ON RISK EXPOSURE IN THE INFOMAL SECTOR   
This chapter examines the risk exposures in the informal sector and identifies the impacts of such 
risks. It further explores various understandings of risk events from respondents. A key contribution 
of this chapter is an attempt to answer the first research question, about which risk exposure brings 
high financial impact to the households, and the chapter also identifies potential risks which are 
insurable.  
This chapter is divided into seven sections. Section 6.1 provides a description of data and a 
framework for analysis. Section 6.2 explores a detailed understanding of risks. Sections 6.3 and 6.4 
are of a descriptive empirical nature and the types of risk exposures in the informal sector are 
discussed respectively. In section 6.5 a discussion of the insurable and non-insurable risks is 
presented with the aim of focusing on micro insurance demand.  In section 6.6 extended analyses of 
insurable risks are conducted to show their impacts and the coping strategies applied for each risk. 
Finally, in section 6.7 a summary of the chapter is provided.  
6.1 DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA AND FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS 
The study uses a household survey containing individual level data on demographic characteristics, 
employment status, health status, social economic activities and use of financial services. The 
definition of a household is constructed to a sub-family relationship unit to include adults plus those 
family members who would typically live and eat together. These family members include spouses, 
unmarried natural or adopted children who are aged 18 or under, and children under the age of 21 
who are full-time students. The household‘s head is classified as eligible to purchase insurance. The 
final sample consists of 304 people including 246 heads of household for a structured survey 
questionnaire and 18 households participated for unstructured interviews (personal history).  
In order to understand micro insurance demand perspectives in the informal sector the research 
findings involves three steps. The first step establishes risk exposure faced by households and their 
financial impacts. In the second step the strengths and weaknesses of different risk coping strategies 
applied by household were analysed. The third step establishes the relationship between household 
characteristics and demand for micro insurance through a probit regression model
24
. Given this 
framework, the findings are presented and discussed in chapters six, seven and eight respectively. 
This chapter attempts to answer the first research question by identifying the risk exposure, their 
characteristics and impact (costs). The chapter analyses socio-economic risks facing households, 
                                                          
24 The  separate results for probit regression are presented in chapter eight of this thesis 
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how often they occur, the resulting cost of losses, and which risks takes most of the household‘s 
earned income.      
6.2 UNDERSTANDING OF THE RISK EXPOSURE IN THE INFORMAL SECTOR  
Three main understandings emerged related to risk exposure in the informal sector in Tanzania. 
Firstly, from focus group discussions a risk exposure is seen as events that cause financial liability. 
Households affected by a risky event incur a potentially substantial monetary loss. The liability 
which has a direct bearing on individual‘s well-being and causes poverty or increases the depth of 
poverty. Respondents indicate that apart from the physical and psychological consequences from 
experiencing a risk, risks events can push a household further into poverty, or drive a non-poor 
household below the income poverty line. A risk was explained as the reason why children‘s 
education is at stake; it affects people‘s health permanently or reduces life expectancy. In line with 
Alderman and Paxson (1994, 1995), Dercon (2001, 2003, 2005), Morduch (1995) and Adato, et al. 
(2006), there is evidence that if households have the option to insure against risk exposures, risk will 
have a limited impact on welfare. It is therefore exposure that causes undesirable welfare outcomes 
such as income poverty, poor housing, low education levels or low life expectancy. However, risks 
exposures are only one factor which can affect household wellbeing. Additional factors such as 
declining trends in economy and increases in commodity prices may also be useful factors (Mosely 
and Krishnamurthy, 1995; Kruger and Vakis, 2003; Alderman and Hague, 2007; Dercon and 
Krishnan, 2000; Foster, 1995).  
 
Secondly, there is evidence that costly preventive measures chosen by households contribute to risks 
which in turn, causes poverty. These measures are expensive, inadequate and to some extent take 
longer to recover from after a loss event.  Thirdly, households exposed to a risk suffer on-going 
uncertainty about whether and when a loss might occur.  The households that are exposed to greater 
risk-uncertainty are less likely to take advantage of growth opportunities, such as investing in new 
technologies or additional working capital, that would be likely to lead to increased wealth and 
reduced poverty as in Ginnekin (2005), Mosely and Krishnamurthy (1995) and Eswaran and Kotwal 
(1990). As a result, households exposed to a great deal of uncertainty remain in persistent poverty. 
 
It appears from discussions that considerable emphasis is placed on risk which causes financial 
burden.  The financial impact depends on several variables, including the frequency of occurrence, 
the associated costs (impacts) and the duration or permanence of the effect. Households consider 
risks depending on the characteristics of the risks; there are risks that affect individuals and occur on 
an unrelated manner (idiosyncratic), and risks that affect the entire population, correlated among 
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individuals (covariate), across time (repeated). The study analyses risk exposures by looking at the 
financial need that takes a large portion of a household‘s income expenditure. In FGD the direct 
approach was adopted by asking respondents to rank risk exposure that they have experienced over 
last three years.  Thereafter a more indirect approach was applied by trying to gain insights about the 
impact of risks by determining how crises affect their income pattern.   
6.3  TYPES OF RISK EXPOSURES IN THE INFORMAL SECTOR  
Using Rahman and Hossain (1995) risk framework three major risk categories were identified: - The 
first category of risk is lifecycle risks which stem from events such as marriage and birth, old age, 
and death, but also involve regular expenditures for food, housing, education and healthcare. These 
risks are generally predictable, which makes planning and managing them more feasible. However, 
they become crises if they are not adequately planned for, if insufficient savings have been 
accumulated to manage them, or if they occur concurrently with another risk.  Secondly, structural 
risks that are caused by long-term or permanent changes in the national or international economy, as 
well as by disasters caused by seasonal or weather-related effects. The third category of risks are 
crisis risks, which are unexpected shocks to the household that may increase costs, drain resources, 
and/or disrupt its ability to generate income. These crises may have a sharp single impact (for 
example, business theft, fire); they may be recurring (i.e. on-going health problems); or they may be 
permanent (i.e., a disabling injury, unexpected death of a wage earner).      
6.4 THE NATURE OF THE RISK EXPOSURE IN THE INFORMAL SECTOR 
 Firstly, the rates of injury, illness and mortality reported in this survey signify the presence of health 
risks. The pattern of risks and health outcomes indicate that a household spends a substantial amount 
on health risks. Food expenses represent around 20.8 percent of household spending, while cost of 
education represents 12.5 percent of household‘s spending and theft affected around 10.6 percent of 
the household. Other exposures that increase financial needs reported include flood, fire, divorce and 
dependents but were relatively less widespread.  
Secondly, the household‘s major income was spent on risk exposure related to the cost of building 
houses 23.4 percent, child birth and medical expenses 22.8 percent and 16.2 percent respectively.  
Some risks are frequent and less severe (i.e. minor health problems), some are less frequent but 
when they strike they demand a big lump sum of money to recover from them immediately (e.g. 
injuries, medical expenses and losses resulting from fire in a business premises). These risks 
adversely affect the income flow of the household and raise expenditure on the lowered income. 
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Common risks that an informal sector household faces in Tanzania have been extracted from the 
survey see Appendix C.  
Thirdly, further examination of the financial spending relative to household monthly incomes; the 
top ten risks that takes up household income are in the order: - House building expenses 23.4 percent 
of the income, Child Birth 22.8 percent, Food Expenses 20.8 percent, Removal by authority 17.5 
percent, Illness 16.2 percent, Injuries and accidents 16.2 percent, Education Fees 12.5 percent, Theft 
10.6 percent, Death of a family member 10.2 percent and Divorce 9.7 percent. Figure 6.1 below 
indicates risk exposure that takes up households earned income. 
Figure 6.1: Risk exposures in the informal sector in Tanzania 
   
Source: Household Survey 2010 
The main risks identified can be classified into a more general typology that addresses the statistical 
probability of the risk occurring and provides a basis on which schemes and services can be 
developed and tailored to the community.  Note the difference between covariate
25
 risks and 
idiosyncratic risks. This distinction is important because a micro insurance technique applies for 
idiosyncratic risks while covariate risk calls for social protection measures. The difference between 
micro insurance and social protection were discussed in details in chapter two and three of this 
thesis. 
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Covariate risks are risks that randomly occur but affect many individual households at a time. These are repeated shocks which put 
entire communities at risk and may prove very difficult to insure. However, other social protection mechanisms like labour market 
interventions, relief works, transfers, or development assistance may be more effective as risk-management tools in these circumstances.  
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Table 6.1: Typology of risks in the informal sector in Tanzania 
Typology of risks Example 
Low frequency: occurs infrequently in a 
household‘s lifetime. 
Serious illness, emergency hospitalization, being 
widowed, forced contribution tax, electricity bills, 
dependents. 
High frequency: occurs frequently in a 
household‘s lifetime 
Illness, death, food expenses, child birth, theft, school 
fees,  cost of housing  
Idiosyncratic: occurs randomly and 
affects the individual worker/ household 
Loss of assets due to use of a particular type of risk 
e.g. fire, destruction and looting of assets by 
vandalism. 
Covariate Flooding, inflation, drought  
6.5 INSURABLE AND NON- INSURABLE RISKS EXPOSURES  
The findings presented in section 6.2 have led to the construction of insurable and non-insurable risk 
exposure in this section. The study makes a distinction between insurable and non-insurable risks to 
translate the information into a business proposition for micro insurance products. To qualify for 
economically feasible protection from private insurance, the criteria for the "ideal risk" should be 
met as far as possible. Firstly, insurance is based on the statistical laws of large numbers which 
imply that, for a pool of uncorrelated observations, the variance of the pool decreases with the 
number of observations (Priest, 1996).  However, if insured units face highly covariate risks, the 
variance reduction that can be obtained by pooling is greatly reduced (Skees and Barnett, 1999; Bals, 
et al. 2006). Spatially correlated catastrophic losses can then exceed the reserves of the insurer 
leaving unsuspecting policyholders unprotected. The presence of highly covariate risk is a major 
cause of insurance market failure in many low income countries. 
Secondly, the principal-agent literature identifies two primary types of asymmetric information 
problems; adverse selection (or hidden information) and moral hazard (or hidden action). In 
insurance markets, adverse selection occurs when potential policyholders have proprietary 
knowledge about their risk exposure that is not available to the insurer (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 
1976). Insurance underwriters assign potential policyholders into risk rating classes. Because 
underwriters do not have access to all the relevant information, many potential policyholders are 
misclassified. Those who are misclassified to their benefit (detriment) are more (less) inclined to 
purchase. As a result the insurance program is likely to experience losses that exceed the projections 
used to establish premium rates. In response, the insurer may increase premium rates for all classes. 
But this only compounds the problem and leads to an even more adversely selected group of 
insurance purchasers (Beenstock, et al. 1986). Unless the underlying information asymmetry can be 
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addressed, adverse selection will cause insurance markets to fail. Moral hazard, the second common 
asymmetric information problem, occurs when, as a result of purchasing insurance, policymakers 
engage in hidden activities that increase their exposure to risk. This behavioural response leaves the 
insurer exposed to higher levels of risk than had been anticipated when premium rates were 
established. Unless the insurer can effectively monitor policyholder behaviour so as to enforce 
policy provisions, moral hazard will also cause insurance markets to fail. 
Indeed, using Siegel and Alwang‘s (2001) framework for an ideal risk to insure, the research has 
identified risk related to:  medical expenses, death, theft, house building expenses, flood and fire, 
and education expenses are insurable. These risks are measured on the percentage of household 
income spent to cover risk and the financial impacts they cause to them. Each of the insurable risks 
will be examined and their characteristics will be analysed in the next section. 
6.6 ANALYSIS OF THE INSURABLE RISKS EXPOSURE   
6.6.1 House building expenses  
In this expense, a financial risk arises when flows of income do not coincide with required 
expenditures. The general characteristics for these types of risk exposure are that they can be 
anticipated, they are generally predictable and that makes planning and managing them more 
feasible. However, certainty of the occurrence of a damaging event will not necessarily reduce an 
individual household‘s vulnerability if the capacity to protect income or consumption from the 
impact of the damaging event is limited. The results show that a total of n=96 (12.5%) owned houses 
while n=139 (18.1%) rent the houses as indicated in graph in  the figure 6. 2 below.  
Figure 6.2: Informal Household House Ownership in Tanzania 
 
Source: Household Survey 2010 
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The study indicates that the cost of building expenses become crises if they are not adequately 
planned for, if insufficient savings have been accumulated to manage them, or if they occur 
concurrently with another risk. While households are generally aware as to whether and when these 
events will occur, the high likelihood and frequency of their occurrence creates an on-going 
uncertainty as to whether or not the household will have sufficient income or assets to cover the cost 
associated with this event.   Indeed, research finds that irrespective of their status (legal or illegal) 
the following are common characteristics of most informal household housing settlements; they are 
built and serviced incrementally, ensuring flexibility on the part of builders and owners using 
personal savings since formal housing systems or markets are hardly realistic options.  
The informally built houses exhibit high variations in types and quality of construction, ranging from 
traditional construction materials (e.g. mud and pole or thatch) to modern quality components 
(concrete blocks, corrugated iron, zinc, or tin roofs). The greatest motivation for house possession is 
that, it allows an individual household to access to large amount of loans to expand a business by 
using buildings as collateral. The household survey indicated the majority do rent the houses which 
suggest that peer pressure, income generating purposes and escaping high rent payments are the 
major motives to build a house.  
Figure 6.3: Informal Household’s Collateral used for borrowing 
 
Source: Household Survey 2010 
Specifically, the results from FGD showed that school fees, food expenses and cost of building a 
house emerged as significant risk exposure. Results suggest that life cycle events have a severe 
impact to most households. Their frequency makes managing them a pressing need for many 
informal households. From an insurance perspectives house building expenses cannot be associated 
with risk, as risk is an unexpected event causing financial loss. House building expense is 
predictable and expected. However, FGD participants indicate that this is one of the major causes of 
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families. For them their house is also the greatest source of wealth. The study reveals that 
households spend over 23 percent of income for housing purposes. Given the percentage of income 
that a household spends and the duration that takes (more than ten years) on housing expenditure we 
consider this risk in our analysis. The analysis conducted in the survey was supported by information 
extracted from the focus group discussion as indicated in Table 6.2 below. 
Table 6.2: Focus Group’s Discussion- risk exposures ranking 
Group Numbers 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total 
No of people in FGD 7 7 7 7 6 6 40 
Building a house  4 5 4 4 3 4 24 
 Paying school fees  3 2 4 4 5 5 23 
Food expenses  5 2 2 2 4 5 20 
Bills(  Rent, electricity, water etc)  2 1 1 1 2 2 9 
Source: Focus Group Discussion 
Building a house received the highest financial spending priority for most households interviewed, 
except in families where land is handed down between generations. Respondents reported that land 
prices have escalated rapidly in recent years. A typical plot for a house might cost 500 thousand 
shillings to 10 million Tanzanian shillings ($500 -$10,000).  Many households‘ families cannot pay 
such prices and therefore have to share small plots with their parents or rent rooms for life. 
Construction expenses for building a house are in range of 5 million to 20 million Tanzanian shilling 
($5,000 -$20,000) in high density areas only. For prime areas and low density prices tend to be far 
higher. Those who do not own a house highlighted rent as financial stress, particularly when coupled 
with other economic pressures such as illness or school fees. Monthly rent ranged from US$30 to 
$100 per month depending on the location and number of rooms required.  
The major technique applied  to cope with housing  related expenses are use of personal home 
saving, households saving in order to purchase building materials. Most families plan well in 
advance for the expenditure of home construction. According to the FGD most families aim to have 
60-70 percent of the total expense in hand before starting the house building. The survey reveals that 
over 40 percent of the respondents use their own saving to respond to different risks including house 
building.  The respondents indicated that they kept some savings at home with an average balance of 
Tsh. 2,000 (US$ 1.5) per day. After saving at home, informal saving techniques (as discussed in 
chapter seven of this thesis) are the second most common type of saving practised by respondents. 
Informal savings techniques assist informal households to accumulate capital for a variety of 
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purposes, including the cost of building a house, business investment and as a crisis buffer, although 
their usefulness as a coping strategy is somewhat limited. The research identified that informal group 
savings dominates informal sector households.  
There is evidence that apart from saving some families are forced to sell off part of their inherited 
land or physical assets in their possession in order to obtain the money needed for home 
construction. The household survey indicates that 38.6% of the households protect themselves from 
risk-induced losses by selling a stock of physical assets. Availability of surplus funds is an 
opportunity to buy more assets, which they were ready to sell to raise extra cash to build a house. 
Households in the informal sector often acquire extra assets such as radios, cassette recorders, 
refrigerators, televisions, VCRs and stoves. The FGD participants argued that rather than stashing 
away spare cash, they buy appliances above and beyond their households‘ needs so that they can sell 
them during cash flow shortfalls. These findings indicates that savings-in-kind seems to be more 
appropriate for risk management than cash savings because appliances are basically inflation and 
devaluation resistant. While most people buy these appliances because they want them, a large 
number of households are ready to sell off their assets as a coping mechanism although this does 
serve as a last resort.  
Borrowing from micro finance institutions for housing purposes was practised by a few respondents 
in the informal sector. The data reveals that most of the respondents will borrow for business and 
sickness purposes, rather than for building purposes. The findings indicate that 1.5 percent will 
borrow for housing purposes, 6.8 percent will borrow for business purposes and 5.9 percent will 
borrow sickness purposes. Figure 6.4 below indicates the borrowing purpose. 
Figure 6.4:  Informal Households Purpose for Loans 
  
Source: Household Survey 2010 
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 Major micro finance institutions providing micro credit loans include the Savings and Credit 
Society (SACCO) registered under the co-operative society act whose main function is to promote 
savings among its members and to create a source of credit to its members at a fair and reasonable 
interest rate. Generally, SACCOs are member based and their main source of capital is share 
holdings and member deposits. The use to which a loan is put is determined by the shareholder and 
can include housing. The loan size depends on the member‘s shareholdings which also provide the 
collateral for the loan. A detailed study of 5 borrowers from the FGD participants that was carried 
out by author shows, among other things, that: for the house owners who owned medium size 
houses, loans were used for room extensions and alterations; loans were relatively small and were 
issued repeatedly (more than three times). For example, the average loan obtained by each one of the 
five households was about TShs. 2,000,000 ($2000) and the disbursement was usually TShs. 
200,000($200); followed by TShs. 400, 0000 ($400) and so on.   The total loan amount was not 
adequate to complete the renovations. The owner households had to top up the amount from other 
sources. Tenants lived in the houses and monthly room rentals were adequate to repay the loan; and 
all borrowers admitted that the loan was an important catalyst for the house improvement. 
6.6.2 Medical expenses (health risk) 
The medical expenses were found to be the second highest risk exposure in the informal sector in 
Tanzania. Health related risks are stressful events for households because; its expenses cannot be 
postponed. They must be taken care of immediately or it will be worse. The results indicate that 
around 40% of the households incur medical expenses in the form of injuries and accidents, child 
birth and illness. Figure 6.5 below indicates types of medical expenses incurred by households. 
Figure 6.5: Households types of medical expenses 
 
Source: Household Survey 2010 
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cannot be predicted. Households are especially vulnerable given their limited resources; they cannot 
afford periodic medical checks and once they are diagnosed, it is often too late to treat the disease. 
The financial impact of medical expenses varies. Generally, illnesses which require hospitalization 
have the largest impact on a household budget. Small illness can have a major impact on a family if 
they happen often enough or affect several members of the households at once. The harshest impact 
on a household comes from long-term illness and major injuries which require multiple 
hospitalizations. For example the FGD participants explained that ―she got sick for about one week 
ago; she thought she will be fine, if she just rested for few days. She was wrong.  She ended up 
admitted and hospitalized for much longer period. During this time she stops attending to her 
business (selling food). Her only income generated over time was entirely spent for medical costs. In 
the end she became desperate that she finally sells her second house (formerly used for renting - 
generating income) in order to pay for proper health care. By the time she recovered she had 
suffered multiple losses. 
Everyday illness can be checked and treated at the government medical centers or district hospitals 
with reasonable expenditure. They are usually crowded and associated with shortages of medicine. 
The quality of health care in government hospitals and clinics is generally considered poor; hence 
households incur high expenses for medical care in private clinics. Many respondents identified high 
cost of prescriptions as a significant financial burden. All told, medical expenses have escalated 
rapidly in recent years. The monthly household expenditure information solicited from the structured 
interviews indicated that the average household spent US$10.60 on health expenses, which 
constituted 6 percent of monthly household expenditure. Most of the amounts given were for 
expenditure on medicines either with or without prescriptions from the doctor. Indeed, the cost of 
prescribed medications was a major complaint in the FGDs. In government clinics and hospitals 
where low income households usually access medical services, inexpensive health care is available 
for a registration fee of US$0.66 and monthly contribution of US$0.70; children under 5 years old do 
not pay any medical charges. 
Serious disease brings much more potential for adverse impact.  For example Mr. “A”, reported 
suffering from stomach diseases, since 2007. His treatment has cost him and the family a total of 
Tsh. 300,000/- ($300). Throughout the same time his wife has suffered pregnancy complications and 
a child died and they had to pay Tsh 250,000/- ($250) plus funeral costs. However, she (wife) has to 
remain hospitalized for the next two weeks and attend medical treatment after every week.  To cover 
medical bills families have taken loans from MFI and sold a family asset of a plot (piece of land).  
 Four major impacts were derived from these quotes; firstly, when severe health risk exposure 
impact occurs to households who are temporarily employed, they face greater risks of losing jobs in 
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cases of both short and long-term illnesses and emergency care and have lower productivity and 
there is also an increase in the possibility of losing a job due to missed days at work. Secondly, the 
disease reduces the earning capacity of the family as one or more wage-earners become debilitated. 
Thirdly, the emotional stress of a family member‘s illness can lower the productivity of the whole 
family. Fourthly, the medical checks and treatment for serious illness can be a huge economic 
burden, beyond the capacity of the typical informal households in the area. Added to this are 
transportation costs, as well as accommodation and food for family members who accompany the 
patient to care for him/her while in the hospital. According to the respondents in the FGD, average 
expenses for long-term care, intensive care, or an operation would fall in the following range: Less 
serious illness (10-50 thousand Shillings =$10 -$50), More serious illness (50 -200 thousand Shilling 
= $50 -$200, Fatal illness (200 – 500 thousands Shillings =$200 -$500, Most costly illness –Above 
500 thousand shillings =>$500). 
The easiest and quickest technique used to finance health risks are personal home savings
26
.  In 
second place that respondents will look to cover medical expenses costs from their current business 
proceeds; if current income is insufficient, households may start to use up capital in their business. 
Moreover, households prepare for emergencies such as illness by engaging in multiple business 
activities. The FGD indicates that half of the participants do engage in multiple business activities to 
smooth seasonal fluctuations in income. For some, this diversification becomes permanent and it 
eases cash flow problems when one line is not doing well. It is common to find a household running 
several businesses that have varying levels of cash flow at different times of the year purchasing 
assets. Indeed, selling of assets in their possession to cater for this type of risk is also very 
common.
27
   
The study shows that when savings and assets are insufficient households will borrow from whatever 
sources they can. Three sources are identified, firstly, FGD participants pointed out those families 
who have one person in a formal sector job often have access to interest free loans through their 
companies. Loans payment is deducted from a workers‘ paycheck. The amount that can be borrowed 
depends on the company‘s loan policy.  The person or family retains the risk of the loss themselves 
by borrowing from a friends‘ network, and nearly 40 percent of the respondents were once assisted 
either freely or through borrowing from members of the family or friend‘s network during financial 
difficulties or need.  
                                                          
26 Personal and group saving techniques discussed in section 6.4.1 apply to most of the risk exposures in the informal sector. Households 
kept saving on a daily basis a minimum amount of $1.5 for emergency and other purposes.  
27 As noted in section 6.4.1 households often acquire extra assets so that they can sell them during emergency risks like health risks. 
Some households beyond selling assets in their possession also save in the form of assets other than cash because appliances are 
inflation and devaluation resistant.  
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Secondly, there is great deal of evidence that borrowing from MFI Credit lines
28
 and from 
moneylenders is widely practised to meet medical expenses.  However, there is evidence to suggest 
that access to an MFI loan reduces reliance on the moneylenders; several focus group participants 
said: ―We stopped borrowing from moneylenders ever since we started borrowing loans from MFI.‖ 
In general, the high interest rate of 50 to 100 percent per month is considered the main deterrent to 
this source of credit. The interest rate is usually for any period less than a month and hence a 
minimum rate even for a loan repaid in a couple of days. Non-payment of debt by the end of the one-
month term results in a doubling of the interest payment. Seizure of assets is the penalty if non-
payment continues for a couple of months. According to the FGD participants, most moneylenders 
lend out between US$25 and $150. The interesting feature however is that the attitude toward 
moneylenders is mixed, and for a business opportunity that requires an immediate injection of 
capital households would prefer moneylenders. Moneylenders lending, is something most people try 
to avoid because of the high interest rates and concerns about having their assets seized but 
occasionally they are used to take advantage of a business opportunity since their services are 
quicker, and easy with simple procedures.  Thirdly, the use of medical health insurance is limited to 
14% of the respondents. There are two types of health insurance schemes i.e. community health 
funds (CHF) managed by VIBINDO and an NHIF
29
 scheme. However, in case of CHF, the level of 
enrollment decreases due to household‘s change of jobs and working locations.   
6.6.3 Education Expenses  
This risk does exist as a long-term expenditure in many families. Educational expenses may occur 
over the course of 20-25 years for families with 1-6 children. Most of the respondents perceived 
school fees among the major risk exposure that affect the household budget. The pressure to find 
money to pay for school fee was reported to affect informal households therefore is an important 
aspect in our analysis.  Education related expenses are critical, in part because of the high value that 
the respondents place on children‘s education. Due to economic reforms in the early 1990s, schools 
began asking parents to assume a greater share of expenses through higher school fees. As for school 
fees expenses the major characteristics observed during the study was that both private and 
government schools do exist. But most of the respondents sent their children to government schools 
since costs of private schools are higher. The cost of going to school includes registration fee (once a 
year), tuition (twice a year), examination fees (twice a year), uniform, supplies (books, notebooks), 
meals and transportation. 
                                                          
28 The result indicates that a larger number of households would borrow from MFI for business and sickness purposes than would borrow 
to cover the cost for building a house. The major MFI credit lines operating in the informal sector in Tanzania are explained in Chapter 
seven of this thesis. 
29 National Health Insurance Fund is a compulsory insurance scheme for civil servants’ in Tanzania.  The scheme provides coverage to a 
worker plus any other four households or dependants. The scheme provides general health services benefits to its members including 
hospitalization. 
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 Kindergarten is necessary not compulsory. Most households would prefer to send their children to 
attend this level. Universities and vocational schools bring additional expenses.  Most education 
expenses occur at the beginning of the school year in January (kindergarten to secondary level) and 
October each year for university students. Most of the household‘s families often adapt to the fees 
for primary schools, because the fees are reasonable and anticipated.  
The financial impact on education expenses become especially significant for households whose 
children enroll in secondary and university/vocational schools. Respondents estimated the average 
financial impact for school fees for children of different educational levels as follows:  Kindergarten: 
2 -6 years child costs around (US$150-250) per year and Primary school: 7 -13 years old child costs 
per pupil/year (US$100 -$150) (only transport and meals); Ordinary level Secondary 
school/vocational training: 14 -17 year old child costs per pupil/year (US $400-$600) depending on 
location of the school and High Secondary School: 18-19 year old student costs per student /year 
(US$500-$700) depending on the location of the school; University: 20 and above years old  student 
costs per student/year (US $800-$2000) depending on the university and location. There are student 
loans available provided by the state for university applicants with conditions.  
The major technique used for educational expenses are personal home saving; Use of Business 
Proceeds; Informal Savings Clubs; and Selling of Assets (see discussion in section 6.4.1). However, 
the FGD reveals the unique technique of reducing expenditure on non- food items were applied as 
way to increase household saving.  The household reduces expenditure on expensive foods (usually 
high protein content foods such as chicken and beef), compromising the nutritional value of the 
meals. Other respondents indicated that, if reduced consumption did not free up sufficient funds, 
they were likely to borrow from friends and relatives, often without interest.  Borrowings from 
friends and family are typically interest free, but the amount available is usually limited and also has 
a short duration.   
6.6.4 Death of household member 
The agony due to deaths of a loved one has been consistently noted as a financial burden.  A survey 
indicates that 12.5 percent of the households surveyed have experienced loss of a household 
member. During the FGD discussion, the research revealed that the financial burdens resulting from 
the deceased was not due funeral expenses but rather the member‘s contribution towards the total 
household income during his lifetime. The most expensive death-related loss is the premature or 
unexpected death of a breadwinner; the household has to find a way to replace the lost income. 
The financial impact for the death of member of the household is significant. In addition to pain and 
emotional suffering the family goes through the (aside from the emotional loss) one-time component 
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cost of proper burial, cost of settling the deceased‘s accounts and potentially, an on-going 
component to replace the income that the deceased formerly provided to the family.  Other adverse 
effects that bring huge financial risks for families include lowered productivity within families over 
both the short-term and long-term. For example the cases extracted from the FGD illustrated the 
point in question Mr. “E” is self-employed and lives in a family house (owned by his father) with his 
step mother. He normally received an addition working capital from his father to expand his 
business on a monthly basis. His mother is divorced, his father died in early 2009. His step mother 
chased him out of the family house immediately after the death of his father. Court proceeding are 
taking longer than expected; his business income is shrinking because of the increased expenditure 
resulting from renting out, legal expenses and less capital invested. 
Another impact is the changes in life styles for example Mr. “F”, twenty two years old lost his father 
who left her mother (unemployed) with three children. Funeral events and costs were well attended 
by relatives/siblings/friends and neighbours because the father was a popular leader in the area. He 
has been student at the time of his father‟s death. Problems start to unfold because of the increased 
expenditure beyond capacity to pay (school fees, limited assets to sell and no monthly income) he 
has had to leave school and establish a small business to support the family and three young 
siblings. The father‟s premature death causes a lot of changes in their family life styles. 
According to respondents, expenses for a typical funeral runs 100 – 500 thousands Tanzanian 
Shillings ($100 -$500).  These sums of money are quite high in this socio-economic context, though 
participants noted that the financial stress for funerals tends to be mediated by families and friends. 
There is evidence to suggest that funeral costs in most Tanzanian communities are financed by 
relatives and neighbours since social commitments are still very high.  
The major techniques applied to handle this type of risk exposure include the use of personal saving, 
use of business proceeds
30
 and family and friends contributions. The primary social connection tends 
to be proximity, either from neighbours, other market vendors or religious group members. There 
was evidence that the building of social networks to fall back on in times of need is regarded as a 
type of ex ante risk management strategy. This ranges from an implicit understanding between 
households and to community ties in general. There is a strong expectation of reciprocity. The FGD 
sessions considered friends and families to be social capital utilized by households. Reciprocal 
support is most common for household crises such as death and illness. According to many 
respondents, when struck by death of a household member for instance, sometimes you don‘t have to 
seek assistance; friends and relatives make contributions on their own as in the following case: - 
                                                          
30 Explanation the same as that in medical expenses 
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Respondent aged (38) lost a husband in 2009. Funeral expenses, she spent Tsh. 100,000/- ($100) 
from her own pocket, received Tsh. 150,000/-($150) from friends, and Tsh. 300,000/-($300) from 
relatives. She received a lot of financial assistance from her husband‟s relatives because they felt 
more responsible for the funeral expenses. 
According to the FGD families receive financial support from relatives/family/friends/neighbours in 
the form of cash envelopes/labour at funerals. An envelope for a funeral might be Tanzanian 
Shillings 5000- 10,000 per person (US$5-10). Relatives or close friends might send Tanzanian 
shillings 10,000 - 50,000 ($10 - $30) per person. Contributions to that amount depended on both 
their economic status and the strength of their relationship to the deceased. When death occurs every 
member shows respect and even those who are rarely involved in family issues will wish to assist 
with funeral costs. In total, respondents estimated that families on average can cover 30-60 percent 
of funeral expenses via external support.  Funeral expenses typically are shared among siblings, 
especially when a parent dies. The shares are not equal (sons normally contribute more than 
daughters), but all make a substantial contribution.  The use of life insurance is limited to a few 
respondents mostly members of MFI with credit line access to life insurance, and the policy covers 
funeral costs for the policy holder.  An example of an life insurance policy can be seen from the first 
micro insurance scheme
31
.  
6.6.5 Theft and covariant risks  
In the FGD sessions, a participant does not consider theft as major financial risks and mass, 
covariant risks like floods
32
, earthquake and fire calamities seem to be remote in occurrence. 
However, their consequences to household income are huge. Indeed, little evidence of floods was 
reported during the rainy season. In this study the data provides a smaller portion of loss of assets 
due to fire, floods, theft, drought, and riots because these events were not common in Tanzania.  Fire 
incidence was reported at a very minimal level which was an unexpected result.  Floods occur 
seasonally during the rainy season each year affecting non movable assets and were not considered 
to be major risks. Generally these exposures affect those families who live in unplanned lowland 
areas where the water drainage system cannot handle heavy rains.   
                                                          
31 The First Micro insurance Agency Limited (FMiA),  was an insurance company focused on microfinance borrowers in Tanzania. They 
provide insurance services for small-business owners and low-income earners.  The FMiA involves people who are members of the 
Savings and Credit Cooperatives Organizations (SACCOS), cooperatives, village savings, loan associations, banks and other forms of 
microfinance institutions  
32 Risks are said to be covariant when their pattern of occurrence is the same for a substantial portion of the population. For example, 
the risk of flood damage of household living in the un-surveyed lowland areas in Dar es Salaam is covariant because a substantial portion 
of households are significantly affected when a flood occurs. Risk whose pattern of occurrence varies for each household affected are 
called idiosyncratic. 
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6.7 SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER  
This chapter has explored the financial consequences brought about by the risk exposures in the 
informal sector, by describing characteristics and their impacts to the household‘s earned income. 
The results indicate that informal households face a variety of risks that provide unique challenges to 
their incomes. The household incomes were interrupted occasionally by unforeseen events like 
increases in food prices and medical expenses resulting from illness and injuries.  
 
The results from the data reveal three important outcomes. Firstly, that the most important risk 
exposure relates to house building expenses, medical expenses, education expenses and death related 
costs. A theft, flood and fire risk seems to be remote in occurrences.   
 
Secondly, it appears from the data that there are great variations on impacts on risk among 
households depending on the family background, economic status and the groups they belong to. 
More significant impact on risk exposure relates to major health problems which require 
hospitalizations and proper diagnosis.  
 
Thirdly, there is evidence of collective and group responsibilities on handling risk exposure. 
Significantly, findings show that death related risks are taken care of largely by families and friends 
networks.  
 
Having identified the major risk exposure, the next chapter will therefore focus on furthering the 
analysis on risk coping strategies used in the informal sector in Tanzania. The analysis will highlight 
weaknesses and establishes the attributes of the informal techniques that can be applied in micro 
insurance products design.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Saqware, PhD Thesis July 11, 2012 
  
97 
CHAPTER SEVEN: RESULTS OF ANALYSIS OF RISK COPING STRATEGIES 
The aim of this chapter is to present and discuss the finding related to risk coping strategies used in 
the informal sector in Tanzania. The chapter focuses on the second and third objectives of the 
research by examining the strengths and weaknesses of risk management techniques in place. A key 
contribution of this chapter is to highlight the gaps and establish the attributes of the informal 
techniques that can be applied in micro insurance product design.  
The chapter is divided into six sections. Section 7.1 provides a description of the major coping 
strategies in place in the informal sector. Section 7.2 discusses the major features of the risk coping 
strategies in place. Section 7.3 provides an analysis of the major strengths of the coping strategies in 
place. Section 7.4 identifies the limitations of the coping strategies. Section 7.5 presents a social 
protection case from the findings and finally section 7.6 provides a summary of the chapter.  
7.1 MAJOR COPING STRATEGIES IN THE INFORMAL SECTOR 
The finding indicate that  a coping strategy depends on the type of risk and the ability of households 
to cope with their consequences; it differs from one risk exposure to another and whether the risk in 
question is predictable or unpredictable. The data suggests that the coping strategy applied depends 
upon the existence of a household‘s stock of physical and financial assets, the nature of the social 
networks the household is connected to, the frequency of risk exposures and expectations about 
possible future risk exposures.   
 Table 7.1:  Major coping strategies and risk management techniques applied.  
 Technique applied 
Frequency Percent Percent 
Applied  
No of 
Risks 
Grade 
Use of personal savings 307 40.1 50 ***** A 
Informal Saving Clubs 300 39.2 50 ***** A 
Use of business proceeds 296 38.6 40 **** B 
Selling of Assets 84 11 40 **** B 
Reducing Expenditure 17 2 10 * D 
Borrowing: Friends and Family 228 29.8 40 **** B 
Borrowing: Banks and MFI credit  33 4.3 20 ** C 
Borrowing: Moneylenders 19 2.5 10 * D 
Health/funeral Insurance 98 14.9 20 ** C 
 Source: Household Survey and FGD participants 2010 
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7.2 THE FEATURES OF COPING STRATEGIES  
As indicated in table 7.1 above; it appears from the data that there are four features of risk 
management    applied to cover large number of risk exposures. These are self-insurance elements, 
informal social networks, and member based micro finance and funeral/health associations.  
7.2.1 Self-Insurance 
These techniques appear to be more frequently used than others to cover many risk exposures; they 
were used to cover the cost in respect of building a house, medical expenses, education expenses, 
death and theft. There are three aspects of self-insurance that is; personal savings, use of business 
proceeds and selling off assets. Personal saving is directly linked with level of individual income and 
expenditure. Saving works as proxy insurance during the contingency and plays a crucial role in 
households‘ decision making. In a standard saving model, households calculate how much money to 
spend in each period and how much to save.  However, in practice, households‘ expenditure 
overrides cash inflows or the income schedule. So the scope for saving remains secondary, unless it 
is mandatory to save (Deaton, 1991, 1992).  
Data suggest that saving is influenced by the nature and condition of households‘ income. The 
research findings indicate that daily saving was well practised; the respondents indicated that they 
kept savings at home with an average balance of Tsh. 2,000 (US$ 1.5) per day. The interpretation is 
that majority of the respondents are self-employed and they own a small business which provides 
them with income on daily basis. The study reveals that over 40 percent of the respondents use their 
own savings to respond to different financial needs. However, expenditure puts households in a low 
profile cycle of competing financial pressure and saving. In other words households earning at a 
subsistence level find it difficult to accumulate savings.  
Figure 7.1: Households Saving Patterns 
 
Source: Household Survey 2010 
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It appears from the data that there are both push and pull motivations behind saving behaviour. On 
the one hand, explanations suggested a lack of attractive formal savings facilities as a major factor as 
explained by FGD participants: - “the respondent in the FGD argued that “you are better off putting 
your money back in the business.” On the other hand, there were strong indications that 
reinvestment also reflected a desire for business growth. “My business capital is too small…if it is to 
grow I have to keep pumping in more money.” Hence this reduces the amount of savings. Therefore, 
household saving patterns though practised, for less disciplined households savings become 
inadequate to cope with risks. Focus group discussions revealed that, although they usually 
maintained some savings, most households were more inclined to reinvest surplus funds into the 
business rather than save.  
The second element of self-insurance derived from the data is the use of business proceeds; this was 
applied by 38.6 percent of the households interviewed to cover four types of risk exposure. The 
strategy seems to be the first line defence during financial needs. To increase income households do 
diversify and engage in multiple business activities to smooth seasonal fluctuations in income. 
Hence, data indicates the diversification process allows households to accumulate monthly annual 
income ranges from $301 to $600, the average monthly accumulated earnings
33
 of the households 
surveyed ranged from $101 to $600. The unit of protection in this technique is the level of income 
obtained from diversified sources. During the survey a diverse range of activities were uncovered. 
These activities were characterized by their small scale, labour intensive work practices and small 
amounts of fixed capital.  
The third element of self-insurance is that households insure themselves by building up assets. The 
study indicates that precautionary savings provides quite an effective, even though imperfect 
strategy for households in dealing with income risk. The choice of assets being held depends on the 
extent and speed with which assets can be made liquid which is very important from insurance point 
of view. Household asset holding patterns in the study areas is presented in figure 7.2 and 7.3 below. 
The coverage provided by asset based saving depends on the size of the assets. This strategy is 
accessible to most households depending on how much money they are able to save. The data 
indicates that the majority of households owned total movable assets worth $401-$1000 which can 
be sold in case of emergencies.  
                                                          
33 Most of the household incomes are generated from business proceed and sale of labour 
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Figure 7.2: Household average value of movable assets 
  
Source: Household Survey 2010 
A total immovable asset includes plots, land and property. The household survey indicates that the 
majority of households do not own any assets. However, there are reasonable numbers of households 
who have immovable assets worth above $20,000. Comparing this with total immovable assets and 
movable assets we find the majority of households own movable assets which are easy to sell and 
there are not very expensive unlike immovable assets. 
Figure 7.3: Household average value of immovable assets 
 
Source: Household Survey 2010 
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indicated by Wood (2003), the consequence is that households cannot enter into high-risk activities, 
and since downside risks are too high, the decision not to invest in a high risk but high return activity 
means foregoing income. To handle income risk, households have to enter low-risk, low-return 
activities. The consequence is further impoverishment, or at least increased inequality. Indeed, the 
same evidence was identified by Morduch (1995) and Dercon (2002), using the ICRISAT sample 
which shows that households with limited liquid assets grow proportionately a low-return, low risk 
crops.  
Secondly, the cost of holding different assets seems to be too high for most households. The main 
problems associated with this strategy are: a) having sufficient storage space and b) being able to sell 
them at an appropriate price when cash is really needed. In many cases households will first borrow 
to pay for an emergency and then sell their assets. The household survey indicates that 38.6% of the 
households protect themselves from risk-induced losses by selling a stock of physical assets.  Deaton 
(1991) sets out clearly the benefits of self-insurance via asset saving when credit markets are 
imperfect. The model shows that if households are infinitely lived then households will build up 
assets in good years to deplete in bad years. Assets will not be systematically accumulated to very 
large levels due to impatience.  However, it is not easy to draw policy conclusions from this work, 
and any way the results follow largely from the impatience of households: if only they were patient, 
they would build up sufficient assets to cope with future stress.  
In practice, assets are risky, not safe. The covariance of asset values and income due to risk 
exposures makes self-insurance a far less useful strategy than it seems. Asset market difficulties that 
face households suggest that the portfolio of assets available to the households is far from ideal. 
Another form of risk related to assets is not so much related to the return per se, but to the terms of 
trade of assets relative to consumption. If negative risk exposures occur, households would like to 
sell some of their assets. However, if everybody wants to sell their assets, asset prices will collapse 
and the consumption that can be purchased with the sale of assets will be lower. Similarly, when a 
positive shock occurs, all will want to buy assets for future protection, but then prices will be pushed 
up. In all, self-insurance becomes far more expensive as a strategy.  
Bevan, et al. (1991) reported on the construction boom taking place during the coffee boom in the 
mid-1970s in Kenya; prices for construction materials and other durables increased considerably. 
Households tried to put some of their positive windfalls into more assets, but their choice set was 
strongly restricted due to the macroeconomic policies. Moreover, access to relatively safe and 
profitable assets, which might be useful for self-insurance, may be limited. Unevenness in assets 
may be a reason why households cannot protect themselves easily via assets. While risk in returns 
and terms of trade may limit, in certain circumstances, the use of assets for a risk management 
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strategy, there examples where assets contribute as risk coping strategy. This study suggests that 
integrating asset markets with the wider economy could avoid much of the often-observed covariate 
movements in asset prices and incomes. For example, if a household in the informal sector is holding 
assets, a low cost financial saving could be facilitated, and then communities could use alternatives 
to physical assets for saving of wealth. Introducing a focus on savings for self-insurance in the micro 
finance schemes could be of help.  
Thirdly, diversification of sources of income does not necessarily imply that the household follows a 
high-risk strategy. Also, entry constraints limit the diversification that can be achieved, leaving only 
low return activities free to the households. When a large negative event occurs, the usual 
households‘ activities may not yield sufficient income. If all households in a community or region 
are affected, local income earning activities are unlikely to be sufficient. The findings show that 
substantial scope for diversification exists, but income remains highly variable. The income 
diversification for effective risk-reduction appears to be limited. Observed diversification patterns 
are often not aimed at reducing risk, since households face entry constraints to enter into profitable 
activities. 
The study finds that informal households work with very little capital and utilize a low level of 
technology and skills. They generally operate at a low level of productivity which provides irregular 
income and employment to meet some of the daily needs. The findings indicate that profitable or 
mean income preserving diversification is not easily achievable; household have to enter into low 
return-capital extensive activities, since high return activities require capital. The households are less 
diversified despite facing more serious consequences of bad income draws with limited risk 
management instruments. The implication is that many diversification strategies are actually mean 
income reducing, making them less interesting for households; lower risk will have to be weighed 
against low returns, providing another reason for the limited income smoothing achieved in practice.  
7.2.2 Family and friends network 
The second feature derived from the data is the dependency on family and friends networks. This 
suggests that Tanzania is a collectivistic society. Networks of friends and families are mainly coping 
mechanisms that depend on family (nuclear and extended) and other networks of friends.  Kinship 
and geographical proximity between neighbours assume fundamental importance in certain types of 
locality and are particularly activated during periods of social and economic uncertainty. The build-
up of reciprocal favours between neighbours thrives among cohesive, informal households where 
resources for satisfying needs in other ways are low.  The study finds that the strategy was used to 
finance costs related to medical expenses, education fees, death of a household member and theft. 
Friends, relatives, neighbours and fellow businesses represented key social assets for most FGD and 
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household survey respondents. This support typically emerged in the form of reciprocity: ―Assist 
someone today in order to be assisted some other time when you are in need‖.  Reciprocity involves 
the mutual obligation to give and to receive. It expresses and cements a social relationship between 
giver and receiver. The product or service exchanged symbolizes the underlying social relationship 
and has value over and above its material worth. In practice then, the commodities and services 
exchanged tend to lie outside market calculations of the value of the exchanges. Rather, they are 
characterized by the principle of reciprocity which mutually obliges the parties concerned to enter 
into binding relationships with other households. 
The research suggests that the habit of share and share alike is easily understandable in a community 
where everyone is likely to find himself in difficulties from time to time, for it is scarcity not 
sufficiency that makes people generous. He who is in need today receives help from him who may 
be in need tomorrow. These extended kinship networks provided a major source of social and 
economic support for those in need. Nearly 40 percent of the population indicates to have used this 
strategy for different financial needs.  This research finds that the reciprocity was paramount and 
bound kin, neighbours and friends to each other as in Dercon and Krishnan (2005). The data suggest 
that most households did not have sufficient income to meet their own needs. Hence, they were often 
compelled to create and maintain supportive relationships within their community. Out of these 
relationships emerged reciprocal transactions which bound households together and helped 
strengthen social relationships. These reciprocal transactions symbolize the social and economic 
interdependence between the households involved.  
Although the relationships are quite complicated, family support appears to be motivated by two 
main factors. Firstly, people give money or other assistance in times of crisis on the expectation that 
recipients will return the favour in the future. This informal obligation seems to be fortified through 
participation in other social structures that increases the likelihood that one will actually benefit in 
the future. A second motivation is family obligations, for example to give money to needy 
dependents. This obligation is not accompanied by any expectation of reciprocation. Since some 
extended families only include one or two persons who earn reasonable wages, family obligations 
can represent a significant expense. Many respondents consider the family and friends as an 
effective, easy coping mechanism. However, major weaknesses in relying on friends and family are 
the availability and reliability, incomplete protection and vulnerability to covariant risks. The payout 
from an informal network is not usually sufficient to pay for the whole risk; it is often supplemented 
by the individual affected member.  
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7.2.3 Member based micro finance 
The third element of risk management strategies in place is the use of member based micro finance 
schemes. This study has identified four major groups based micro finance institutions used to 
manage risks in the informal sector. The data shows these schemes allow households to accumulate 
capital for a variety of purposes, including consumption, business investment and managing 
emergency risks.  
Firstly, are the Rotating Saving and Credit Associations (ROSCAs), which are traditional savings 
and credit arrangements. While the main function of ROSCAs is to enable capital accumulation of 
indivisible items; they also serve as risk-pooling arrangements if individuals receive negative risk 
exposure during the rotation cycle. ROSCAs is a group of people who come together at regular 
intervals to make contributions into a fund that is distributed to one of its members at each meeting 
until each member has received money from the fund (a.k.a pot). Interest is not earned on the fund. 
The members of the ROSCAs are normally from within the neighbourhoods and thus know one 
another. These contribute to ensuring commitment to the association and reduce the risk of default. 
When each person has received money from the fund the group could be dissolved or the cycle is 
started over again. The ROSCAs contain both the element of saving and lending. The first person to 
receive money from the fund is a borrower, since s/he is receiving money up front. The last person to 
receive money from the fund is a saver since s/he would have been making regular contributions to 
the fund until such time as it is his/her turn. To reduce risk and enforce commitment new members 
are placed in the last positions. The placement of an individual in the cycle can be random or 
through bidding.  Membership of ROSCAs is used to finance expenditures such as school fees, the 
purchase of plots or building a house. Members can only win the pot once in the lifetime of the 
ROSCA.  As indicated in Chiteji (2002) and Besley, et al. (1983) defaults on ROSCA loans are 
found to be extremely rare. This is because ROSCAs use pre-existing social connections between 
individuals to help circumvent the problems of imperfect information and enforceability. 
 
The second category of a members based micro finance schemes is the SACCOs; the idea seems to 
have been highly marketed during the implementation of micro finance policy in 2001. The group 
member based SACCOs in the informal sector in Tanzania adopted the Grameen Bank 
methodology
34
 based on peer groups. Normally business groups collect compulsory payments from 
                                                          
34 Schemes using the Greeman model, offer general loans for business expansion. Clients must have an existing business in order to 
qualify for loans. Saving products are generally compulsory guarantees for loans which, means that starts-ups do not qualify for loans. 
The model aims at meeting working capital needs although there are incidental data indicating some loans finance house improvements, 
acquisition of durables such house furniture and television sets.   
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members to contribute to the group‘s fund - incorporating both savings and loans. Recently, a few 
SACCOs have modified the traditional Grameen model; developing new products including micro-
insurance covering risks related to health and credit life insurance.   
The third category of member based micro finance is the village bank model which was established 
in the 1980s in Latin America by Foundation for International Community Assistance (FINCA). The 
model has proved hugely exportable, and can now be found in over 3000 cities in 25 countries 
including Tanzania. Village banks have been set up to serve the informal households community. 
They serve entrepreneurs in order that they can build their business and escape poverty. More than 
improving the businesses opportunities of the poor, providing credit allows the opportunity to learn 
how to manage money and how best to make a living. Morduch, (1999) indicates that the village 
bank enforces group based collateral, by allowing substantial local autonomy over loan decisions 
and management. The theory behind community banks is that a sense of ownership among the 
community ensures repayment. Loans are made to individuals, with a mandatory saving of at least 
20 percent of the loan value. This mandatory saving also serves as a type of collateral in kind, since 
subsequent loan sizes are tied to the amount that members have on deposit with the bank. This also 
ensures that the village bank will become self-sustainable, and not reliant on the external finance of 
non-governmental organizations. Many other methods may be used to ensure repayment of loans; 
however, these methods are decided very much on the village scale. They provide a wide range of 
savings and loan products to their members. They commonly require compulsory savings, but also 
offer individual or group saving products and deposits. This methodology focuses on empowering 
relatively large groups of people (20-40) in building their own financial institutions, with a savings 
first approach.  
 
Savings, credit and insurance arrangements help risk management in two ways. Firstly, households 
use precautionary savings or consumption credit to smooth consumption in the face of either income 
risks or anticipated variation in income or in expenditure. Secondly, households can use production 
or investment credit to build up assets and thereby increase future capacity to self-insure. As a vast 
literature on micro finance indicates, there exists a wide range of community-based arrangements for 
managing risk through finance
35
. Informal credit arrangements commonly incorporate some 
insurance element, enhancing the risk management function of the (informal) contract. Thirdly, 
major credit-based quasi insurance is the existing of loans according to risk exposures that happen to 
                                                          
35 The excellent reviews of the micro finance movements as well as the stylized features of micro finance institutions see for example, a 
recent book by Armendariz and Morduch (2005) on the economics of micro finance. See also Robinson (2001),  Hossain and Rahman, 
(2001) for an overview of the micro finance movement in developing countries and Zeller and Meyer (2002) for limitations of the micro 
finance movement and how to make it sustainable and more effective. For a general overview of formal and informal financial services 
used by poor in developing countries see Rutherford (2000). 
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either the borrower or lender. The research finds that an informal contingent loan provides insurance 
against a wide variety of idiosyncratic risks exposure faced by informal households.  In this 
arrangement, loans are state-contingent. If the borrower faces a negative risk exposure after the loan 
was agreed, he pays a lower interest rate. If, on the other hand, the lender faces a negative shock 
after the loan was agreed, then he receives a higher interest rate. Repayment dates are also flexible 
and state-contingent. Due to the high incidence of idiosyncratic risks faced by households in this 
setting, the quasi-insurance component of informal credit arrangements effectively pools risks over 
time as both parties are likely to find themselves affected by negative risk exposures over successive 
periods. Micro finance offers a well-known category of a semi-formal, community-based credit, 
savings and insurance services.  
The research indicates that microcredit institutions are typically characterized by joint liability; loans 
are made to individuals, they can obtain a loan only if they form a group with other individuals 
seeking loans. This creates added incentive for group members to provide each other with insurance 
against risks as part of the cost of risk induced illiquidity so that disruptions to loan servicing is 
shouldered by other group members. As a result, microcredit arrangements lower informational costs 
for lenders by taking advantage of peer selection effects (which can lower problems of adverse 
selection) as well as peer monitoring (which can lower problems of moral hazard). The risk-sharing 
inducements of microcredit arrangements are further deepened by dynamic incentives, whereby loan 
sizes are increased over time. Hence, default rates are lowered provided progressive lending takes 
place over infinitely many periods. In addition, default rates are also lowered by screening out ‗bad 
types‘. The most important feature is that microcredit institutions are less likely to require traditional 
collateral (e.g., housing, land) that have resale value, as they rely more heavily on reputational 
mechanisms to reduce default.  
By lessening the need to place borrowers‘ assets at risk of seizure in the event of default, micro 
lending arrangements reduce borrowing risk and associated risk rationing of credit
36
.  Perhaps more 
importantly, lower or no collateral requirements tend to improve the access of households to credit to 
tide them over in the wake of serious risk exposure. Khandker (2007, 2009) finds that micro finance 
institutions enhanced flood-affected households‘ access to finance and thereby played a central role 
in enhancing coping ability. The findings suggest that increased financial savings improved liquidity 
hence facilitating better risk management by depositors. Micro savings arrangements can be 
voluntary or compulsory and typically involve small, frequent deposits. In the former case, savings 
can be withdrawn at the depositor‘s discretion and thereby helps households to meet anticipated but 
                                                          
36 See Boucher, et al.  (2005), Boucher and Guirkinger (2007) for theoretical discussion and empirical evidence, respectively, on risk 
rationing in credit contracts in rural Latin America. 
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lumpy expenses or to cope with unanticipated shocks. In the latter case, they act as a form of 
collateral that can be accessed in the event a borrower runs into repayment problems. Under such 
arrangements, compulsory savings can typically be withdrawn only with the consent of the group. 
This provides a form of credit insurance otherwise unavailable to many borrowers.  
 
The data indicates that 14.6 percent of the populations are members of an MFI and 4.3 percent have 
taken loans. Those who have taken loans say they prefer monthly payment than annual repayments 
loans. The most popular loans are from MFIs (10%) and NGOs (5%). Households prefer to borrow 
from MFIs than NGOs and Banks. Most of the participants will prefer state banks to commercial 
banks. The findings indicate that most of the loans were used for business purposes and purchase of 
assets or working tools. The household borrowing patterns shows that MFI with a monthly payment 
model are most preferred as indicated in figure 7.4 below. This suggests that borrowing culture 
within an informal household is reasonable. 
Figure 7.4: Household’s Borrowing Patterns 
 
Source: Household Survey 2010 
On other hand the study provides evidence of use moneylenders which involves significantly higher 
interest rates compared to borrowing from MFIs. The high interest costs of the private money lender 
are partly due to the costs of monitoring. However, the transaction costs (pecuniary and time costs) 
incurred when contracting a loan may be much lower than in the formal sector. Thus depending on 
the size of the loan it may be less costly to contract the loan from the informal sector.  The costs of 
default to the borrower may be lower when borrowing from the informal sector compared to the 
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up with loan payments, the interest cost on a loan in the formal sector can become quite large if 
penalty payments are imposed.  An informal lender may not impose such stringent conditions if it is 
observed that the delinquency is because of a real difficulty in meeting payments because of an 
extraneous shock. Thus for households who face a high amount of risk and uncertainty, and 
therefore a high probability of delinquency in payments, the informal sector may be the preferred 
choice for sourcing a loan.  
 
The results indicate that moneylenders were used for medical expenses only (health related risks). 
However some participants apply for business purposes. When the MFI‘s products do not address 
their needs, households were forced to borrow from moneylenders for emergencies. Indeed, 
respondents argued that the MFI loans process hinders some households from borrowing from MFIs. 
The chain of process includes membership registration and sometimes at the end insufficient loans 
will be granted.   For a business opportunity that required an immediate injection of capital, a 
household would prefer to borrow from a moneylender in order not to lose a business opportunity. 
The moneylender‘s services are occasionally used to take advantage of a business opportunity; their 
services are more likely to be used to manage risks. During FGDs, there were strong indications that 
households borrow from moneylenders primarily when struck by a risks crisis.  
The defining features of all members‘ based schemes are the interpersonal relationships between 
members. The schemes are characterized by low information and transaction costs, since participants 
typically live in close geographical proximity and their economic circumstances; wealth, income, 
realizations of risk exposures  are, for the most part, easily observable. Contracts, almost always 
unwritten, are found to be self-enforcing even in the absence of state policing and judicial courts 
arising from a combination of effective peer monitoring, fear of social sanctions as well as repeated 
interactions over time between the same individuals.  Therefore, informal arrangements are similar 
in that they involve repeated transactions between the same (or almost the same) set of individuals 
(or households). 
The data indicates three major issues related to the member based micro finance scheme as an 
insurance technique; firstly, micro finance becomes an ideal institution to provide micro insurance 
because of the pro-poor nature of interventions; their clients are low-income individuals or 
households that would typically be excluded from standard insurance schemes. Due to its group-
based community character, they can exploit informational advantages that are not available to 
private or public insurers that deal with individuals, thereby overcoming moral hazard and adverse 
selection problems. In addition, they overcome the problem of limited scale economies that affect 
larger insurance companies, since it typically has much lower overhead costs. It can also resolve 
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enforcement problems common in low-income economies using peer monitoring, a mechanism 
unavailable to non-community based private insurers. It can more easily address the problem of low 
awareness among clients regarding insurance products via outreach efforts, thereby increasing the 
risk pool. However, the small size of the risk pool in informal-based micro insurance schemes is one 
of its major shortcomings. 
Secondly, there is evidence to suggest that member based schemes provide social relationships that 
foster and strengthen ties for reciprocity and inter-household borrowing. However, data indicates 
that these strategies have two major problems. Firstly, they provide incomplete protection, as the 
pay-out is not usually sufficient to pay for the whole risk. There is evidence of partial risk-sharing 
via transfer behaviour in the systems and the insurance model is rejected. The key prediction of the 
insurance model implies that all group resources are effectively pooled; therefore an unpredicted 
event is covered by insurance policy transfer from other members in the group.  From this it was 
obvious that the group can insure particular risks, not all risk exposures. Therefore it is tempting to 
suggest that other means should be used to insure excluded risk exposure. Member based schemes 
should be equipped to develop micro insurance policies to cover these risks. However, the 
consequences of these alternatives should be well understood. 
 
Thirdly, another problem of member based schemes is issues related to self-enforcing, imposing 
sustainability constraints. Enforcement through norms alone is unlikely to be sufficient. These 
schemes rely on specifying an enforceability (or sustainability) constraint in each group, in which 
individuals must find it in their interest to remain in the scheme, rather than going it alone. The 
easiest assumption to justify this is that besides full information, because of strong social norms, and 
the existence of rules to punish deviations, it is never better to renege on the agreement to share 
risks. The schemes systematically find that risk-sharing arrangements can be sustained if individuals 
discount future returns at a low rate, so that any future benefits matter in deciding to enter or to 
remain in the scheme.  Evaluating the effects of group saving coping mechanisms needs to take into 
account their effect on incentives to sustain the agreement rather than to go it alone.  
 
It can be concluded from the findings that any policy intervention that improves an individual‘s 
position outside a member based scheme should understand the existing mechanisms. Insurers must 
target groups rather than individuals; this of course requires detailed information about the group 
schemes operations. Member based schemes provide a useful alternative to sale micro insurance 
within its members when substantial design and information are gathered and analysed. An 
alternative could be to encourage and support groups involved in informal insurance arrangements to 
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develop group-based self-insurance mechanisms. Ultimately, more empirical research should shed 
light on various groups and institutions engaging in informal arrangements, their functioning, role 
and their potential for expansion. Also, more work is needed on whether and how these informal 
arrangements are affected by interventions and whether alternative schemes can be designed. It is 
likely that interventions should be cautious especially in contexts conducive to these private informal 
institutions.   
7.2.4 Funeral/Health Societies  
The fourth features on risk management techniques applied in the informal sector are health or 
funeral societies. These are used to cover events such as deaths and funerals. They have arisen 
largely in response to the substantial expenditures associated with funerals. They are typically 
characterized by a well-defined membership base and membership rules. Membership is restricted to 
individuals living in the same geographical area. As a result, individuals are able to observe fellow 
members closely and monitor their behavior, mitigating problems of moral hazard (for example 
spending payouts on non-funeral expenses). Moral hazard is not as much of a problem in the case of 
funeral insurance as in the case of other forms of insurance as, at least in most cases, it is extremely 
unlikely that individuals precipitate death because they have funeral insurance.  
 
In these semi-formal burial societies, contributions are typically to be made on a regular basis or 
when a death occurs. Contributions can be monetary or in kind (in the form of food and labour 
assistance). Payments are made for funeral-related expenses incurred when a member or a well-
defined set of relatives of the member die and the amount is typically conditional on the relationship 
of the deceased to the member. There are funeral associations established to provide insurance 
against death-related risks. In addition to death-related risks exposure, these organizations provide 
insurance against other adverse shocks. For example, funeral associations provide coverage for 
funeral costs and illness. Although these institutions are described as informal they operate with 
written rules and regulations, and membership rules of funeral associations require that new 
members must put in applications. The rules include but are not limited to group‘s membership fees, 
and members in default are subject to exclusion from the group, fines, public warning or bringing the 
person before a local court. Invariably the fear of shame is expected to play an important role in 
reducing the incidence of default. There was a significant positive relationship between incomes and 
whether a person or household would be a member of a funeral association. These requirements are 
a screening mechanism to reduce the incidence of adverse selection and to ensure commitment. The 
activities that are insured are clearly defined and this reduces the incidence of moral hazard.  
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The research finds various semi-formal community-based financing scheme initiatives known as 
micro insurance community health funds or mutual health organizations. Typically, these 
community-based health insurance initiatives are established in conjunction with health care 
providers. They are usually characterized by voluntary membership (which can potentially increase 
adverse selection problems) and have strong community involvement in pooling, revenue collection, 
resource allocation, and often, service provision. The latter can ameliorate moral hazard and adverse 
selection problems. Members make regular ex ante contributions and receive a payout in the event 
that illness occurs.  Among other things, community-based health insurance associations vary on the 
basis of the extent of coverage (high frequency, low cost events; or low frequency, high cost events). 
In a review of community-financed health initiatives, Preker, et al. (2002) finds micro-level evidence 
that community financing improves access for informal sector households to much-needed health 
care and provides them with some financial protection against the cost of illness. In addition they 
also find macro-level evidence that risk-sharing in health financing improves all five World Health 
Organization (WHO) indicators of the performance of a country‘s health system (including the level 
and distribution of health, financial fairness and responsiveness indicators).  
 
This research finds that community-financed health initiatives frequently suffer from low resource 
mobilization, small size of the risk pool and poor management capacity. Perhaps most critically from 
the viewpoint of risk management by the informal households, we find evidence that the poorest are 
often excluded from these schemes in the absence of some kind of subsidy. The household survey 
reveals that 14 percent of the respondents use formal insurance services and in particular health 
insurance schemes managed by VIBINDO society. This scheme is a provider based scheme. This 
strategy was used for the costs related to death and medical expenses only.  For a few respondents 
mostly members of MFI with credit lines have access to life insurance. The policy covers funeral 
costs for the policy holders, examples of an insurance policy available can be seen from the first 
micro insurance scheme.  
 
The high level of risk and the evidence that households are not able to completely protect against 
adverse shocks suggests that there may be demand for insurance.  The relative successes of informal 
techniques appear to be in terms of getting round the problems of information asymmetry and 
enforcement. This suggests that they should be the ideal local financial intermediary to link up with 
formal financial institutions. There are challenges associated with this kind of cooperation that must 
be addressed if these arrangements are to be successful. Informal insurance groups tend to be small 
in size and the success is because their relatively small size allows them to screen and monitor at 
reasonable costs. A program linking them to formal financial institutions should be careful not to 
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expand the size of the associations beyond what is optimal to effectively continue to perform these 
functions. Dixon, et al. (2007) indicates that the experience of micro finance organizations that 
expand too quickly is that staff get over-stretched and diverted away from their core functions. This 
leads to frustration amongst members of the micro finance groups and the rate of default increases.   
There is evidence to suggest that a large number of member based schemes deliver public goods
37
 
and services, bolstering the ability of households to manage risk, whether through risk transfer (i.e., 
insurance) mechanisms or, more commonly, through reduced risk exposure. The research finds 
disease control through community-based preventive medical and sanitation programs that help to 
reduce health risks in market centers. These are typically provided through community-based 
arrangements established by NGOs or local governments to deliver goods and services that have a 
public good character.  Findings from a combination of focus-group discussions and household 
surveys suggest that the community-based model for the provision of public goods and services are 
preferred by respondents to those by the commercial sector. The major reasons cited for their 
preference are the ease of access and flexibility for payment provided by community-based 
distribution, relative to other models.  
7.3  MAJOR STRENGTHS OF COPING TECHNIQUES APPLIED. 
The data indicates that coping strategies applied have two main advantages relative to private risk 
management schemes that do not involve communities in program identification and 
implementation. Firstly, community participation often results in improved targeting outcomes
38
. 
Not surprisingly, relative to insurance projects from outside the community, communities can better 
identify the most needy and vulnerable among them. Thus, there is substantial evidence that 
communities enjoy major informational advantages in identifying who needs assistance and when, 
thus reducing the costs of verifying the need for indemnity payments and the risks of either false 
negative or false positives in the decision as to whether to provide claims payments. 
 
Secondly, member based schemes have an advantage of low information and enforcement costs. Due 
to the frequent, repeated interactions among members linked through kinship, informal group 
members and the general lack of privacy that characterizes their economic activities, the effort and 
circumstances of a member of the community can typically be observed relatively easily.  This 
reduces problems of asymmetric information (i.e., moral hazard and adverse selection) which beset 
insurance markets. Moreover, due to the close proximity of members within a community, the cost 
of monitoring a fellow member is low and social sanctions are commonly available as relatively 
                                                          
37 Public goods do not have rivalry in consumption and are non-excludable 
38 See Coady, et al. (2004) and  Conning (1999)  for relevant references 
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low-cost enforcement mechanisms. In addition, given that members of a community typically 
interact with the same individuals on a repeated basis over long periods of time, unwritten or 
informal contracts can be self-enforcing as the short-term benefits from reneging are much smaller 
than the long-term costs. Thus, even in the absence of formal legal courts, community-based 
arrangements can ameliorate problems of moral hazard and contract enforcement that plague 
insurance contracts. 
 
However, these cost and information advantages can easily be offset by objectives, one should guard 
against the naïve assumption that member based schemes are necessarily always superior. To date, 
there are no careful evaluations of the efficacy or rate of return from community-based 
arrangements, and the extent to which they address problems of informational asymmetries and 
lower enforcement costs. An empirical project for the future could be to fill this gap
39
 in knowledge 
either through non-experimental econometric work or randomized controlled trials related to 
community-based arrangements.  
7.4  MAJOR LIMITATIONS ON COPING STRATEGIES APPLIED 
Informal risk management arrangements are not a panacea for uninsured risk. The research has 
identified two main limitations of these arrangements for managing risk successfully. Firstly, the 
exclusion of the poorest and other marginalized sub-population. The evidence for most semi-formal 
institutions in the informal sector in Tanzania;- shows that the poorest members of the community 
cannot participate in SACCOs, ROSCAs, Village Banks and mutual health associations because they 
are not able to afford to make contributory payments.  Indeed, Hogset (2005) finds that poorer 
households are systematically less likely to receive transfers from other households than are better-
off neighbours. Similarly, Dercon, et al. (2008) finds that better-off households belong to more 
mutual insurance groups and have larger social networks.  This research shows that households with 
more human and physical capital have larger social networks, indicating that exclusion from social 
networks can be due to economic status.  
  
The key point from this study is that group formation for risk management purposes is voluntary and 
therefore potentially excludes subpopulations such as women, religious minorities and the poorest.  
Access to groups is not necessarily equal and is not readily imposed exogenously. Santos and Barrett 
(2006) discussed that  exclusion of the poorest from insurance groups may be a rational response for 
non-poor agents in the presence of poverty traps, as those trapped in a low-level equilibrium are far 
less likely to be able to reciprocate in the future and thus become undesirable insurance partners. 
                                                          
39 This research recommends that future research direction should focus in this area. 
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Using data from a village in Tanzania, De Weerdt (2005) and De Weerdt and Dercon (2006) find 
that the poor have less dense social networks used for risk-management purposes. In addition to 
exclusion of the poorest, endogenous group formation can also lead to exclusion along the lines of 
ethnicity, occupation, gender, geographical proximity or other characteristics. For example, 
Goldstein, et al. (2005) finds that gender, lineage and social interactions, as well as wealth, matter at 
the individual level for inclusion in informal social networks among rural households in eastern 
Ghana.  
 
Secondly, the findings suggest that decisions to exclude insurance partners on the basis of variables 
such as lineage, occupation and geographical proximity can be rationalized on the basis of keeping 
information and enforcement costs low. However, on the other hand, more homogenous groups are 
also less likely to be able to withstand large covariate shocks, as their incomes are likely to co-vary. 
For example, Grimard (1997) discusses the tension in the selection of insurance partners made by 
households in Cote d‘Ivoire. The study suggests that households living in close proximity can be 
easily monitored but are vulnerable to correlated risk, while households living far away from each 
other are difficult to monitor but do not suffer from correlated risk.   
 
Moreover, while inter-household transfers offer some effective insurance against idiosyncratic 
shock, they offer no insurance against covariate shocks for the obvious reason that all community 
members find themselves in the same boat with respect to the covariate component of realized 
income. Informal risk coping strategies thus commonly fail in the wake of natural or manmade 
disasters, during which poor households have limited resources for self-insurance and often cannot 
avail themselves of local risk sharing arrangements; consequently they must reduce consumption 
drastically (Morduch, 2005; Platteau, 1991). In addition, Rosenzweig (1988) indicates that the 
severity of risks determines the efficacy of informal risk management arrangements, as risk sharing 
may break down in the face of more severe risk exposures. Table 7.2 indicates the major strengths 
and weaknesses of risk management applied.  
Table 7.2: Strengths and weaknesses of applied coping strategies (insurance perspectives) 
 Moral 
hazard 
Adverse 
selection 
Covariate 
risks 
Cost 
efficiency 
Quality Equity of 
access 
Self-insurance +++ ++ +/- +/-  - +++ 
FF-Network +++ ++ +/- +/- - ++ 
MB-MFI‘s ++ - +/- +/- +/- ++ 
Funeral/Health Ass. ++ - - ++ +/- ++ 
Market based scheme + -, - +++ ++ +++ -,-,- 
Source: Authors analysis; Note:  (+++) strong comparative advantage (- - -) Strong disadvantage 
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7.5 A SOCIAL PROTECTION CASE IN THE FINDINGS  
The limitations identified in section 7.4 calls for social protection cases in the informal sector. 
Broadening the concept of public-private partnership, to take into account the variety of informal 
schemes engaged in the provision of public goods is the way forward. This co-provision largely 
depends on the willingness of the state to cooperate (Schmidt, 1995; Brown and Ashman, 1996). 
Recent studies by Berman (1998) and Alderman (2002) describe the important role of private health 
care providers and social assistance schemes in financing health risk and meeting the demands and 
needs of the population. There is empirical evidence that argued that public-private partnership 
influences economic growth (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Putnam, 1993; Narayan and Pritchett, 1997; 
Moser, 1998). These studies argued that cooperation can lead to more efficiently operating 
government structures, and have a positive influence on household incomes and that it is an 
important element in the complex asset portfolio of poor households, as it reduces vulnerability.   
 
This finding has brought some insight on the relationships that are grounded in structures of 
voluntary associations, norms of reciprocity and co-operation. The existence of member based 
schemes indicates the importance of public-private cooperation.  Memberships in groups and 
networks facilitate information exchange and participation, thereby reducing transaction costs and 
helping to build trust and social cohesion. Whereas it has widely been accepted that social capital 
matters for successful cooperation between the state, market and member based schemes several 
questions remain open. As Putnam (1993) pointed out that building of social capital depends upon 
basic structural factors such as the state‘s capacity, the degree of cohesion within local communities 
and the extent to which the social structure is egalitarian. The key question is how to build 
institutional bridges in a situation where there are insufficient resources and where the relationship 
between public authorities, the private sector and member based schemes has been distant.  The 
necessary pre-condition for cooperation is for the state to withdraw and give up some of its 
activities.  
 
The research presents four major areas that social protection programs can potentially bridge. Firstly, 
the provision of financial services to households with low income involves huge fixed costs to the 
financial service providers as indicated in Siegel and Alwang (1999). The scope for positive 
government action in support of greater access is most evident when the overall contractual and 
information frameworks are deficient. Building sustainable and deepening financial systems is a 
long term process; additional impact can be achieved by government action in the short to medium-
term specifically directed towards facilitating financial market activity that helps access. This would 
include putting in place the legislation and other rules needed for specific financing tools and 
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institutions, and giving every individual a national identification that can be used as collateral in 
obtaining a financial service.  Governments can also opt to stimulate access more directly through 
financial literacy programs. 
 
Secondly, social protection can be used to reinforce and harness the informational advantage enjoyed 
by informal based arrangements by covering the start-up costs associated with creating viable micro 
finance institutions, thereby providing households with valuable credit, savings and insurance 
products. Relative to strict commercial or central government mechanisms, informal based 
mechanisms typically enjoy an informational advantage, leading to reduced enforcement, monitoring 
and transactions costs.  This advantage can likewise be harnessed to make financial services delivery 
commercially viable through group lending and insurance arrangements where they might not 
otherwise be remunerative for a commercial provider nor attractively priced for poor households.  
 
Thirdly, social protection can address one of the most important limitations of informal based risk 
management arrangements; their frequent inability to insure the poorest households. In the case of 
many semi-formal risk management institutions, households need to make an initial contribution in 
order to become a member, and poor households often cannot afford the ex-ante contributions 
required to become members of an insurance pool. By providing funding to an appropriate informal 
based insurance arrangement, social protection can enable participation by socially-excluded groups. 
The social grouping also creates potential opportunities to reduce social exclusion and thus perhaps 
to use social protection to close some of the holes in existing social safety nets. The key is whether 
gaps can be identified and directly addressed through the design of social protection transfer 
schemes. Chantarat and Barrett (2008) show how transfers to poor households that are otherwise 
endogenously excluded from social networks can induce new social relationships that not only 
benefit those who gain directly from transfers but also nonparticipants with whom participants then 
endogenously link.   
 
Fourthly, social protection can expand their role in enabling the informal sector to manage risk by 
expanding the menu of permissible projects to include innovative programs. The findings suggest 
prominent examples include burial insurance societies and health insurance associations. In fact, 
informal based arrangements can be supported successfully by social protection because of the 
latter‘s close link with informal sector. Other examples include public goods and services,  and 
social protection can reduce the risk of infectious disease by subsidizing informal based public 
health programs that reduce the risk of water-borne disease by supporting informal based sanitation 
programs that promote changes in individual hygiene practices.  Expanding the menu of permissible 
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projects also enables social protection to be more inclusive of potentially vulnerable groups that may 
not be able to participate in more traditional social protection programs. As already discussed, 
informal based arrangements inherently struggle to internalize risks experienced by all members. 
Social protection can in principle, help informal households reduce exposure to covariate risk, 
through provision of risk-reducing public goods and services. 
 
Social protection can harness the power of informal based techniques targeting for effective two-tier 
allocation of disaster assistance. Alderman (2001) describes a two-tier allocation of social assistance, 
whereby the central government provides grants to members based on commune-level criteria. Local 
governments then allocate these grants to poor households within their communes based on 
household-level criteria. Social protection similarly adopts a two tier allocation process, whereby it 
provides in-kind or cash assistance to a community organization. The community organization can 
then use its superior local information to allocate program participation (or assistance) to the poorest 
households. Nevertheless, the existence of significant risk pooling in the absence of social protection 
should serve as a caution, policymakers need to guard against disrupting existing social insurance 
arrangements. As discussed by Dercon (2005) public assistance that improves a household‘s position 
outside group-based informal risk sharing arrangements can change the nature of informal networks. 
In particular, it can reduce households‘ reliance on and need for each other, thereby adversely 
affecting the ability of informal networks to act as a safety net. This can not only crowd out pre-
existing community based risk management, it can have broader disruptive effects on information 
flow, and cooperative decision-making in production, marketing and community resource 
management processes. Literature on the possible crowding out effects of new, exogenous transfers 
emphasizes these prospective problems (Cox and Jimenez, 1998; Cox, et al. 2004). The extent to 
which these problems are general, however, remains an open question. For example, Lentz and 
Barrett (2005) find no evidence of crowding out of private transfers by food aid, whether allocated 
by communities or external agencies, in northern Kenya and southern Ethiopia. 
7.6 SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER 
The chapter had analysed major coping strategies; the ability to manage risks is a function of a 
combination between social, physical and financial assets in place. The chapter indicates the social 
protection case from the data. In addition, the study has shown that income variability remains high; 
diversifications and other income strategies are only used to a limited extent and in any case 
insufficient. The chapter has documented in detail the complexity of these strategies and 
weaknesses.  
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There is strong evidence of insurance need in the informal sector, since the available techniques 
provide for only partial insurance, and emergencies and crisis expose the limitations of informal 
systems and self-insurance. Hence, households are not able to fully insure against risk. For example, 
funeral associations normally provide insurance against particular risks and not all households are 
involved in risk-sharing networks. The entry requirement has been the barrier for households and 
therefore some are left out of these arrangements. Other risk-sharing arrangements provide partial 
but not full insurance because contributions may not be large enough to cover the full cost of the 
risk. Thus some households are able to insure against certain risk exposures, whilst others cannot.  
 
As discussed in the literature review and conceptual framework, it is expected that households who 
are more exposed to risks with limited protection in place are more likely to opt for insurance 
products. The next chapter provides for better understanding of household insurance demand 
perspectives. The chapter analyses the market‘s understanding and perceptions of insurance and 
summarizes the empirical evidence for the possible factors that influence demand for micro 
insurance. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: RESULTS ON HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTCS THAT 
INFLUENCE MICRO INSURANCE DEMAND 
The results on chapter six and seven on major households risk exposures and coping strategies 
respectively provides a background for better understanding of households‘ participation in 
insurance market. This chapter focuses on the fourth objectives of the study by examining 
households understanding and perceptions on insurance products. The main contribution of this 
chapter is to highlight factors that influence demand in the informal sector and provides empirical 
evidence from the data.   
The chapter is divided into five sections. Section 8.1 begins with the relative attitudes of the informal 
households towards use of financial services. Section 8.2 explores types of micro insurance products 
demanded in the informal sector, by summarizing the evidence for the possible factors that influence 
demand for micro insurance. Section 8.3 Probit regression model which examines the household 
characteristics that influence micro insurance demand was presented. Section 8.4 presents the result 
and interpretation of probit regression outcome. Finally, section 8.5 summarizes the chapter.    
8.1 ALTITUDE OF HOUSEHOLDS TOWARDS USE OF FINANCIAL SERVICES 
8.1.1 Savings and Borrowing 
Savings and borrowing are important aspect of financial services that encourage household financial 
decision making. Firstly, saving is a source of working capital and is used during emergencies. The 
survey revealed that most of respondent derived their working capital form relative/family/friends 
and personal wages/labour representing 12% and 11.5 percent respectively. Almost half of 
households were self-employed and their working capitals were derived from family and personal 
saving through labor (salaried income from part time or permanent job). 4.5 percent of the 
respondent derived their income from bank/mfi/ngo institution.  
Secondly, borrowing behavior is an important aspect since it provides an insight regarding demand 
for micro insurance. The households who engaged in regular borrowing and saving activities have 
better exposure to financial markets. There is evidence that use of one financial service provides an 
informational advantage to know more about additional services.  The study indicates that borrowing 
from relatives and friends dominates; the survey reveals that 21% of households have taken at least 
one credit in the last 3 years. The most popular loan was from MFI (10%) and NGO (5%). The 
preferred mode of loan repayment is monthly payment.  MFI in the form of SACCOs is widely used 
by group. 
Saqware, PhD Thesis July 11, 2012 
  
120 
Figure 8.1: Household Use of Financial Services 
  
Source Household Survey 2010 
8.1.2 Knowledge of Insurance 
The data indicates that households have a basic understanding of insurance; few respondents 
demonstrated a strong understanding of insurance. Strong understanding implies that the respondent 
had a clear definition of insurance, why insurance products are purchased and how it works, that is, 
payment of premiums and a conditional benefit if the insured event occurs. Basic understanding 
signifies a limited grasp without full knowledge of how insurance works for example types of 
insurance products and able to mention at least five insurance companies operating in Tanzania. No 
idea   captures both misunderstanding as well as inability to define insurance.  
The survey revealed that the lack of trust undermines successful micro insurance delivery. Only 
11.8% trust insurers. As many as 34 % of households neither trust nor do not trust insurers. Any 
possible bad experience with insurance that might be easily spread by media or word of mouth can 
turn those neutral into distrustful, thus reducing the market size significantly.  On the other hand, big 
number of neutral people is also an opportunity. This group would not reject a new product because 
of trust. If they have good experience significant market opportunities would open up. At least one 
or two individuals per group have heard of vehicle insurance but their knowledge of other types of 
insurance was limited and in some cases nonexistent. Apart from those with credit life insurance 
none of the participants had insurance (currently or previously). A few participants, however, 
indicated that they knew people who had insurance. This confirms the earlier findings by Churchill 
and Manje (2002) that a lack of awareness or impartial knowledge, as well as attitudes based on 
misconceptions undermine the insurance potential in the informal sector.  
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Figure 8.2: Households Insurance Knowledge 
 
Source: Household Survey 2010 
This highlights the need for effective and broad-based consumer financial education with regard to 
insurance. Analyzing the education levels of the household and insurance knowledge, the study finds 
insurance knowledge varies with educational level. While secondary school leavers and above have 
strong understanding of insurance concepts. Primary school levels who have strong understand 
either through credit life insurance education or they owns vehicles and motorbike were mandatory 
third party liability insurance is required.  
Figure 8.3: Households Educational Level 
  
Source: Household Survey 2010 
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8.1.3 Perception of Insurance 
The insurance perception seems to be poor; the study finds the relative frequencies for five 
categories of responses indicated in figure 8.4.  Forty percent of the respondents did not indicate any 
perception because they were not sure they knew enough about insurance to express opinions on the 
subject. This suggest that majority of the respondents are open to education and insurance companies 
needed to market in their areas about their products and costs.  Only eighteen percent expressed a 
favorable response regarding insurance without reservations. Those who were categorized under 
―affordability reservations‖ mentioned that while they knew the benefits that stem from insurance 
would help them cope with risks, but insurance was beyond their means. Applicability reservations 
were slightly different as respondents indicated that they did not have anything that was worth 
insuring. 
Figure 8.4: Households Insurance Perceptions 
 
Source: Household Survey 2010 
Negative perceptions
40
was reported and twenty percent of those respondents with a strong or limited 
understanding of insurance expressed strong negative views, either based on their own experience or 
through hearsay. Their perception of insurance is highly affected by media and insurance staffs. 
There is evidence that negative perception was the results of company personnel had commuted 
fraud.  The primary complaint was the length of time for claims to be paid. A few mentioned that 
insurance firms and brokers are not trustworthy. Even stronger negative perceptions emerged during 
the focus group discussions. There is general sense in FGD that people prefer to save or invest 
money is such a way that they can be certain and they are able to access it later.  In sum, 52 percent 
of the respondents either think that insurance is not appropriate for them or have a negative view 
                                                          
40 See appendix D; for perceptions of micro insurance extracted from focus group discussion. 
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about insurance, while 40 percent do not have sufficient information to form an opinion. With full 
knowledge that they are vulnerable to risks, and that insurance is one way to protect against them, 
lack of exposure makes the majority of informal household feel that insurance is not applicable to 
them, they cannot afford it, or they have more pressing needs.  
8.1.4 Product demand match 
Figure 8.4 demonstrates that most respondents are satisfied with different product characteristics. 
For the purpose of this analysis we have presented to respondents two generic micro insurance 
products with detailed information allowing household to declare if they are willing to purchase 
given specific product features. This exercise was aimed to find micro insurance demand 
perspectives. We presented life insurance product and health insurance because these products 
widely available in Tanzania and we adopted features of micro insurance products of ―First Micro 
insurance Agency (Life) and Community Health Funds
41
 (health insurance). Research identify that 
benefits, coverage and quality of provider commands the best-selling characteristics for health 
insurance while life insurance the opposite result was identified; the most prominent selling 
characteristics was  proximity, coverage  and benefit.   
Figure 8.5: Households Most Preferred Product Characteristics 
 
Source: Household Survey 2010 
The cost of coverage was assessed in two ways: first, the concept of insurance was explained; then 
we ask participant if they are willing to pay given this type of insurance cover. The results give a lot 
of new insights on micro insurance perspectives. However, Churchill and Manje (2002) suggest that 
there are a number of hurdles to be overcome before willingness to use micro insurance will be put 
into action. Their findings indicated that people have an inclination to invest in financial services for 
which they get cash back, indicating a lack of understanding of the insurance value proposition. 
Furthermore, the trade-off between ―peace of mind‖ and ―bread on the table‖ will always be 
particularly pronounced for the low-income market. All of this once again underlines the need for 
financial education. The reasons for not purchasing insurance, (lack of willingness to buy) can be 
                                                          
41 Detailed information about Community Health Funds in Tanzania see chapter two of this thesis 
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explained by combination of bad experience, benefits, coverage and price of the product. In case of 
health insurance quality of the provider is the most important reason after benefits. The other 
important reason is knowledge gap in the form of dissatisfaction from the fact that there is no benefit 
while nothing happens. 
Figure 8.6: Households willingness for Micro insurance Products 
 
Source: Household Survey 2010 
The amount that are currently spent for any risk exposure happened over last three years indicates 
that most of the household over 13 percent spends on average between $21 and $50 for one risk 
event. 10.2 percent spends from $50 to $100 while over 3 percent spends above $100 for one risk 
exposure. This gives important insurance pricing mechanisms. 
Figure 8.7: Households Average Spending Per Risk Exposure 
   
Source: Household Survey 2010 
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8.2 TYPES OF MICRO INSURANCE DEMANDED IN THE INFORMAL SECTOR 
Based on the evidence presented in chapter six and seven, the findings indicates that the most 
prevalent financial liability were those related to house building expenses, medical expenses, 
educational expenses and death of member of household. This suggests low cost housing insurance, 
health insurance, educational insurance and life insurance are the potential micro insurance products 
useful in the informal sector.  
8.2.1 Low cost housing insurance 
Building a house is a financial priority for most informal household; Due to lack of access to 
housing finance the majority of households are building houses informally and incrementally. 
Incremental building is self-financing strategies were earning through small business and other 
informal means were applied. Small daily incomes make it difficult to obtain the lump sum of 
money necessary to undertake home construction or make a meaningful home improvement. The 
cost of building house creates financial needs. The informal household does not have access to the 
existing formal housing systems. Hence, households suffer from a severe shortage of quality 
housing
42
. 
This research finding conducted affordability analysis considering the capacity to pay for the cost of 
building materials and infrastructure. The results indicates that the amount that a family can allocate 
from its monthly savings for housing payment is no more than Tshs. 50,000/= (US $ 38.00) per 
month which will take 10 years to build two bedrooms of 25 sq m. this has been compared to a 
family with a minimum monthly accumulated income Tshs 150,000/= (US $ 115.00) per month at a 
construction rate of Tshs. 240,000/= (US $ 185.00) per sq m.  
These results suggest that any micro finance program with both financing and protection concept 
will create micro insurance demand. This will assist informal households to improve asset holding, 
through access to affordable housing and protect homeowners against their properties. The program 
may include improvement loan which is designed to support ongoing incremental building. The 
loans must be highly flexible and can be applied to completing unoccupied houses, finishing already 
occupied houses, extending extra rooms onto houses, repairing worn out components of existing 
housing, and building auxiliary structures such as a latrine or outdoor kitchen. This program must 
also allow the homeowner to maintain protection measures (micro insurance) over their housing 
process. This category of insurance can be sold through informal coping structures.   
                                                          
42 Tanzania Building Agency (TBA) an executive agency under the ministry of Infrastructure development with main function of providing 
safe office buildings and accommodation to Tanzanian citizens in 2009 conducted housing needs survey in Dar es Salaam. They found 
that over 79.8 percent of the city population live in a rented house. 
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8.2.2 Educational endowment insurance 
There is evidence that household are not so much worried about uncertain events but an educational 
expense which seems to be mandatory expenditure given the value proposition for children‘s 
education. Education endowment insurance providing investment vehicles for household to save for 
education expense may stimulate demand for micro insurance product in Tanzania. The endowment 
insurance particularly education insurance will receive high demand among many households since 
household with children below 24 years age will be interested in education insurance for their 
children‘s. The survey indicates the number of younger household is over 46 percent.  
Figure 8.8: Household Composition and their age structure 
 
 Source: Household Survey 2010 
8.2.3 Health   and accident insurance 
For most informal households, illness represents a regular threat to their income earning capacity. 
Beside the direct costs for treatment and drugs, indirect costs for the lost earnings of the ill person 
and those accompanying her/him to the hospital, have to be shouldered by the household. Almost 
80% of the diseases are water borne or are caused by water bodies; cholera, diarrhea, typhoid, 
hepatitis and malaria, most of which require prolonged treatment and sometimes hospitalization. The 
average expenditure on health care among various income groups varied from 6% for low income 
households to 2.3% for households with larger incomes, as per a household survey of healthcare 
utilization and expenditure survey of 2010. Thus it makes sense for the household to buy health 
insurance.  
However, health insurance products need to be customized to the requirements of the households. 
For frequent but less expensive illnesses, self-insurance (dipping into savings) is desirable. For the 
next level of illnesses, which may require hospitalization, insurance should cover treatment as well 
as related costs, transportation and attendants‘ stay. For catastrophic illnesses, full reimbursement of 
costs of treatment in a public hospital only may be affordable. Thus, for health insurance to work in 
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the informal sector, it needs to be blended with savings schemes, preventive health care, and better 
management of public health facilities. Health related risks manifests in the form of illness, child 
birth, injuries and accidents. Minor illness can be easily paid out of current business income. 
However, serious illness or accident and major injuries which require hospitalization are costly and 
brings major financial burden to household.  
Based on the analysis of the risks and coping mechanisms, this research suggests a possible demand 
for two types of health insurance. First, households at the upper end of the low income market, who 
normally pay for private clinics, might be interested in a scheme that allows them to access better 
quality health care. As we have already demonstrated serious illness is by far the most significant 
risk facing household in the informal sector. The long term illness has potential to reduce household 
income to absolute poverty by taking away their assets. Since their health care costs are higher and 
they are better educated, they might be more receptive to health insurance. There is evidence that for 
many household payment of transport for the patient and caretaker is the first financial hurdle they 
meet when faced with health problem. Health insurance that covers the cost of hospitalization and 
transportation would help household avoid using stressfully risk management strategies.  
Second possible health insurance niche could be prescription insurance. A health insurance plan 
marketed and delivered through private clinics is unlikely to reach poor households. These groups 
have access to health care services through government facilities were the costs of treatment and 
medication were generally low. The major financial concern was about the high cost of medicine. 
Prescription insurance scheme may be able to negotiate discounted rate for scheme participants if the 
insurer pays the pharmacy directly.   
8.2.4 Life Insurance  
This research found that death of a family member was a manageable risk for many households, with 
the possible exception of the death of a breadwinner. The most expensive death-related loss is the 
premature or unexpected death of a breadwinner; the household has to find a way to replace the lost 
income. The finding indicates that majority of household had experienced a death in the past 3 years 
and all had contributed to the funerals of relatives, friends and neighbors. There is evidence of the 
affected families borrowing without interest or selling assets to take care of contingencies to cover 
for proper funeral expenses. The demand for life insurance is linked with loan; this suggests that 
credit life insurance is perceived as condition to loan rather than insurance product. The respondents 
were aware of the fact that they have credit life cover and that it is capitalized upfront. In the event 
of borrower‘s death, the outstanding balances are paid and the client‘s family receives a lump sum 
that varies in amount with the size of the loan balance and cause of death. Often policy covers a 
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spouse and fixed number of children. For example of the First micro insurance agency provides a 
lump sum of US$300 plus funeral grants in the event of the policyholder‘s death.  
However, the emergence of informal funeral funds in particular suggests a potential demand for life 
insurance because it demonstrates a willingness to accept preventative risk pooling, at least for death 
risks. Any life insurance product for the low-income market would be wise to imitate the strengths 
of informal schemes, such as expedient claims processing and the use of groups to control adverse 
selection and deter premium lapses. A formal insurer should then be able to position itself well vis-à-
vis funeral funds by providing greater value. With a larger risk pool and greater economies of scale, 
for the same premium amount a formal insurer might be able to provide a benefit that is roughly 5 to 
10 times larger than the payouts in most informal schemes, especially if it could rely on existing 
distribution channels, such as market associations, religious groups and MFIs, to minimize 
transaction costs. 
Improved products and processes for micro life insurance will stimulate demand. Life insurance for 
households on an individual basis can be expensive since data on mortality rates is limited within 
this group. Further the administration costs on an individual insurance can be higher due to the low 
level of insured amount for households. Thus life micro-insurance products have to be designed 
differently. In case individual insurance is to be given, the premium may have to be split into several 
installments, to make it affordable. Moreover, standard requirements such as proof of age and 
medical examination may have to be waived.  Group insurance products automatically mean a better 
pooling of risk and less adverse selection against the insurance provider. The higher the rate of 
participation by the members of the group, the less expense is needed for underwriting. Very 
important from a household‘s point of view, is that a significant number of risks that would be 
rejected by an insurer on an individual basis can be covered in group schemes. Access to insurance 
protection is thereby improved. Where little insurance exists and premium-paying resources are very 
scarce, group insurance products may be the best viable way to proceed. An excellent group life 
insurance product could be family group life insurance which is designed to cover all the family 
members of the insured and the premium amount would also be low as compared to the sum of the 
premium amount required for all individual family members.   
While a product that packaged together savings, credit and insurance would help overcome many 
obstacles, it would still have difficulty penetrating the poorest segments of the market, which 
indicated that they had difficulties in saving on a regular basis. It may also not be attractive to 
entrepreneurial persons who are less risk averse than the general public and prefer to flow excess 
cash back into their enterprises.  For different reasons, both of these market segments prefer not to 
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adopt a preventative approach; for these groups, emergency loans would probably be the most 
appropriate risk-managing financial service.   
8.2.5 Property, fire and theft insurance 
The informal households own home equipment‘s, electronic and work related machinery. These 
assets are susceptible to idiosyncratic contingencies such as fire, theft and breakdown which may 
affect income levels. Many of these assets are low priced and easily repairable; thereby reducing 
possible impact. However, untimely occurrence of these events may substantially impact the income 
of the poor household. Impact of these events on borrowed assets is more severe. The availability of 
insurance coverage for such property insurance for the informal households is virtually non-existent.  
While theft and to a lesser extent fire, were identified as risks for households and businesses, probes 
on frequency of occurrence and the associated losses indicated that these were generally not major 
concerns. In fact, most respondents had very few assets that would be worth insuring. Until the 
situation changes if theft or fire become more frequent occurrences and the households have 
accumulated more assets property insurance will probably not appeal to a large enough segment of 
the low-income market to make it viable.   
8.2.6 General factors that stimulate demand 
The research findings provide four deliveries and design factors which will influence demand for 
micro insurance, firstly, the study has demonstrated that a majority of respondents are either wary of 
insurance or not sufficiently familiar with it. Indeed, household show a strong preference for 
improved savings facilities and emergency loans to help them cope with risks, rather than insurance. 
The lack of familiarity with insurance, social biases, and a few negative perceptions will definitely 
inhibit demand. To serve the informal market, insurance providers will have to stimulate demand 
through good promotion strategies that educate the market and increase the social acceptance of 
insurance as a legitimate coping mechanism.  This type of social marketing campaign would use 
their existing coping strategies, especially reciprocity and mutual support, as a frame of reference to 
explain how insurance works. Sales techniques should also help customers understand that insurance 
could offer better coverage than that provided by informal coping strategies. 
Another approach would be to segment the market and initially target clients that are more receptive 
to insurance, particularly the less poor and better-educated clients. If an insurance product is well 
received by this segment, then it will be easier to market it to other market segments. One of the 
most effective sales techniques, testimonial marketing, uses case studies, quotes and endorsements 
from actual persons who have benefited from the insurance products to tell their stories. Prospective 
customers can relate to them and their situation. By highlighting the experiences of persons who are 
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reasonably representative of the target market, it promotes a broader social acceptance to legitimize 
insurance.    
Secondly, timely disbursement of payout, the trust that underlies their basic tenets of reciprocity and 
their integral role within community explain the popularity and persistence of many saving clubs that 
provide informal insurance. They are well understood by the target population they serve and can 
quickly verify claims in the event of risks.  Marketing will not be effective if the insurer does not 
deliver since complaints about delays in processing claims were common and strongly felt, demand 
could be stimulated by attacking this issue, by guaranteeing payment within three days (or whatever 
period of time market research concludes is acceptable). The insurer would then be able to garner 
favour in public opinion and generate positive word-of-mouth marketing, by exceeding expectations, 
for example paying out benefits in 1 or 2 days.   
Thirdly, flexibility system of premium payment, the seasonality analysis of household cash flow 
shows that equal monthly or weekly installments may present a problem. Significant innovations are 
required to tailor the premium payment schedule to the household‘s cash flow. With an uneducated, 
low-income market, there is a high chance that the insurer will experience late payments or lapsed 
policies. The insured event is then bound to strike former policyholders who will want to make a 
claim. When claims are rejected because the policies had lapsed, the insurer will probably 
experience public relations problems that will cement the negative perceptions widely held by the 
skittish market. The challenge, therefore, is to develop payment mechanisms that dramatically 
reduce the likelihood of lapsed policies.  
Fourthly, another major factor that will influence demand for micro insurance and enhance outreach 
of micro insurance is the adoption of suitable distribution channels. The households in the informal 
sector are numerous but dispersed, and often not members of any organized association or 
cooperative. Micro insurance can be distributed using existing channels to the households at a 
reasonable incremental cost. These include; networks of existing micro-credit institutions, agent 
network of existing insurance companies, community organizations such as self-help groups, credit 
and saving cooperatives, post offices, which tend to have a widespread network in Tanzania and 
marketing network of consumer product companies. Due to the complex challenges of enhancing the 
outreach and sustainability of micro insurance, it is important to recognize that no single actor the 
user community, NGOs, government or the private sector, can by itself provide all the inputs that are 
needed to make it a success. Thus there is a need for collaboration.   
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8.3 HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS THAT INFLUENCE MICRO INSURANCE 
DEMAND 
This section establishes household characteristics that influence demand in the informal sector. 
According to the framework of analysis
43
, in this third step the probit regression model results were 
presented and discussed.   
8.3.1 DESCRIPTIONS AND MEASUREMENT OF THE VARIABLES    
8.3.1.1 Dependent Variables  
This study attempts to show how informal household characteristics influence the demand for micro 
insurance.  Therefore, the dependent variable is whether household prefer to use any insurance 
cover/policy and is measured 1 if yes and 0 if no.    
8.3.1.2 Independent Variables 
The explanatory variables are expected to influence the demand for micro insurance includes 
demographic characteristics age, education, employment status, risk exposure, marital status, 
economic and financial characteristics (income, house ownership, assets and use of financial 
services).   
8.3.1.2.1 Demographic factors 
Age: There were no prior expectations on the sign of the estimate for the average age of the 
population to the demand for micro insurance. On one hand, young household with younger children 
may tend to be more risk averse and have a higher demand for insurance. On the other hand, young 
aged household may be less risk averse than older household. Some elderly households may be very 
risk averse, while others may be less concerned about the risk of financial losses because of a shorter 
time horizon or greater assets. The study therefore hypothesized that the estimates sign for the age 
variable can take negative or positive influence on overall demand for micro insurance.  Previous 
studies such as Duker (1969) suggested a curvilinear relationship between the demand for insurance 
(life) and age. As age increases, household heads have a greater awareness for need of life insurance 
due to decreasing earning power and a greater number of dependents to protect against financial loss 
following the death of household heads. Beyond a certain age, however, the needs of life insurance 
declines as children‘s grow up and become self-supporting and the household accumulates wealth 
that can be used to support the level of living of the family (Beck and Webb 2003; Browne and Kim, 
1993; Chui and Kwok, 2009; Outreville, 1996).  
                                                          
43As ddiscussed in Chapter 6  this is third step in the framework which involves three steps where by first step involves identifying risk 
exposures, second step involves analysis of risk management techniques and last step involves probit regression analysis. 
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Education: Education improves individual household understanding of the importance of risk 
management. Education, as an index of the stock of human capital within a household, is associated 
with insurance demand. Normally, people with higher education would imply that they have greater 
expectations of income growth, have more awareness of the necessity of insurance. Indeed, (Burnett 
and Palmer, 1984) indicated that higher education is related to greater insurance demand. Thus, the 
education level of the household head is hypothesized to be positively associated with micro 
insurance consumption. In this study, education is categorized into three  variables: none and 
primary (PEDU) are considered as less educated household and have less demand for micro 
insurance hence negative estimates measured as 1 if household has attained PEDU level or 0 
otherwise.  While households with SEDU and UEDU level of education are considered educated and 
have positive estimates to the demand for micro insurance since they are able to understand the 
concept behind insurance and the technical procedures attached to them, measured 1 if household 
attained SEDU level and 0 otherwise and University (UEDU) measured 1 if household attained 
UEDU level and 0 otherwise. Educated people are better able to understand the benefits of risk 
management and long-term savings and may become more risk-averse in the process. Therefore, we 
expect a positive relationship between education level and micro insurance demand as in Browne 
and Kim (1993), Burnett and Palmer (1984), Li et al. (2007), Outreville (1996) and Truett and Truett 
(1990).  
 Employment: Demand for micro insurance can differ depending on the type of household 
employment in the informal sector. This variable has not been examined in the previous studies. 
Self-employed household or salaried staff‘s e.g. casual laborers, daily payment are two categories of 
employment considered in the study.  In this study self-employed household head is hypothesized to 
have a negative influence on micro insurance demand because household is considered to have 
income enough to handle risks and have greater access to alternative risk management while salaried 
staffs are considered to have positive demand for micro insurance because of the nature of their 
income flow and limited access to alternative risk management schemes available in the informal 
sector.  In this study employment is categorized as self-employed (SEMPL) measured as 1 if 
household is self-employed and 0 otherwise and Wage employed (temporary or permanent) 
(WEMPL) measured 1 if household is a salaried staff and 0 otherwise. 
Marital status: As one of the main purposes of insurance is to protect dependents against financial 
loss if the breadwinner dies prematurely, one would expect that married couples will have children 
hence need for insurance protection. Hence, in this study married households are predicted to have a 
greater demand to own insurance since there are one or more persons depending on their earnings. 
The most obvious example might be a possible demand for childbirth or maternity insurance. The 
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study measured married household as 1 and 0 if otherwise. It has been argued that marital status 
increases number of dependents (Beenstock, et al. 1986; Browne and Kim, 1993; Burnett and 
Palmer, 1984; Chui and Kwok, 2009; Li, et al. 2007; Truett and Truett, 1990).  Hence, the higher the 
number of dependents, the larger is the demand for income risk protection as a form of insurance 
(Lewis, 1989). The study expects a positive relationship between marital status and micro insurance 
demand. 
Risk exposure: The adverse effect of risk exposure to the wealth of the informal households 
influence demand for micro insurance. As discussed in the conceptual framework and literature 
review
44
, it is expected that households who are more exposed to risks are more likely to opt for 
insurance products. We considered respondents‘ frequency of risk events and the associated costs to 
measure the degree of uncertainty about whether, when and how often loss occurs. The costs of the 
potential loss (money spent for event, time, other hidden/associated costs).  
Health risk exposure measuring household medical expenses incurred during the last three years 
were taken into account: medical expenses were categorized as injuries and accidents (HRIA), minor 
illness (HRMI) and serious illness (HRSI) (Child birth, hospitalization) and premature death 
(DHMR). These risks are expected to have positive influence to the demand for insurance. We 
measure health risks or premature death risks by considering weather household have incurred any 
of these risks exposures over last three years and coded 1 and 0 otherwise. 
Another category of risk exposures includes education expenses (EER). Education fee bring 
financial burden to informal sector household. Although this category of risks exposure is not 
insurable risks per se, general characteristics for these types of risk exposure are that it can be 
anticipated. A financial risk arises when flows of income do not coincide with required expenditures. 
While households are generally aware whether and when these events will occur, the high likelihood 
and frequency of their occurrence create an on-going uncertainty as to whether the household will 
have sufficient income or assets to cover the cost associated with these events. The study measures 
household who incurred or is continuously paying educational fee as 1 and 0 otherwise. 
 Costs of building house (HBER) are considered to have a positive influence to the demand of micro 
insurance. Building a house is a priority for most informal household
45
; the cost of building house 
creates financial needs. Cost of building house seems to be financial risk or expenditure due to the 
priority given to most household in the informal sector. Low cost housing insurance providing 
investment vehicles for household to save for building a house may stimulate demand for micro 
                                                          
44 See chapter three  and four of this thesis 
45 See chapter six were the detailed priorities of the informal households were analysed. 
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insurance product in the informal sector in Tanzania.  We measure household who incurred or is 
continuously saving to pay cost of building a house as 1 and 0 otherwise.    
8.3.1.2.2 Economic and financial factors 
Income: The expected sign of the estimates for income is ambiguous because of two competing 
hypotheses. If the estimates on income are negative it implies that increases in income reduce the 
demand for insurance. As Lin and Grace (2007) hypothesized individual will purchase less insurance 
at higher income level implies that as income increases the demand for insurance should diminish. 
Mossin (1968), in turn, proved that if a person faced a price of insurance greater than the actuarially 
fair value, but below the price at which no insurance would be purchased, and the consumer 
exhibited decreasing absolute risk aversion, then the amount of insurance coverage fell as wealth 
increased. Mossin did not consider the case where higher incomes might generate more assets at risk 
and thus the higher income person would have greater losses to insure against.   
The alternative hypothesis argued that income could have a positive coefficient in the insurance 
demand equation (Dionne and Eeckhoudt, 1989; Dionne and Harrington, 1992). This implies that if 
potential losses change as wealth changes (which makes sense in our case as wealthier people may 
have more assets and businesses that are exposed to potential losses), we may see a positive 
relationship between income and insurance purchased. Higher income may generate more risk for 
the individual and therefore it increases an individual‘s insurance demand. Previous empirical 
studies by Goldsmith (1983) and Burnett and Palmer (1984)) have consistently found that income 
has a strong positive effect on the demand for insurance. Intuitively, as income increases, insurance 
purchases become more affordable, however and most importantly, as a person‘s income increases, 
so does the capacity to absorb shocks increases. The income in this study was measured by 
accumulated monthly earned income from wages, business and salaries.  Obviously, increasing 
income makes insurance more affordable and creates a greater demand for micro insurance to 
safeguard the income potential of the insured and the well-being of dependents. Also, accumulated 
wealth needs to be invested, and life insurance can be an attractive instrument to achieve financial 
goals.  
 
House ownership: The greatest motivation for house possession is that, it allows individual 
household to access to large amount of loans to expand business by using buildings as collateral. 
Thus, we hypothesized that household who owns house have a higher demand for insurance than 
household without houses. The major argument is that house owners possess risk of losing a very 
valuable and expense asset due to risk events. House ownership is predicted to have positive 
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influence on household insurance demand. The house ownership variable is coded 1 if the head owns 
his house and 0 if he does not. 
Assets: We follow Lin and Grace (2007) who split assets into liquid and fixed assets. Liquid assets 
are expected to have a negative effect on insurance holdings because, if a household has more liquid 
it means that he/she has liquid assets to prevent unexpected financial risk, the household would buy 
less insurance. On the other hand fixed asset are expected to have positive influence on the demand 
for insurance to protect assets in question against insurable losses. To identify the impact of different 
types of assets on insurance demand, this study classified asset as liquid assets and fixed assets.   
8.3.1.2.3 Financial literacy 
Use of financial services: The use of financial services increases the confidence of consumers in 
other financial instrument such as insurance. Thus, a positive relationship is expected (Beck and 
Web, 2003; Chui and Kwok, 2008; Li, et al. 2007; Outreville, 1996). The use financial services were 
categorized into two aspects.  First the use of bank services (UBSERV) i.e. bank account, bank loans 
and use of MFI services (USMFISERV) i.e. member of MFI, loans from MFI  were assumed to have 
positive influence on demand for micro insurance, this is associated with readily available insurance 
information, experience and trust.  
Insurance Knowledge: Insurance knowledge refers to familiarity about the concept of insurance 
and is expected to have positive influence on the demand for micro insurance because they 
understand and value insurance services. Respondents who had some understanding of insurance 
(i.e., those in the ―strong understanding‖ and ―limited understanding‖ categories) was  measured 1  
and 0 if he has no idea about insurance.  
Insurance Trust:  This refers to the impact of expectation, prompt payment of claims and the value 
of micro-insurance products to low-income earners. Respondents who had some understanding of 
insurance (i.e., those in the ―strong understanding‖ and ―limited understanding‖ categories) were 
asked about their perception or impression of insurance measured 1 if household positive perception 
about insurance 0 if has a negative perception about insurance products.    
8.3.2 MODEL ESTIMATION 
The probit model is used to analyze an econometric framework that has dummy dependent variables.  
In order to evaluate factors that influence demand for micro insurance.  When household prefer to 
use any insurance policy the desire is greater than zero (y * > 0) the person demands micro 
insurance. The probit procedure calculates estimates of regression parameters; it computes estimates 
of the parameters β and € of the probit analysis model            Where € ~ N (0, 1). Whereas 
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Y* is a depend variable that represent a choice of household, β is a vector of parameter of estimates 
and X is a vector of independent variable, presumed to effect the household choice. We therefore, 
define a dummy variable Yi = 1 if person demands micro insurance and 0 otherwise. Then Y* can be 
viewed as an indicator of whether household‘s characteristics influence demand positively or 
negatively. Thus, our model to investigate household demand for micro insurance is given as 
follow:- 
         (   )     (     )    (     )    (       )    (    )  
  (    )    (    )    (        )    (      )     (        )  
       (      )        (        )        (      )     (     )     (    )  
   (    )     (    )     (     )      (         )       [        ]  
8.3.3 PROBIT REGRESSION RESULTS 
A probit model investigates factors that influence micro insurance demand in the informal sector. In 
this study it was hypothesized that variable in the equation would influence demand for micro 
insurance in the informal sector since previous studies have shown conflicting results using same 
variables we wanted to probe this case in Tanzania. Table 8.1 summarizes the results for the demand 
for micro insurance in the informal sector in Tanzania.  
8.3.4 RESULT DISCUSSION AND INTERPRETATION  
The estimations are correspondingly run for any micro insurance policy and table presents the results 
of the probit regressions.   The results are discussed in details hereinafter. 
8.3.4.1 Significant determinants of micro insurance demand in the informal sector 
The model implemented investigates factors that influence household demand for micro insurance. 
The estimate value of dependent variable in the table 7.1 is interpreted as the strong significant, if 
significant column indicates zero value or the value closer to zero, we consider values ranging from 
000 – 067 to be significant.  This implies that the age, employment, married, education, use of 
financial services, income, risk exposures, insurance knowledge and trust as significant determinants 
of micro insurance demand in Tanzania. The model negative estimates means that given household 
characteristics reduces the demand for micro insurance while a positive estimate means that given 
household characteristics increases chance to use micro insurance services.    
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8.3.4.2 The age and demand for micro insurance (AGE) 
The significant and positive estimate is in line with the result of (Beck and Webb, 2003) which 
implies that with the increase of age, household will buy insurance to protect their economic 
requirement during old age. The result indicates that as informal household becomes older, due to 
the fears of old age lives and related socio-economic risks; they are more willing to participate in 
insurance. To protect the basic livelihood when they are old, they are more inclined to join micro 
insur
ance 
servi
ces.  
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s that 
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46 For definition and measurements of parameters see appendix E 
Table: 8.1: Probit Parameter
46
 Estimates Results 
 Parameter 
Est. 
Std. 
Error Z Sig. 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
  
 Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
PROBI
T
a
 
AGE .372 .161 2.315 .021 .057 .687 
SEMPL .618 .159 3.883 .000 .306 .929 
WEMPL .565 .160 3.528 .000 .251 .878 
MARRIED -.601 .186 -3.223 .001 -.967 -.236 
SEDU .397 .126 3.163 .002 .151 .643 
PEDU -.175 .063 -2.778 .005 -.298 -.051 
UEDU .373 .125 2.974 .003 .127 .619 
UMFISERV .722 .172 4.190 .000 .384 1.060 
UBSERV -.465 .195 -2.383 .017 -.847 -.082 
LIQUID ASS. .226 .136 1.667 .095 -.040 .492 
FIXED ASS. -.005 .009 -.517 .605 -.022 .013 
HOUSOWN -.066 .076 -.865 .387 -.215 .083 
INCOME -.207 .079 -2.623 .009 -.361 -.052 
HRMI -.184 .063 -2.924 .003 -.308 -.061 
HRIA -.247 .074 -3.331 .001 -.393 -.102 
DR HH -.207 .079 -2.637 .008 -.361 -.053 
EDUER .208 .088 2.359 .018 .035 .380 
HBERISK .212 .108 1.965 .049 .000 .423 
KNOWL. 
INS. 
.560 .157 3.570 .000 .252 .867 
TRUST INS. .318 .174 1.828 .067 -.023 .660 
Intercept -1.419 .526 -2.700 .007 -1.944 -.893 
a. PROBIT model: PROBIT(p) = Intercept + BX 
Saqware, PhD Thesis July 11, 2012 
  
138 
y people at home that need supports, which makes households, face a heavier burden of 
maintenance. As many household have personal experience of the family support, so they know the 
drawbacks, out of concerning about their lives of future and reducing the burden of their children, 
they are more willing to participate in micro insurance. Given the expected increase in the elderly 
population and the willingness and ability to save for old age, it becomes clear that there is a strong 
need of micro insurance to provide financial security for aged living in informal sector. 
 
The results imply that, all else equal, older household demand micro insurance higher than the 
youngest individuals. This is in line with the study by Ito and Kono (2010) were through a household 
survey complemented with experiments finds that age significantly explains health insurance uptake. 
The positive and significant estimate may also imply lack of social security systems and 
disintegrating social safety nets in the informal sector.     
8.3.4.3 Employment and demand for micro insurance. (SEMPL, WEMPL) 
In contrast to our expectation, the result shows that self-employed household has positive and 
significant influence to the demand for micro insurance. Self-employed were hypothesized to have 
negative influence to micro insurance demand because they have enough income to cover risks and 
can easily save and access alternatives risk management techniques. The result however shows the 
opposite; one possible explanation could be those households are able to save more which increases 
the capacity to purchase micro insurance. This may also be an indication that household engaged in 
self-employment have more assets and income. They have more to lose or subjected to losses hence 
interested with micro insurance products. Hence, confirming that employed people accumulate more 
income; they have capacity to purchase insurance, the patterns of their income induces better saving 
and have more knowledge with insurance.    
8.3.4.4 Married status and demand for micro insurance (MARRIED)  
The effect of marital status on micro insurance demand is negative and statistically significant, this 
result is inconsistency with our expectations that the married couples determines the expanding size 
of the family and therefore demand for micro insurance protection.  This finding also negates 
previous and more recent research by Osei and Gemegah (2011) held in Ghana were marital status 
variable was found to have positive and significant statistically at the 10 per cent significance level.    
 
The results may come from the two possible reasons. First, a large number of families spend a large 
part of household income into children‘s education and daily consumption, reducing the purchase 
power for insurance, to some degree. Secondly, it also suggests that married couples have improved 
sources of incomes against risks due to increased social network.   
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8.3.4.5 Level of education and demand for micro insurance (PEDU, SEDU, UEDU) 
The result largely confirmed that better educated i.e. secondary to university level tends to prefer the 
use insurance products while those household with lower level of education avoids the use of 
insurance.  The education measured in three levels in this study, is positive and significant for all 
dependent variables except PEDU. The result verifies our expectations and indicates that educational 
level is an explanatory factor for micro insurance demand in the informal sector.  Secondary and 
university level attained by households expresses to be positive and significant and PEDU indicates 
negative estimates. This not only proves our hypothesis that education attainment is positively 
related to micro insurance demand but also supports previous empirical findings (Beck and Webb, 
2003; Browne and Kim, 1993; Hwang and Gao, 2003; Hwang and Greenford, 2005). The result 
indicates that, in Tanzania, individuals with higher educational attainment are more likely to buy 
micro insurance. 
One interpretation being that educated households are more open to ideas, receptive to alternatives, 
easy to learn and understand the policies and therefore ready to accept micro insurance policy. 
Respondent who completed at least secondary school (SEDU) and university graduates (UEDU) 
were more likely to demand insurance than those illiterate or completely primary School only 
(PEDU). Another interpretation is that education level is associated with the insurance knowledge 
this means that if the informal sector are well informed and educated about the concept of insurance, 
they will value insurance services, which will impact positively on their demand for micro-insurance 
services.  
This calls for an improvement level of information given about insurance products to the market 
particularly, to the informal economy. Such information should be designed to meet the unique 
needs and backgrounds of the informal sector. The challenge will be to provide this education on a 
broad scale and in a manner that addresses the needs of different people with varying degrees of 
literacy (McCord, 2008). This finding are   also in line with recent research by Chankova, et al. 
(2008) and Bendig and Arun (2011) who finds that household heads with no formal, primary or 
secondary education are less likely to be enrolled in a MFI or participate in the micro finance market 
than higher educated head and that education is a significant factors explaining the uptake of 
voluntary life insurance. These studies combines‘ comparable household surveys conducted in 
Ghana, Mali and Senegal in a model which tries to predict enrolment in a mutual health organization 
and they find that education is the significant explanatory factors.    
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8.3.4.6 Use of other financial services and demand for micro insurance (USMFISERV, 
USBSERV) 
The variable USMFISERV refers to those household who accessed micro finance services both 
informal and formal such as credit to cope with risks. The estimates  for this variable was positive 
suggesting that households engaged in regular borrowing and saving activities have better exposure 
to financial markets and would like to use insurance products. Though, strong positive influence may 
also be the result of linked life credit insurance required by micro finance as a condition to loan 
rather than insurance product. Yet, the result demonstrates a strong association between use of micro 
finance services and household demand for micro insurance.  
Contrast to our expectation household members who used banks services (USBSERV) was less 
likely to demand micro insurance. The use of banks services has negative influence to the demand 
for micro insurance. One interpretation is that the use of banks is a qualification to formal insurance 
than micro insurance; it also indicates higher financial literacy associated with a greater use of banks 
services and forma insurance service.  
The magnitude of estimate suggests that it is less important factor to the demand for micro 
insurance. The other possible explanation can be that bank debt might make insurance unaffordable 
for household under financial pressure. In additional the trust to insurance given the historical 
evidence of the failed state owned insurance company can profound less demand for insurance 
product. This study  have  provided evidence  that demand for insurance itself is considered as risky 
by individuals because the insurance purchase implies a risk of loss if the claim is not paid.  
8.3.4.7 Risk exposure and demand for micro insurance (HRIA, HRMI, DRHH, EDUER, and 
BHER) 
The study expected that risk exposures household experienced over last three years would positively 
influence demand for micro insurance. There were three categories of risks; heath related risks 
injuries and accident which are considered to be serious health problems (HRIA) and minor health 
risks which are considered to minor illness (HRMI). Second category is death risks (DRHH) i.e. 
death of household member and third category of risks education (EDUER) and house building 
expenses (BHER) incurred by households. 
Result is in support of the view that risk exposure positively influence demand for micro insurance 
for risk related to housing costs and education expenses. There were significant and negative 
estimates. This indicates that household would prefer insurance product in the form of investment to 
cover risk related to building a house or paying for educational fee.  
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However, as for risk exposure related to health and death crisis we found that there are negative 
estimates with the demand for micro insurance. The possible explanation is that emergencies crisis 
and health risk household would prefer using most common and familiar informal technique. Results 
provides an evidence that household regards the use of formal services to be additional risks possibly 
because they don‘t trust providers or do not understand the functioning of the services hence prefer 
to use informal services. A similar conclusion was drawn in earlier studies on micro insurance by 
Gine and Yang (2009) and Gine, et al. (2008).   
Another explanation may be that serious shocks like death of household is taken care by families. A 
similar interpretation may be hold for the experience of illness and other emergency crisis which 
suggest that household are more likely to use loans for emergencies crisis i.e. health, injuries  and 
death. Findings suggest death of a family member was a manageable risk for many households given 
the available informal risk management techniques.   
8.3.4.8 Income and demand for micro insurance (INCOME) 
In contrast with our expectation, the effect of income is negative and statistically significant for 
insurance demand in the whole sample. We use average monthly earned income to represent 
household level of income. Although the result contradicts with the already published studies 
obviously it verifies that saving income effect micro insurance demand as a substitute for the 
handling risk exposure. This indicates that household with higher income were less likely to use 
micro insurance as a risk management option given their financial capability to handle risks.  
 
The previous studies suggested that income have a positive influence on the demand for micro 
insurance for example according to Hwang and Gao (2003), income is statistically significant and 
positively correlated with life insurance consumption in China. Many other authors who have 
analyzed the insurance purchase decision have found income as a significant factor (see for example, 
Scotton, 1969; Propper, 1989; Savage and Wright, 1999; Bhat and Jain, 2006). It is possible that this 
reflects the fact that incomes enables household handle risk exposures using other means.  
 
Another possible reason may lie in the constrained in the access to formal services relatively due to 
irregular incomes. The belief that income earned in the informal sector may not necessarily put in 
the formal financial services given the available informal risk managing technique. Other 
interpretation is those households have little faith in the compliance mechanisms given widely held 
view that insurance is not paying claims.  Informal households think that they do not require 
insurance. This is probably due to lack of confidence in insurers and poor understanding of the risk-
pooling concept. Previous experience with micro insurance shows that many people do not 
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understand the concept of insurance and how it works. In some cases, the views of households about 
insurance are negative. They see it as the reserve for the rich; something that is irrelevant, too 
expensive or even unfair (McCord and Osinde, 2005; Cohen and Sebstad, 2005; Churchill and 
Manje, 2002); Matul, 2005; McCord, 2008). 
  
This result proves that the increase of income will not serve as a pushing factor for insurance 
purchase, also verified by Beenstock, et al. (1988) in property-liability. That is to say, the income is 
not high enough to encourage household purchase micro insurance.  Compared to previous studies in 
this study, the savings rate in the informal sector is extremely high.  We can therefore forecast that 
the big volume of savings will discourage potential for the demand for micro insurance in future.  
8.3.4.9 Insurance knowledge and demand for micro insurance (KNOWLEDGE, TRUST) 
Insurance knowledge and trust was found to have a significant and positive influence on micro-
insurance demand. This means that if the informal sector household familiarity and understanding of 
the concepts of insurance have positive influence on the demand for micro insurance because they 
understand the value of insurance services.  This calls for an improvement in the level of information 
given about insurance products to the market particularly, to the informal economy. Such 
information should be designed to meet the unique needs and backgrounds of the informal sector. 
The challenge will be to provide this knowledge on a broad scale and in a manner that addresses the 
needs of different people with varying degrees of literacy (McCord, 2008)  
 
Insurance Trust refers to the impact of expectation, prompt payment of claims and the value of 
micro-insurance products to low-income earners. It measures the household perception of insurers. 
Our result shows that an improvement in the perception of low-income earners about insurers has a 
positive and significant impact on the demand for micro insurance. This result corresponds to the 
finding reported by Gine, et al. (2008), and Bhat and Jain (2006) also found perception to be 
significant and positively associated with health insurance purchase. For instance, if low-income 
earners trust that insurers will honour their contractual responsibilities by making timely payments 
of claims when necessary, then they will have the confidence to take up micro-insurance cover 
(McCord, 2008).   
8.3.4.10 Non-Significant determinants of micro insurance demand in the informal sector 
The result shows that house and assets possession are not statistically significant contrasting with our 
expectations. Nevertheless, the result is explainable. The main risks against assets/house are fire and 
theft; these risks affect a very small number of household in the informal sector in Tanzania. The 
finding indicates that there is no significant relationship between household assets possession and 
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risk exposures and therefore insignificant demand for property insurance. The result means that 
household house and assets possession is not enough to induce the person to purchase micro-
insurance products. Instead, the micro insurance, demand can be explained by other factors in the 
model.   
 
The distinction has to be made with regards to liquid and fixed assets possession.  A higher liquid 
asset index has a positive estimate with the demand for micro insurance, the fact that liquid asset has 
positive estimate may be due capacity to purchase insurance or an indication of socio-economic 
status hence financial literacy (Bendig and Arun, 2011). However, fixed asset endowment in this 
study indicates to have insignificant effect to the demand for micro insurance which seems different 
from conventional situation. There are two possible reasons; Firstly, fixed asset possession means 
easy access to loans in case of risk events and secondly, household who have more fixed assets 
engage in multiple economic activities and earn higher incomes which provides guarantee in case of 
risk events.  
 
Similarly, in the case of house ownership which is often viewed as a proxy for socio-economic status 
of the household. An interesting finding emerges with regard to the house ownership, which are 
negative estimates with the demand for micro insurance. This could imply that household reluctant 
since incidence of loss of property against fire appears to be remote case in the informal sector or it 
implies that household has capacity to borrow in event of crisis given collateral availability. 
8.4  SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER  
This chapter has highlighted two major issues related to micro insurance demand perspectives in 
Tanzania. Firstly, it provides the attitudes towards use of financial services and analyzes potential 
innovative micro insurance products in line with the financial needs of the households. The study 
finds that knowledge and trust as a measure of degree of familiarity and perception for a given 
household, proves more significant to the development of micro insurance in the informal sector. 
Hence, provide necessary information of interests to commercial insurer willing to undertake micro 
insurance business in Tanzania. The study shows that the demand for micro insurance increases with 
household self-perception towards financial products and trust. The study suggests that 
implementation and promoting financial education will improve the demand and reduce mis-trust of 
insurance business among informal sector household.  
 
Secondly, probit regression model examines the household characteristics that influence micro 
insurance demand suggest possible markets segment toward those groups of household who 
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preferred micro insurance products. There is evidence that micro insurance demand can be 
influenced by household‘s characteristics in different ways. Unlike the variables of income, assets 
and house possession which verifies their insignificant influence on micro insurance demand among 
the variables employed in our model. This study indicates risk exposures that a household 
experienced in the past three years has relation to demand for micro insurance. The  health risks and 
death related risks has negative influence to the demand for micro insurance, education expense and 
cost of building house have positive influence to the demand for micro insurance. This implies that 
existing informal programs function as the effective strategies towards emergency health and death 
related risks in the informal sector in Tanzania.  
 
The next chapter will conclude the study by re-visiting some of the main findings from this research. 
The chapter will also discuss main contributions of the study, some of the key implications and 
recommendations for practice identified before concluding with areas worthy of consideration for 
further study. 
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CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUSION AND RECOMENDATIONS 
This is the final concluding chapter; Section 9.1 re-visits some of the main findings and the 
respective conclusions from this research are presented. Section 9.2 discusses key policy 
implications and provides some recommendations.  Section 9.3 provides three main contributions of 
the thesis. Section 9.4 indicates the limitations of the study which calls for further research. Finally, 
section 9.5 identifies areas worthy of consideration for further research. 
9.1 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The research findings in this PhD project render reasonable explanations for micro insurance 
demand perspectives in the informal sector in Tanzania. The thesis has systematically analysed the 
risks to which informal households are exposed and their coping strategies. A comparison of risks 
and coping strategies were used to identify possible gaps that could be filled by micro insurance 
services. The debate centers on three categories: 1) the financial needs to which informal households 
are exposed; 2) the coping strategies in place including strengths and weaknesses and 3) household 
characteristics that influence demand for micro insurance. To understand the differences in the 
needs, preferences, and opportunities for insurance among different market segments; - the research 
examines expenses which take large portions of household earned income.  This involves three 
subsequent stages. The first stage identifies risk exposures facing households and their frequency 
and severity. In the second stage respondents were asked about their coping strategies and their 
strengths and weaknesses were examined. In the third stage the probit regression model was 
conducted to identify the relationship between household characteristics and demand for micro 
insurance. The results are presented in chapter six, seven and eight respectively. This thesis provides 
critical insights regarding informal household‘s risk exposure, the coping strategies they have in 
place and evidence of the relationship between micro insurance demand and household 
characteristics. 
 
There are three major findings from the data analysis. First, the thesis has demonstrated that with 
limited and inadequate risk management measures available to households, the consequences and 
recovery from risk exposures remain for several periods after their first occurrence. Hence, risks 
exposures causes decline in household earned incomes. It has been found that some risk exposure 
has significant influence to micro insurance demand while others have less significant influence. 
This implies that micro insurance policy designs must reflect those risk exposure with significant 
influence to micro insurance demand. Moreover, the findings indicate that demand for micro 
insurance in the informal sector depends on the competitive advantage between formal insurance 
services and available informal techniques. Comparing to market-based, informal arrangements have 
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important informational advantages. Informal households typically have intimate knowledge 
regarding the circumstances and needs of member households, and due to their close physical 
proximity and frequent, repeated interactions between them, they can use relatively low-cost 
methods of contract enforcement, such as peer monitoring and the threat of social sanctions. These 
advantages provide better risk management among households which is often not the case for a 
typical commercial provider.  
 
This implies that some inferences can be drawn from the design and development of micro 
insurance. For example schemes may allow flexibility in the premium payments, such flexibility can 
reflect household income earning flow and insurance companies may design timely disbursement of 
payouts, which is the trust that underlies the basic tenets of reciprocity and the reputation of many 
informal group based schemes that provide insurance. The results show that low demand for micro 
insurance in the informal sector is the result of the inflexibility of financial instruments, which does 
not adapt to the conditions prevailing in the informal sector. The analysis suggests that informal 
households may be willing to be integrated into formal financial services if thorough review of the 
existing eligibility criteria that hinders them to join is changed to conform to their financial needs. 
There is evidence that the insurance industry has done little to improve their operations and product 
innovation to meet the household‘s needs.  
 
The important measures to put into consideration in future may include to link up insurance with the 
informal schemes through  which public social assistance programs can be initiated that will help 
informal households build up their asset base with the minimum micro insurance cover against 
uninsured risk exposures. This result conforms to the mistake hypothesis which explains the low 
demand of insurance as the result of obstacles related to information, cognitive resource and time. 
As suggested in the mistake hypothesis, the households might not insure themselves if they do not 
know whether benefits of insurance exceed the cost of being uninsured. It seems to suggest that 
traditional insurance theories provide a strong starting point for the analysis of the insurance market. 
However, micro insurance demand requires insurers to look at informal based solutions already in 
place and incorporate these into product design.  
 
Secondly, the findings show the existence of a direct link between demand for micro insurance and 
household characteristics. This implies that household characteristics are key factors in the 
development of micro insurance products in the informal sector. The implication is that selected key 
characteristics which have positive and significant influence to the demand of micro insurance must 
be taken into consideration for effective and innovative micro insurance products. The research 
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shows that factors that strongly and significantly influence micro insurance demand in the informal 
sector in Tanzania are employment status, marital status, and education level, and risk exposures, 
knowledge of insurance and use of micro finance services. Micro insurance demand appears to vary 
across demographic variables; in this study there were noticeable differences according to marital 
status, income, and education.  Among the factors that affect the choice of coping mechanisms, the 
major ones were income and education levels of a household. Less poor households use primarily 
reversible coping mechanisms, which included formal and informal savings, while poorer 
households often resort to irreversible responses, such as selling business assets or borrowing at 
exorbitant interest rates. Reversible responses only have a marginal effect on the household‘s cash 
flow, while irreversible coping mechanisms either increase subsequent costs or reduce future 
earnings, and make it difficult for the household re-establish its normal expenditure pattern. More 
educated households were much more ready to use micro insurance than less educated households. 
There is evidence that any insurer targeting the informal sector market would be wise to invest 
heavily in consumer education and advertising.   
 
Thirdly, there is evidence to suggest that the low demand for micro insurance can be explained by 
behavioural biases, in particular the underestimation of risk exposure and individuals‘ aversion to 
insure against high severity, low probability risks. This behaviour seems to be derived from the 
available informal arrangements which are characterized by closely knit social networks and groups 
that provide security in exchange for loyalty to the group. Also, uncertainty avoidance culture is low 
within the households in Tanzania, and households seem to be more tolerate to different situations.  
 
The study demonstrates that the majority of respondents are either wary of insurance or not 
sufficiently familiar with it. Indeed, households show a strong preference for improved savings 
facilities and emergency loans to help them cope with risks, rather than insurance. Four types of 
insurance discussed in section 8.2 may stimulate demand for micro insurance. As current coping 
strategies are inadequate with a larger risk pool and greater economies of scale a formal insurer 
could probably provide a benefit that is 5 to 10 times larger than the payouts in most informal 
schemes, especially if it could rely on existing distribution channels, such as members associations, 
group savings and MFIs, to keep transaction costs low. In summary, there is evidence that micro 
insurance has potential if the barriers to adoption are overcome. It seems that the most important 
area for innovation is around the types of products, distribution channels and administration. If 
insurance providers can bring down those costs, they will find demand and will be able to grow a 
sustainable business that provides substantial benefits to clients.    
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9.2 RECOMMENDATIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The current analysis was driven by the challenges facing access to micro insurance in informal 
households in Tanzania. Like in many parts of the world, the informal sector in Tanzania is growing 
and its contribution to the overall national economy cannot be underestimated. The lack of 
sustainable financial risk management makes informal households vulnerable to socio-economic 
risks that hinder the expected economic growth. Tanzania has made significant progress in 
implementing financial sector reforms and achieved a more competitive market with an expanding 
market share of private insurance
47
. Thus, understanding demand perspectives enables stakeholders 
of the insurance industry to improve their product development, policy formulations and 
implementation.  
 
Based on the analysis above, this research proposes three policy recommendations. Firstly, the 
findings suggest that there is a micro insurance product design gap. Indeed, there is no doubt in the 
finding that informal households in Tanzania need some financial instruments given the nature of 
socio-economic risk they encounter. The results therefore suggest that it is important to have 
appropriate policies aiming at developing financial instruments which incorporate attributes of the 
informal sector households. To accelerate demand and create trust a properly designed micro 
insurance product is likely to result in higher demand. This must be accompanied by a well-
functioning scheme to remove any imbalance which might set an unprecedented bad scenario.  
Findings indicate that the point of entry to address the product design gap should be 
housing/building and education insurance.  
 
The important policy recommendation is that insurance companies should liaise with local or 
community based organizations to be attractive to informal sector households.  Insurers must adapt 
effectively to the living and working conditions of people, which are usually area or trade specific. 
Effective adaptation can occur through a process of mediation composed of two essential functions; 
empowerment and increased social capital. The first happens by enabling the population to express 
its needs and priorities; and the second occurs through forging a receptive public opinion towards the 
insurance. The process requires trust-building measures. The role of informal institutions which is a 
major determinant of micro-insurance demand is to reduce transactional costs and the tendencies of 
moral hazard and adverse selection. The insurance companies can help local associations to form  
agencies by giving them capacity training in issues covering premium payments and collections, 
claims processing and the duties of the parties involved in an insurance contract. Correct marketing 
measures must be adopted to increase demand for micro insurance in the informal sector.   
                                                          
47 The comprehensive analysis of the growth of financial sector in Tanzania can be seen in chapter two of this thesis. 
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Moreover, the household perception about insurance products can be improved through the proper 
explanation of the benefits of micro-insurance products, the legal obligations of the parties involved 
in the insurance contractual relationship and an explicit explanation of when a policyholder can 
make a claim and the procedure for making such claims. Such initiatives will improve the trust and 
perception of the informal households about insurers and this would eventually impact positively on 
the demand for micro insurance. Financial literacy must be offered, focusing on products developed 
according to the socio-economic situation of the clients in each group.  While most informal 
households have heard about micro insurance, the ratio of real understanding is not high, so the 
focus of publicity should be recognized from the surface to the depth of understanding, which could 
remove the worries left behind about the micro insurance services. The efforts to support education 
should be strengthened since the education level of a household influences positive participation in 
micro insurance.  
 
Secondly, government subsidy is needed and is an important policy issue. In order to achieve the 
aims of poverty reduction strategies, micro insurance must be part of the equation. Sometimes 
poverty reduction initiatives encounter major setbacks when the target groups and individuals suffer 
from medical expense, loss of property or the death of the breadwinner in the family. These risks 
push the informal households further below the poverty line thereby eroding any meaningful gains 
made by the poverty reduction programs. It is, therefore, imperative for the government to make 
micro insurance a central pillar in its poverty reduction program. The findings suggest that the 
subsidy has an important role in extending and replicating micro insurance schemes that have 
emerged as promising route for financing socio-economic risk exposures. The research indicates that 
gaps in coverage exist for the poorest households, because these households are unable to make the 
initial contributions needed in order to become members of the schemes. The exclusion of certain 
individual households is of particular interest to policy makers; hence the need to subsidize the cost 
of participation of these households.  Alternatively, governments can build the capacity of micro 
insurance schemes to tap into reinsurance markets, thereby enabling them to transfer risk outside the 
community; they can underwrite the start-up costs needed to create relevant insurance products.  In 
so doing, governments can develop a system of two-tier allocation of disaster assistance which 
harnesses the informational advantage enjoyed by communities while providing the external 
assistance necessary to cope with covariate risk.  
 
Thirdly, a successful business case for micro insurance requires a supportive regulatory 
environment. The ideal regulatory environment neither over promotes the market (because to do so 
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distorts the market) nor does it create barriers by insisting on rigid enforcement of traditional 
insurance guidelines. New regulatory frameworks that are easier to enforce and follow must be 
developed since creation of regulatory frameworks assist on trust building too.  The Tanzania 
Insurance Regulatory Authority should also consider appropriate legislation that will encourage 
insurance companies to venture into the micro-insurance business. Such legislation can take the form 
of providing subsidies or tax exemptions to insurers that provide a certain level of micro-insurance 
services. 
 
Nevertheless, the results of the study should not be interpreted as suggesting micro insurance 
demand is free from dangers. Experiences from other countries should assist in taking precautionary 
measures.  Other non-financial factors such as distribution and technology are also necessary to 
influence demand for micro insurance. Not only do they have a direct effect on economic growth but 
also promote insurance demand. Implicitly, if policies aim to promote demand for micro insurance 
they must also focus on factors that influence economic growth and investments. Research suggests 
that five focus areas that need to be delineated before a micro insurance scheme can be instituted, 
these include; a clear specification of the target group/client profile within the informal economy, the 
nature of risks faced by this sub-group, the types of interventions possible (social security, social 
insurance, social funds, labour market interventions), the financing options available (fees for 
services, premiums, subsidies, rotating savings and credit type circulating schemes, loans) and the 
delivery system and management structure. 
9.3 CONTRIBUTIONS AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
This study has made three main contributions from its findings. Firstly, this PhD‘s research provides 
unique conceptual contributions through clarifying the concept of micro insurance and extends the 
debate of the effectiveness of micro insurance as a risk management tool in the informal sector. The 
study contributes to the existing literature on micro insurance demand and risk management in the 
informal sector (see for example, Adams, 1992; Alderman and Paxson, 1995; McCord, 2008; Jalan 
and Ravallion, 1999) by taking into account recent advances in the understanding of poverty and 
their relationship to risk management techniques. By doing so, it has not only filled the gap in the 
area but has also improved the general understanding of the micro insurance demand concept. The 
results optimize household‘s insurance needs; identifying the positive attributes of informal 
insurance systems that could be incorporated into the design of micro insurance products.  It also 
provides the operational linkages and determines which processes can be improved, with a view to 
determining the factors that allow them to participate in micro insurance schemes.   
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Secondly, a major contribution is made through the employed probit regression model, which is the 
first of its kind in Tanzania, to develop and empirically test models of micro insurance demand using 
household‘s characteristics; and this contributes towards advancements of knowledge within the 
context of micro insurance demand. The extent to which micro insurance demand studies commonly 
used micro finance clients to derive the demand perspectives was noted. This coverage of micro 
finance clients was found deficient in that it included only the beneficiaries of micro credit clients. 
This study addressed these weaknesses to provide arguably the representative evidence needed in the 
informal sector. This was possible by including members and non-members of MFI‘s in the informal 
sector in Tanzania. 
The third major contribution of this study is the synthesis of evidence of a range of risk management 
arrangements observed in the informal sector in Tanzania.  They include traditional, indigenous, 
informal credit, savings and insurance arrangements as well as newer, semi-formal community-
based micro finance. These schemes share a common feature absent from market-based 
arrangements, namely, the use of interpersonal relationships in order to reduce informational and 
transaction costs. In this context this research recommends suggestions on appropriate interventions 
on micro insurance product design. Such information is vital for policy makers and other 
stakeholders addressing issues of access to micro-insurance in the informal sector.   
9.4 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
The study has limitations that signify the need for further research. The main limitation is that the 
study does not collect opinions of the providers of micro insurance services; the supply side opinions 
could have provided more insight into the problem. The second limitation is that the demand model 
equation is made up of a few selected variables. This was done in order to have a reliable 
interpretation of the study. The study could have been richer if other variables were also studied. 
However, despite these limitations the present study has come out with some meaningful findings 
and policy suggestions for further actions. 
9.5 DIRECTION FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The conclusion of the current study does not in any way mark the end of serious research on micro 
insurance demand in general and for Tanzania in particular. Previous studies have their limitations 
ranging from methodological issues to coverage and scope restraints. The limitations of the current 
study have been mentioned in section 9.4 above. Certainly these limitations warrant the need for 
further research both in the field in general and in Tanzania in particular. It was duly acknowledged 
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by the researcher that there is considerable scope for further research. The researcher argues that 
future research may explore three major areas. 
 
Firstly, the micro insurance field is still young and growing, and there are various areas for research. 
Some of the areas for further studies may include research concerning distribution, as clearly MFI 
distribution is a useful channel. Beyond credit life, however, micro insurers that rely solely on MFI 
distribution typically do not scale up to expectations. Very little has been done to document the cost 
of distribution, which in insurance is a key component of any profitability analysis. While much has 
been written about the problems associated with MFI distribution, we have yet to see much 
documentation about the outcomes of alternative channels. Lack of capital and lack of insurance 
expertise are inherent constraints for self-funding and other informal schemes.  
 
Secondly, another area is concerning product suitability and customization. Much has been written, 
but little literature describes profitability at the product level. Of particular interest is whether 
voluntary products can be profitable. This issue is clouded, as many micro insurance schemes are 
delivered by organizations with multiple lines of business, with little documentation on how 
expenses are allocated across lines of business. Contributing to this blurring is a dual bottom line 
perspective, balancing both social and business goals. Research has hardly looked at how these goals 
are balanced. Also, little has been written about competition within the micro insurance field. An 
examination of competitive factors would seem central to any classical business analysis.  
Finally, given the broad range of existing informal arrangements; which are marked by differences 
in membership and leadership structure, history, longevity and nature of activities, future studies 
which would provide evidence on which features of such arrangements make them more conducive 
for successful involvement of micro insurance would be very beneficial. While this study has 
documented the targeting and informational advantages of informal arrangements relative to formal 
arrangements, there are no careful evaluations of the efficacy or rate of return from community-
based arrangements. Future studies which fill this gap in knowledge through either non-experimental 
econometric work or randomized controlled trials related to community-based arrangements can 
promote the understanding of their costs and benefits vis-à-vis other arrangements.  
……………………………………..God Knows Best……………………………………………… 
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Appendix A: Tanzania Economic Performance Indicator 
Economic Performance indicators 
  
  2008 2009 2010 
Population 
(Mil.) 39.3 40.7 43.7 
Birth Rate 34.29 births/1000 population (2009 est.) 
Death Rate 
12.59/1000 population (2008 est.) 
 
GDP at current 
price (TZS Bil.) 24,754.46    29,510.50  33,087.92 
GDP per Capital 
at current price  622,858.94 727,968.68 800,212.7 
GDP Growth 
Rates (%) 7.44 5.48 6.18 
GDP (PPP) 1.353 1.415 1.484 
Inflation 
(consumer Price 
Index) (%) 10.28 12.14 7.82 
Life expectancy 
at birth  
 52 years (2009 est.) 
  
Infant Mortality 
rate 
69.28 death/1000 live births (2009 est.)  
  
 Total fertility 
rate 4.46 children born/woman (2009 est.) 
Appendix B:  Number of Insurance companies and intermediaries in Tanzania 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Registered 
Insurers 
14 17 18 20 24 24 
Broking 
firms 
47 57 54 64 65 80 
Insurance 
Agents 
348 397 429 456 458 488 
Loss 
adjusters 
35 39 40 33 33 36 
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Appendix C:  Risk Exposures affecting income in the informal sector in Tanzania 
Type of risks exposure Frequency Percent 
 Injuries and accidents 124 16.2 
Illness  124 16.2 
Education Fee  96 12.5 
theft 81 10.6 
other (flood, fire, etc) 8 1.0 
 child birth 175 22.8 
 Divorce 74 9.7 
 Retirement 14 1.8 
 food expenses 159 20.8 
 Death of  family member 78 10.2 
 electricity bills 24 3.1 
 Building a house expenses 179 23.4 
 Dependents  30 3.9 
 removal by authority 134 17.5 
 increase in prices of goods 38 5.0 
 forced contribution and tax 11 1.4 
Source: Household survey data 
Appendix D: Focus Group Discussion views about Insurance Products 
Negative views: 
―Insurance is an additional cost; I would rather cope with a crisis with savings, especially saving in 
the form of assets. This has worked well for me so far. Every time I have surplus funds, I simply buy 
assets which I can sell when I am faced with a pressing crisis.‖ 
 
―For now, I would rather work towards increasing my income, asset base and livelihood, only then 
can I think of insurance.‖ ―The money that I have should not be spent on something that I will only 
benefit from when struck by a crisis. I have many needs and some other event may occur which I 
have not insured‖. ―It takes long to receive the benefit after a claim. Although I have not personally 
accessed insurance, this seems to be the major complaint I have heard. This makes me not even think 
about insurance.‖  
 
―I would prefer savings to insurance because I can get the money whenever I need it.‖ ―In as much 
as I would want to save now, I am no longer saving because of inadequate funds, but I would still 
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prefer savings to insurance. Insurance is a long process—verifying whether the event occurred and 
the like. When faced with a crisis, I usually borrow from friends.‖ ―I think insurance is for people 
with a lot of money.‖ ―I see insurance as an expense where the event does not occur until your 
death.‖ 
 
―I see insurance as an expense where the money cannot be redeemed; it takes long to receive 
payments after claims.‖ ―I find it difficult to save because of meager profits I make from my 
business; I cannot even afford to maintain a savings account in a bank. I see insurance as an 
unnecessary expense for a risk that does not normally happen. This money used for insurance can be 
used for other things.‖ ―I cannot afford insurance because of inadequacy in terms of money, but I 
can easily manage savings.‖ ―Insurance is really an expense that can be avoided.‖ 
Positive Views* 
―My business is poultry; rearing chickens, I would really like to insure my chickens against theft.‖ ―I 
would be interested in insurance, but it is something new to me. I am willing to consider it if I can 
receive a lot of education on it.‖ 
*Note: These are positive views expressed during data collection phases for FGDs and unstructured 
interviews. 
 
Affordability Issue 
―Insurance should be accessed by all who can afford to pay the premiums to protect themselves and 
their property against fire, theft, accident, disease and death.‖ ―Insurance is something that needs a 
lot of money. People who have money can insure against accident, fire and theft.‖ ―It is good 
especially when you have a big business, but when the business is small, it becomes a big burden to 
be making contributions to the insurer. Anyone who has a strong business must access insurance 
against theft, damages, or injury to themselves or their households.‖ 
Applicability Issue 
―Insurance is good if you have valuable goods which might be stolen or damaged. But if you don‘t 
have valuable assets and money, it is not important to insure.‖ ―Is available for those who have a lot 
of assets such as cars, houses and big household assets 
Appendix E: Parameters Definition and measurement of the variables 
Variable Hyp
othe
sis 
Definition 
AGE +/- This is a measure of the age of the owner of an informal business. 
PEDU - The education variable measures the level of formal education of a 
respondent PEDU=None and Primary level 
SEDU + The education variable measures the level of formal education of a 
respondent.  SEDU 2=Secondary and vocational level 
UEDU + The education variable measures the level of formal education of a 
respondent. UEDU3=University level 
SEMPL +/- Is an independent variable and measures how self-employment 
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influences his/her micro-insurance demand. 
WEMPL + Is an independent variable and measures how waging employment 
influence his/her micro-insurance demand. 
HRIA + Is an independent variable and measures how household exposure to 
injuries and accidents influences his/her micro-insurance demand. 
HRMI - Is an independent variable and measures how household exposure to 
minor illness influences his/her micro-insurance demand 
HRSI + Is an independent variable and measures how household exposure to 
serious  illness influences his/her micro-insurance demand 
EER + Is an independent variable and measures how household exposure to 
education expenses influences his/her micro-insurance demand. 
HBER + Is an independent variable and measures how household‘s exposure to 
housing expenses influences his/her micro-insurance demand 
DHMR + Is an independent variable and measures how household exposure to 
death of family member influences his/her micro-insurance demand 
MARRIED + The marital status variable is a measure of whether a person is or not, it 
measures how marital influences his/her micro insurance demand  
INCOME +/- Explanatory variable which measures how a level income of a 
respondent will influence his/her micro-insurance demand. 
HOUSE + Is an independent variable and measures how one‘s house ownership 
influences his/her micro-insurance demand.  
LIQ.ASSE
T. 
- Is an independent variable and measures how one‘s level of liquid 
assets holding may influence his/her micro-insurance demand. 
FIXED 
ASS. 
+ Is an independent variable and measures how one‘s level of fixed assets 
holding may influence his/her micro-insurance demand. 
UMFISER
V 
+ Is an independent variable and measures how one‘s use of MFI services 
(any) influences his/her micro-insurance demand. 
UBSERV + Is an independent variable and measures how one‘s use banks service 
(any) influences his/her micro-insurance demand. 
INSKNOW
L 
+ Is an independent variable and measures how one‘s insurance 
knowledge influences his/her micro-insurance demand. 
INSTRUST + Is an independent variable and measures how one‘s trust on insurance 
influences his/her micro-insurance demand. 
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Note: Variables with (+) has positive influence on the demand for micro insurance (-) has negative 
influence on the demand for micro insurance while (+/-) relationship is uncertain. 
Appendix F: Survey questionnaires, demand for micro insurance in Tanzania. 
Introduction 
My name is Abdallah N. Saqware, I am a PhD student at Lancashire Business School in UK; I would 
like to ask you some questions about you, your households, risks you face and activities you are 
engaged in. In addition, I would like to discuss your household needs for financial service, and 
especially insurance. All the gathered information will be combined with information from other 
respondents and used to analyze demand for micro insurance for informal households in Tanzania. 
Please remember that your answers/details and data for this research will be used for academic 
purposes and kept confidential presented on the statistical table. Please also remember there are no 
rights or wrong answers and only your honest opinions are important for me.  
Counset: Do you agreed to be interviewd Yes/NO 
If Yes, Continue: If NO: End of Session 
Basic information 
Interview No:_____________________________ 
Date:____________________________________ 
Address of the respondent (Districts):  
1.  Ilala  
2. Temeke 
3. Kinondoni 
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Question 1: Household details 
INT: To start with I would like to talk with you about your household.   By household I mean all the people living in the same place and sharing 
expenditures for food.  I would like to talk about all the household members that are currently present or left for short period of time (less than 6 
months). 
 
INT: HEAD OF THE HOUSEHOLD = the person who brings the biggest income to the household.   
1.1
. 
Please 
give 
names of 
all your 
household 
members. 
 
WRITE A 
NAME(S)
. 
1.2. Relation to 
the household 
head 
 
1 – household 
head  
2 – spouse / 
partner 
3 – child  
4 – parent 
5 – other person 
1.3. 
Gender 
 
1 – male  
2 – 
female 
1.4. Age 
 
 
AGE OF 
THE 
PERSO
N  
1.5  Employment 
status 
1. Employer 
2. permanent ‗yee 
3.  Temporary‗yee 
4. Self-Employee 
5. Unemployed 
6. Retired 
7. Student 
8. Other (specify) 
1.6. Marital status 
 
1 – single  
2 – married 
3 – separated / 
divorced 
4 – widow(er) 
1.7. Education 
grade completed  
 
1 – none 
2 - primary  
3 - secondary 
4 – vocational 
(technical) 
5– higher 
(university, PhD) 
1.8. 
Disability  
(cannot 
work) 
 
1 – Yes 
0 - No 
1.9 
Member of  
MFI 
1. Yes 
0. No 
1          
2          
3          
4          
5          
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Question 2: Household economic activities, Assets and income sources  
INT: I would like to talk with you about your households economic activities, all those undertaken by adult household members that generate income 
for your household.  
 
Asset type and code Number 
owned 
Resale value at current 
market price (Tsh) 
Today do you earn more/ less/ the 
same amount of this asset 
compared to 3 years ago 
1 More  
2 Less 
3 The same 
 1 2 3 
A) Livestock    
1. cattle    
2. buffalo    
3. poultry    
4. pigs    
5. Goats 
 
   
6. Other (specify)    
B) Property/ Transport/ Agricultural 
equipments and Jewellery  
   
7 Motor vehicles (Car, Lorry, bus, three-
wheeler )  
   
8 Motorcycles    
9 Bicycles    
10  Tractors , harvester or digging 
instrument 
   
11 Carts    
12 Boats    
13 Jwellery    
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C) Domestic appliances    
14. Refrigerators    
15 microwave    
16 freezer    
17 Kerosene stove    
18 Electric stove    
19 Gas stove    
20 Other stove    
21 Hot plates    
22 Sewing machine    
23 Electric iron    
24 Kettles/ Water heater    
25 Fan    
D) Media appliances and communication    
26 Televisions    
27 Video /DVD player    
28 Radio cassette player    
29 Computer/ Laptop for household use  
  
   
30 Fixed telephone    
31 Mobile Phone     
E) Furniture    
32 Table    
33 Chair    
34 Sofa Set    
35 Bed    
36 Wardrobe    
37 Cupboard    
38 Clock    
39 Other    
Total movable asset value    
F) Immovable Assets  
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40 House/ Part of a house/ Apartment  (only 
if owned) 
   
41. Land (only if owned)    
Total immovable asset value    
 
 
 I will read to you different sources of income. Please tell me from which sources did your 
household receive income in the last 12 months? 
 
1 - yes 0 - no 
 Wage employment   
A Permanent job 1 0 
B Temporal small jobs (usually of seasonal character) 1 0 
 Self-employment (registered and unregistered)   
C 
Trade activities  
(other than selling self-produced agriculture goods, those are under F) 
1 0 
D 
Service provision  
(This includes renting car, equipment, apartment, etc.) 
1 0 
E 
Production activities 
(not including processing of agriculture goods, these are in F and G) 
1 0 
 Agriculture (only income generating)   
F Agriculture production (crops, vegetables, fruits, other and its processing) 1 0 
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G Livestock breeding (including selling meat, milk, and other processing) 1 0 
 Other sources   
H Pension  1 0 
I Social benefits 1 0 
J Money received on a regular basis from somebody living and working abroad 1 0 
K Money received on a regular basis from somebody living and working in Tanzania   
L 
OTHER: ________________ 
Use only when  cannot classify in the categories above 
1 0 
 
In the past 12 months, did you or any other members of your household receive any other type of income that we have not already listed? 
 
 
IF THERE IS NO INCOME (ONLY ANSWERS ‗NO‘ TO ALL QUESTIONS H1) GO TO THE NEXT SECTION I.  
IF IN A OR B RESPONDENT ANSWERED YES GO TO QUESTION H2, AND  
IF IN C OR D OR E RESPONDENT ANSWERED YES GO TO QUESTION H5, AND 
IF IN F OR G RESPONDENT ANSWERED YES GO TO QUESTION H8, AND  
IF IN H OR I OR J OR K OR L RESPONDENT ANSWERED YES GO TO QUESTION H11, AND 
 
 H2. Please list all the members (by names) who 
have wage employment (permanent or temporal) 
H3. Number of months during the H4. Net income per average month 
Saqware, PhD Thesis July 11, 2012 
  
187 
last year the income is generated (ENTER AMOUNT in GEL) 
 PERMANENT   
A  
 [_______] Tsh. 
99 – refuse to answer 
B  
 [_______] Tsh. 
99 – refuse to answer 
C  
 [_______] Tsh. 
99 – refuse to answer 
D  
 [_______] Tsh. 
99 – refuse to answer 
E  
 [_______] Tsh. 
99 – refuse to answer 
 TEMPORAL   
F  
 [_______] Tsh. 
99 – refuse to answer 
G  
 [_______] Tsh. 
99 – refuse to answer  
H  
 [_______] Tsh. 
99 – refuse to answer 
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I  
 [_______]Tsh.  
99 – refuse to answer 
J  
 [_______]Tsh. 
99 – refuse to answer 
 
 
H5. Please list all the self-employment activities 
providing income (by activity)? 
PUT ALL DISTINCTIVE SELF-EMPLOYMENT 
ACTIVITIES IDENTIFIED IN H1 BY ADDING 
A SHORT DESCRIPTION BELOW  
H6. Number of months during the 
last year the income is generated 
H7. Net income per average month 
(AMOUNT in Tsh.) 
    
A Trade1 __________ 
 [_______] Tsh. 
99 – refuse to answer 
B Trade2 __________ 
 [_______]Tsh.  
99 – refuse to answer 
C Trade 3 __________ 
 [_______]Tsh. 
99 – refuse to answer 
D Services1 __________ 
 [_______] Tsh. 
99 – refuse to answer  
E Services2 __________ 
 [_______] Tsh. 
99 – refuse to answer 
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F Services3 __________ 
 [_______] Tsh. 
                99 – refuse to answer 
G Production1__________ 
 [_______] Tsh. 
                        99 – refuse to answer 
H Production2__________ 
 [_______] Tsh. 
                         99 – refuse to answer 
I Production3__________ 
 [_______]Tsh. 
                        99 – refuse to answer  
J  
 [_______] Tsh. 
                          99 – refuse to answer  
K  
 [_______] Tsh. 
                     99 – refuse to answer 
 
 
H8. Please list all the agriculture activities 
providing income (by members or by type of 
activity)? 
PUT ALL DISTINCTIVE AGRICULTURE 
ACTIVITIES IDENTIFIED IN H1 BY ADDING 
A SHORT DESCRIPTION BELOW 
H9. Number of months during the 
last year the income is generated 
H10. Net income per average month 
(AMOUNT in Tsh.) 
    
A Agriculture production1 ____________ 
 [_______] Tsh. 
99 – refuse to answer  
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B Agriculture production2 ____________ 
 [_______] Tsh. 
99 – refuse to answer 
C Agriculture production3 ____________ 
 [_______] Tsh. 
              99 – refuse to answer 
D Agriculture production4 ____________ 
 [_______]Tsh.  
                 99 – refuse to answer 
E Agriculture production5 ____________ 
 [_______] Tsh. 
                 99 – refuse to answer 
F Agriculture production6 ____________ 
 [_______] Tsh. 
                 99 – refuse to answer  
G Livestock breeding1 _______________ 
 [_______] Tsh. 
                  99 – refuse to answer  
H Livestock breeding2 _______________ 
 [_______]Tsh. 
                   99 – refuse to answer  
I Livestock breeding3 _______________ 
 [_______] Tsh. 
99 – refuse to answer  
J Livestock breeding4 _______________ 
 [_______] Tsh. 
99 – refuse to answer 
Saqware, PhD Thesis July 11, 2012 
  
191 
K  
 [_______] Tsh. 
99 – refuse to answer 
 
 H11. Please list all the members who obtain 
income from other sources? 
H12. Number of months during the 
last year the income is generated 
H13. Net income per average month 
(AMOUNT in Tsh.) 
 PENSION   
A  
 [_______] Tsh. 
99 – refuse to answer  
B  
 [_______] Tsh. 
99 – refuse to answer 
C  
 [_______] Tsh. 
99 – refuse to answer 
 SOCIAL BENEFITS   
D  
 [_______] Tsh. 
99 – refuse to answer 
E  
 [_______] Tsh. 
99 – refuse to answer 
F  
 [_______] Tsh. 
99 – refuse to answer 
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G  
 [_______] Tsh. 
99 – refuse to answer 
H  
 [_______] Tsh. 
99 – refuse to answer 
 
Money received on a regular basis from somebody 
living and working abroad 
 
 
I  
 [_______] Tsh. 
99 – refuse to answer 
J  
 [_______]Tsh. 
99 – refuse to answer 
K  
 [_______]Tsh. 
99 – refuse to answer 
 
Money received on a regular basis from somebody 
living and working in Tanzania 
 
 
L  
 [_______] Tsh. 
99 – refuse to answer 
M  
 [_______] Tsh. 
99 – refuse to answer 
N  
 [_______] Tsh. 
99 – refuse to answer  
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 OTHER   
O  
 [_______]Tsh. 
99 – refuse to answer 
P  
 [_______] Tsh. 
                99 – refuse to answer 
 
Question 3: Dwelling characteristics of the household  
Questio
n code 
Question Response Codes 
I Is your house owned or rented, or other? 
 1 Owned 
2 Rented 
3 Used without payment (e.g. on squatter land) 
4 Given by family without payment 
5 Provided by government 
6 Other (Specify) 
II How many rooms does your house have? (incl. detached 
rooms in same compound, excl. kitchen and toilet) 
   
III What is the main source of energy used for cooking? 
 1 Firewood 
2 Kerosene 
3 Electricity 
4 Liquid gas 
5 Other (Specify)  
IV What is the main source of lighting? 
 1 Kerosene 
2 Electricity 
3 Other (Specify) 
V What is the main source of drinking water? 
 1 Pipe in the dwelling 
2 Public pipe / Piped water from somewhere else 
3 Stream/River 
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4 Well water 
5 Rain water 
6 Other (Specify) 
VI What is the main material of the walls of the house? 
 1 Mud  
2 Bricks / Concrete 
3 Stone 
4 Blocks 
5 Timber 
6 Wood / Palm leaves / Bamboo 
7 Other (Specify) 
VII What is the main material of the roof of the house? 
 1 Iron sheets 
2 Tiles 
3 Asbestos 
4 Thatch / Palm leaves 
5 Other 
      
VIII What is the main material of the floor of house? 
 1 Cement 
2 Tiles / Terrazzo 
3 Mud 
4 Other 
IX What kind of toilet facility does your house have? 
 1 Pit latrine 
2 Backet 
3 Flush toilet 
4 No facilities 
5 Other (Specify) 
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Question 4: Households   Health Conditions 
  
I 
 
II 
 
III 
 
IV 
 
 
V 
 
(Use IV) Codes 
Person 
ID 
Which 
vaccinations has 
(Name) ever 
received? 
(Code) 
(multiple 
answers 
allowed) 
If you have received 
vaccination, who 
paid for the 
vaccination? (Code)  
(multiple answers 
allowed) 
If you have 
never received 
vaccination, 
why not? (Code) 
If female: have you 
ever received any 
pre-natal care 
during pregnancies? 
(Code) 
Who paid 
for this 
care?  
(multiple 
answers 
allowed) 
(Code) 
During the last 
12 months has 
(Name) 
suffered from 
illness or 
injury? (Code) 
If there were any 
treatment costs (for 
consultation and 
medicine), who took 
over these costs? 
(multiple answers 
allowed) (Code) 
1          
2        
3        
 
Column 2 : Vaccination 
 Column 3, 6 & 8 
: paid by  
Column 4: why not 
received? 
 Column 5:   
BCG (Baccille Calmette Guerin 
Vaccine 
1 
 Himself/herself 
1 Too young  1 Yes 1 
 
DTP 1 (First dose of diphtheria toxoid, 
tetanus toxoid and pertussis vaccine ) 
 
2 
 Other hh member 
2 Did not know about 
vaccinations 
2 No 2 
 
DTP 3 (Third dose of diphtheria 
3 
Other relatives 
3 No supply of vaccination 3 No pregnancies 3 
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toxoid, tetanus toxoid and pertussis 
vaccine) 
 
HepB3 (Third dose of hepatitis B 
vaccine) 
4 
Government 
4 Health centre too far 4   
 
Hib 3 (Third dose of Haemophilus  
influenza type B vaccine) 
5 
Employer 
5 Too expensive 5   
 
MCV (Measles-containing vaccine) 
6 
Health Insurance 
6 Don‘t know 6   
 
MCV 2 (Measles-containing vaccine 
2
nd
 does ) 
 
7 
Did not have to 
pay 
 
 
7 
Other (specify) 7   
 
Pol3 (Third dose of polio vaccine) 
8 
Other / don‘t 
know 
8     
 
TT2+ (Second and subsequent doses 
of tetanus toxoid) 
9  
  
   
 
VAD1 (Vitamin A doses by 12 
months) 
10 Column 7 
 
    
 11 Neither 1     
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YFV (Yellow fever vaccine) 
 
Non 
12 Illness 2     
 
Don‘t know 
13 Injury 3     
  Both 4     
 
 
Question 5: Risks and Risk Management Strategies 
5.1 What were the risks faced by you and your household in last 3 years? 
     
Nature of 
Risk 
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1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
8 
 
9 
 
10 
 
11 
 
12 
 
13 
 
14 
 
20 
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A) Weather 
related and 
environmental 
shocks 
              
1.   Floods                         
2.   Hurricanes                         
3.   Landslides                         
4.   Drought                         
5.   Tidal 
Waves 
   
                     
6. Fire               
7.  Animal 
Threats 
   
                     
8.   Crop 
failure 
   
                     
B) Family 
related shocks 
   
           
9. Death of 
working adult 
household 
member 
   
           
10. Death of 
other 
household 
member 
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11. Serious 
illness of 
working adult 
hh member 
   
           
12. Serious 
illness of other 
hh member 
   
           
13. 
Disablement of 
working 
household 
member 
   
           
14. 
Disablement of 
other 
household 
member 
   
           
15. Disputes 
with extended 
family 
members 
regarding land 
or other assets  
   
           
16. marriage               
17. Childbirth               
18. Divorce               
C) Banditry               
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and crime 
19. 
Destruction, 
confiscation or 
theft of tools or 
inputs for 
production 
   
                     
20. Theft of 
cash  
                        
21. Theft of 
stored crops or 
livestock 
   
                     
22. Destruction 
of housing or 
housebreaking 
   
           
23.  
Destruction or 
theft of other 
assets (cars, 
jewellery, 
media 
appliances, 
etc.) 
   
                     
D) Economic 
shocks 
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24. Dramatic 
increase in 
input prices 
   
           
25. Dramatic 
decrease in 
output prices 
   
           
26. Inability to 
sell 
agricultural 
products 
   
           
27. Inability to 
sell non-
agricultural 
products 
   
           
28. Loss of job 
              
E) Negative 
political, 
social or legal 
events 
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29. 
Resettlement 
or forced 
migration 
   
                     
30. Forced 
contributions 
or arbitrary 
taxation 
   
                     
31. 
Discrimination 
for political 
reasons  
   
           
32. 
Discrimination 
for social or 
ethnic reasons 
   
           
33. 
War/Terrorism   
              
 
Code: 
Column 20: Time take to recover 
Up to one month   1 
Up to six months   2 
Up to one year   3 
Up to two years   4 
Up to five years 5 
Not yet recovered 6 
5.2 Where would you go to get money in an emergency? 
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1. MFI     [        ]  5. Other (specify)    [       ] 
2. CBO     [        ] ………………………………….. 
3. Friends and Family   [        ] 
4. Money Lender    [        ] 
 
5.3 What was the most important coping mechanism
48
 you used immediately after the risk happened last time?  
 
List of coping mechanisms: 
 
 No coping action (i.e. neglecting the illness, not re-building the stolen assets, etc.) 
 
 Insurance 
 Using own funds, depleting savings, etc.  
 
 Reducing consumption 
 Getting additional job (or working more) 
 
 Getting free of charge help from government (benefits, ad-hoc help) 
 Getting help from local associations you belong to or private persons (local businessmen, etc.) 
 Getting free of charge help from relatives/friends (not to be repaid) 
 Getting help that we have to give back (borrowing without interest) 
 
 Buying necessary things (medicines, materials, etc.) with delayed payment (no interest rate) 
 Buying necessary things (medicines, materials, etc.) on credit (with interest rate) 
 Borrowing with low interest (up to 5% per month) from relatives/friends 
                                                          
48 The one that contributed the most to generate the necessary amount of money.  
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 Borrowing from micro finance institutions (PRIDE Tanzania, FINCA, etc.) 
 Borrowing from banks 
 Borrowing with higher interest (more than 5% per month) relatives/friends 
 Borrowing with higher interest (more than 5% per month) moneylenders (wealthy private persons) 
 
 Selling animals 
 Selling wood 
 Selling fruits and other stored agricultural products (including barter arrangements) 
 Pledging household assets in pawnshops (including jewellery, household consumer durables, etc.) 
 Selling household assets (including jewellery, household consumer durables, land, transport vehicles, etc.) 
 
 other __________ 
 
 
  Question 6: Evaluation of own risk situation and attitude towards risk 
 
Questio
n code 
 Réponse  Codes 
I 
Looking ahead, which are the three 
most important risks that your 
household is exposed to in the next five 
years? Please, rank in order!  
a)First b)Second c)Third  
  See codes above!    
II 
In your opinion, are your household 
more or less exposed to health shocks/ 
family related shocks compared to 
other households in your village? 
 1 Much more 
2 A bit more 
3 About the same 
4 A bit less 
5 Much less 
6 Don‘t know 
III 
In your opinion, is your household 
more or less exposed to weather and 
environmental related shocks compared 
 1 Much more 
2 A bit More 
3 About the same 
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to other households in your village? 4 A bit Less 
5 Much less 
6 Don‘t know 
IV 
In your opinion, is your household 
more or less exposed to economic 
shocks compared to other households in 
your village? 
 1 Much more 
2 A bit More 
3 About the same 
4 A bit Less 
5 Much less 
6 Don‘t know 
V 
How do you see yourself: Are you 
rather willing or unwilling to take 
risks? (Imagine a case, where at a 
certain cost you may receive a benefit, 
but which is not certain)  
 1=extremely dislike 
2=dislike 
3= neutral 
4=like 
5 extremely like 
 
Question 7: Use of financial services 
7.1  
(a) Do you have any savings?   
Yes  1        No  2 
 If yes, provide details below  
Name of 
Institution/Society 
Type  of the 
Institution 
(Code) 
Compulsory =1 or 
Voluntary=2 
Outstanding 
balance (Tsh) 
Interest 
Rate (per 
annum) 
Are you 
satisfied 
with the 
savings 
products?  
Yes 1    No 2 
If not, what is the 
main reason for 
your 
dissatisfaction? 
(Code) 
 (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) 
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Column  2  Women Organization 8 Column 7  
State Bank 
1 Financial Leasing 
Company 9 Does not cover needs 
1 
Development Bank 
2 
Other (Specify) 10 
Application requirements too 
demanding 
2 
Domestic private Bank 
 
3 
  
Approval of product too slow 
3 
Foreign private Bank 
 
4 
  Not informed about own rights 
4 
MFI 5   Interest rate too low 5 
NGO 
6   Other (Specify) 
……………….. 6 
Farmers‘ Organization 
 
7 
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7.3 What is the usual frequency at which you save?  
1 – Once in a year 
2 - Every 6 months 
3 – Every 3 months 
4 – Every month 
5 – Every week 
6 – Every day 
 
7.4 What is the usual amount of money you manage to put aside at given frequency?  
________Tsh. 
99 – Refuse to answer  
 
7.5 Do any of you family members have any bank account now? 
0 – no 
1 – Yes 
99 – hard to say  
 
7.6 Have you or any of your family members had any bank account during the last 3 years? 
0 – no 
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1 – yes 
99 – hard to say  
 
7. 7 To what extent do you trust banks?  
1 - definitely not 
2 – rather not 
3 – neither yes nor not 
4 – rather yes 
5 – definitely yes 
99 – hard to say  
 
7.8 (a)Have you obtained any loans from any financial institution during the last 3 years? 
Yes   (1)  No  (2) 
 
If yes, provide details below 
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 (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) 
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
 
Column  2: Type of Institution 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 1 
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Column  4: Purpose 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Column 5:colleterals 
State Bank 
1 Agriculture/Livestock/Fisher
y 
1 
No Collaterals 
2 
Development Bank 2 Business/enterprises 2 Land 3 
Domestic private Bank 3 Construction/housing 3 Building/ Property 4 
Foreign private Bank 4 To buy assets/durables 4 Jewellery 5 
MFI 5 Consumption 5 Vehicle 6 
NGO 6 Ceremonial/Ritual 6 Household item 7 
Farmers‘ Organization 7 Settlement of loan 7 Personal guarantee 8 
Fishermen‘s Organization 8 Emergencies 8 Group Guarantee 9 
Women Organization 9 Medicines 9 Past loan record 10 
Financial Leasing Company 10 
Other (Specify) 
……………….. 
10 
Other (specify) 11 
Other (Specify) 
………………………….. 11 
  ………………………
……..  
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Column 8 : Frequency of Payment  
Column 12: Reasons for 
dissatisfaction 
  
 
Weekly 1 Does not cover needs 1   
Fortnightly 
2 Application requirements too 
demanding 
2  
 
Monthly 3 Approval of product too slow 3   
Quarterly 
4 
Not informed about own 
rights 4 
 
 
annually 5 Interest rate too high 5   
Other (specify) …………………. 
6 
Other (Specify) 
………………… 
6  
 
 
 
7.9 From how many people your family can 
borrow Tsh. 10,000 for one month without 
interest? 
I______I people 
7.10 From how many people your family can borrow 
Tsh. 100,000 for one month without interest? 
I______I people 
7.11 From how many people your family 
can borrow Tsh. 1,000,000 for one month 
without interest? 
I______I people 
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Question 8: Insurance – knowledge, use and attitude 
8.1 Whether or not you ever obtained an insurance coverage, do you know the idea behind 
insurance?          
o Yes        1  No         2  don‘t know          3 
 
What insurance services do you know (heard about)?  
Insurance services (Heard one of this) 
A Health (including illness and accidents)  
B Disability (death and disability) 
C Property 
D Motor Insurance  
E Civil liability/Public Liability 
F 
Obligatory policies, including former state 
insurance 
 
 
8.2 Could you list names of existing insurers in Tanzania? 
 
IF NOT ABLE TO MENTION ANY PUT „0‟  
1- National Insurance Cooperation 9- Imperial Insurance Company 
2- Jubilee Insurance Company 10- Strategies Insurance Company 
3-Alliance Insurance Company 11. Tanzindia Insurance Company 
4-Zanzibar Insurance Company 12. African Life Assurance 
5-Heritage Insurance Company 13. Tanzania Reinsurance 
Cooperation 
6 – Reliance Insurance company  14. MGEN Insurance Company 
7 – Lions of Tanzania Insurance Company 15. NIKO Insurance Company 
8- Royal Insurance Company   
 
8.3 To what extent do you trust the insurance companies you mentioned? 
1- I trust them completely 
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2- I trust them 
3- I have no reason to trust them or not 
4- I do not trust them 
5- I do not trust them at all 
99 – hard to say  
 
8.4 In your opinion, what is the main reason to purchase insurance?            
    
To protect you from future losses      1 
 To share possible losses within a group against regular contribution  2 
 To provide you with investment opportunities     3 
 To protect you from becoming sick      4 
 To save money for the future      5 
 Don‘t know         6 
 
8.5 Have you or any of your family members had a voluntary insurance policy during the last 
3  years?
49
 
0 – no GO TO QUESTION 8.6 
1 – Yes (used to have or have now) GO TO QUESTION 8.7 
99 – Hard to say                                      GO TO QUESTION 8.7 
Which types of insurance have you purchased? (Multiple answers allowed)   ?      
 1-yes 0 -no 
A Health  (including illness and accidents) 1 0 
B Life (including death and disability) 1 0 
C Property 1 0 
D Motor Insurance  1 0 
E Civil liability 1 0 
F 
Obligatory policies, including former state 
insurance 
1 0 
 
                                                          
49 Only voluntary policies, the previous government insurance scheme does not count here.  
Saqware, PhD Thesis July 11, 2012 
214 
 
8.6. Why not?  
1 - Never heard of insurance / do not have enough information / do not know how it works 
2 - I do not know where to find insurance 
3 - The insurance agents are too far from the place I live 
4 - My household has not needed insurance – I think nothing serious will happen to my 
family or me 
5 - My household has not needed insurance because we can manage problems ourselves  
6 - Insurance is too expensive for me 
7 - Heard it is a long / bureaucratic process to realize claim 
8 - No trust in insurer - heard that insurers do not pay (manipulate with conditions, etc.) 
9 - No trust in insurance companies – they can go bankrupt or run away stealing my money 
OTHER: ________________________ 
 
99 – hard to say  
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Question 9:  Product concept I – Health insurance 
INT: I would like to talk to you about health insurance. Choosing to buy health insurance is a 
way to protect members of one‘s family from financial shocks related to the health care costs 
created by an accident or sudden (not prolonged) illness of any of those family members. For 
each of the family members you would like to insure you pay a fixed fee every month or once a 
year. If the policy holder gets ill or has an accident, a claim is made and the policyholder 
receives in a timely manner a cash benefit payment sufficient to cover selected or all health 
care costs.  
 
I will read you a concept of a new health insurance product, and then I would like to ask for 
your opinion about it.  
Coverage: This is the risk-management product that covers health care costs of the 
policyholder, including all expenses related to emergency service (incl. transportation) and all 
expenses related to emergency hospitalization (including therapeutic and surgical cases).  
Benefit: includes amount of money to cover fully official (according to the government list) 
and informal costs. Money is given in cash to the policyholder (or other family member) by an 
insurance agent at the hospital. 
Claim processing: within 3 days all the benefits are transferred to the client (in cash).  
Provider: The service is provided by one of the biggest Tanzania private insurance companies.  
Proximity: The service is available in the nearest town.  
Price: Tsh. 480 per month  
Frequency of premium payment: payments can be done on a monthly basis or up-front.  
 
9.1. What are up to 2 things you like the most 
about this product?  
MAX. 2 ANSWER POSSIBLE. 
1. coverage 
2. benefit (amount obtained) 
3. claim processing 
4. provider  
5. proximity 
6. price (premium) 
7. frequency of premium payment 
OTHER: ………………….... 
 
99 – hard to say  
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9.2. What are up to 2 things you dislike the 
most about this product? 
MAX. 2 ANSWER POSSIBLE.  
 
1. coverage 
2. benefit (amount obtained) 
3. benefit (not receiving anything if nothing 
happens) 
4. claim processing 
5. provider  
6. proximity 
7. price (premium) 
8. frequency of premium payment 
OTHER: ………………….... 
 
99 – hard to say  
9.3 How willing would you be to buy this 
product?  
 
1 – definitely not willing – GO TO 9.5 
2 – rather not wiling – GO TO 9.5 
3 – rather willing - GO TO NEXT QUESTION 
4 – definitely willing - GO TO NEXT 
QUESTION 
 
99 – hard to say  
9.4. How many people in your household 
would you like to insure? (including 
respondent)  
[_____] 
99 – hard to say (do not read) 
 
 
ONLY THOSE NOT WILLING TO BUY 
 
9.5. Why not?          
  NOT READ ANSWERS.                                                             
1. I do not need this insurance 
2. I had bad experience with insurance 
3. I do not trust insurers 
4. coverage 
5. benefit (amount) 
6. benefit (loosing money) 
7. claim processing 
8. provider 
9. proximity 
10. price (premium) 
11. frequency of premium payment                         
OTHER: ………………….... 
 
99. hard to say  
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 ONLY THOSE NOT WILLING TO BUY 
 
9.6. And if the premium is lowered to Tsh. 360 
per month how willing would you be to buy the 
product? 
0 – it will not change my decision – GO TO 
9.7 
1 – maybe I will reconsider my decision – GO 
TO 9.8 
2 – I would be willing to buy it   - GO TO 9.8 
 
99 – hard to say  
ASK ONLY THOSE NOT WILLING TO 
BUY 
9.7. Is there any price at which you will change 
your decision and decide to buy? 
0 – No, I am not interested at all 
Yes, the price is [_____________] Tsh.  per 
month 
9.8. Would you recommend this product to 
your relatives and friends?  
1 – definitely no 
2 – rather no 
3 – rather yes 
4 – definitely yes 
 
99 – hard to say    
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Product concept II – property insurance 
INT: I would like to talk to you about property insurance. Choosing to buy property insurance 
is a way to protect your family from financial shocks related to the loss (theft, fire, etc.) of your 
household or business assets. For all the assets you would like to insure you pay a fixed fee, 
being a proportion of their current market value, every month or once a year. In the event of 
asset loss, a claim is made and the family receives a cash benefit payment.  
 
I will read you a concept of a new insurance product, and then I would like to ask for your 
opinion about it‖.  
Coverage: This is the risk management product that covers a loss or damage (due to theft/fire) 
of a productive or household asset(s) of the value in between Tsh 300 and 10,000.  
Benefit: 70% of current market value of insured asset(s).  
Claim processing: within one month all the benefits are transferred in cash to the client 
Provider: The service is provided by one of the biggest Tanzania private insurance companies.  
Proximity: The service is available in the nearest town.  
Price: 5.5% of the current value of the insured assets, i.e. if you insure an asset worth Tsh. 
1000.  You will have to pay Tsh.55 for the year (Tsh. 4.6 monthly); in case of a loss you will 
obtain 700 of the value.  
Frequency of premium payment: payment can be done in regular monthly installments or up-
front 
 
9.1What are up to 2 things you like the most 
about this product?  
MAX. 2 ANSWER POSSIBLE. 
1. coverage 
2. benefit (amount obtained) 
3. claim processing 
4. provider  
5. proximity 
6. price (premium) 
7. frequency of premium payment 
OTHER: ………………….... 
 
99 – hard to say  
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9.2 What are up to 2 things you dislike the 
most about this product? 
MAX. 2 ANSWER POSSIBLE.  
 
1. coverage 
2. benefit (amount obtained) 
3. benefit (not receiving anything if nothing 
happens) 
4. claim processing 
5. provider  
6. proximity 
7. price (premium) 
8. frequency of premium payment 
OTHER: ………………….... 
 
99 – hard to say 
9.3 How willing would you be to buy this 
product?  
 (INT. READ POSSIBLE ANSWERS).  
 
1 – definitely not willing – GO TO 9.5 
2 – rather not wiling – GO TO 9.5 
3 – rather willing - GO TO NEXT QUESTION 
4 – definitely willing - GO TO NEXT 
QUESTION 
 
99 – hard to say  
9.4. What is the value of the assets you would 
like to insure?   
WHEN DONE GO TO 9.8 
[_____] Tsh. 
 
99 – hard to say  
 
ONLY THOSE NOT WILLING TO BUY 
 
9.5. Why not?                                                                       
DONOT READ ANSWERS. 
1. I do not need this insurance 
2. I had bad experience with insurance 
3. I do not trust insurers 
4. coverage 
5. benefit (amount) 
6. benefit (losing money) 
7. claim processing 
8. provider 
9. proximity 
10. price (premium) 
11. frequency of premium payment                         
OTHER: ………………….... 
 
99. hard to say 
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ONLY THOSE NOT WILLING TO BUY 
 
9.6. And if the premium is lowered to 4% of 
covered amount per year how willing would 
you be to buy the product? 
(for the above example, it means that you will 
have to pay Tsh. 40  to insure an asset of 1000  
for one year; paying Tsh. 3,3  per month).  
0 – it will not change my decision – GO TO 
9.7 
1 – maybe I will reconsider my decision – GO 
TO 9.8 
2 – I would be willing to buy it  – GO TO 9.8 
 
99 – hard to say 
ASK ONLY THOSE NOT WILLING TO 
BUY 
9.7. Is there any price at which you will change 
your decision and decide to buy? 
(use the example above; monthly payment for 
an asset of Tsh. 1000  value) 
0 – No, I am not interested at all 
Yes, the price is [_____________] Tsh. per 
month 
9.8. Would you recommend this product to 
your relatives and friends?  
1 – definitely no 
2 – rather no 
3 – rather yes 
4 – definitely yes 
 
99 – hard to say   
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Product concept III – life insurance 
INT: I would like to talk to you about life insurance. Choosing to buy life insurance is a way to 
protect members of one‘s family from financial shocks related to the death of any of those 
covered family members. For each of the family members you would like to insure you pay a 
fixed fee every month or once a year. In the event of death befalling one of the family 
members, a claim is made and the family receives a cash benefit payment.  
 
I will read you a concept of a new life insurance product, and then I would like to ask for your 
opinion about it.  
Coverage: This is the risk-management product that covers death of the policyholder during the 
fixed term (1, 3 or 5 years).  
Benefit: In case of death of the policyholder during the selected period his/her family receives 
a fixed benefit of Tsh.3000 If the policy holder does not die the family receives nothing.  
Claim processing: within one month all the benefits are transferred in cash to the family.  
Provider: The service is provided by one of the biggest Tanzania private insurance companies.  
Proximity: The service is available in the nearest town.  
Price: the premium payment would be Tsh. 3 per person per month. 
Frequency of premium payment: monthly/Annually 
 
E1. What are up to 2 things you like the most 
about this product?  
MAX. 2 ANSWER POSSIBLE. 
1. coverage 
2. benefit (the level of fixed amount) 
3. benefit (not receiving anything if nothing 
happens) 
4. claim processing 
5. provider  
6. proximity 
7. price (premium) 
8. frequency of premium payment 
OTHER: ………………….... 
 
98 – none  
99 – hard to say  
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E2. What are up to 2 things you dislike the 
most about this product? 
MAX. 2 ANSWER POSSIBLE.  
 
1. coverage 
2. benefit (the level of fixed amount) 
3. claim processing 
4. provider  
5. proximity 
6. price (premium) 
7. frequency of premium payment 
OTHER: ………………….... 
 
98 – none  
99 – hard to say  
E3. How willing would you be to buy this 
product?  
 
1 – definitely not willing – GO TO E5 
2 – rather not willing – GO TO E5 
3 – rather willing  - GO TO NEXT 
QUESTION 
4 – definitely willing  - GO TO NEXT 
QUESTION 
99 – hard to say 
E4. How many people in your household 
would you like to insure? (including 
respondent)   
WHEN DONE GO TO E8 
[_____] 
99 – hard to say 
ONLY THOSE NOT WILLING TO BUY 
 
E5. Why not?                                                                       
NOT READ ANSWERS. 
1. I do not need this insurance 
2. I had bad experience with insurance 
3. I do not trust insurers 
4. coverage 
5. benefit (the level of fixed amount) 
6. benefit (loosing money) 
7. claim processing 
8. provider 
9. proximity 
10. price   (premium) 
11. frequency of premium payment                         
OTHER: ………………….... 
 
99. hard to say  
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ONLY THOSE NOT WILLING TO BUY 
E6. And if the premium is lowered to Tsh.2 per 
month, how willing would you be to buy the 
product? 
0 – it will not change my decision – GO TO 
E7 
1 – maybe I will reconsider my decision – GO 
TO E8 
2 – I would be willing to buy it  - GO TO E8 
 
99 – hard to say 
 ONLY THOSE NOT WILLING TO BUY 
E7. Is there any price at which you will change 
your decision and decide to buy? 
0 – No, I am not interested at all 
Yes, the price is [_____________] Tsh. per 
month 
E8. Would you recommend this product to 
your relatives and friends?  
1 – definitely no 
2 – rather no 
3 – rather yes 
4 – definitely yes 
 
99 – hard to say   
INT: The life insurance can be also linked to an investment plan. The policyholder saves 
regularly (with interest remuneration) for a fixed period of 10 (or 15) years. Savings has to be 
at least Tsh. 10 per month. Your savings safety is guaranteed by the government (as in banks).  
Benefit: In case of death of the policyholder during the fixed term (10 or 15 years) his/her 
family receives the amount saved and a fixed benefit of Tsh. 3000. If the policyholder has not 
died he/she receives all his/her savings and interest earned on them (for 10 years + interest). In 
this case, the interest rate on savings is similar to those practiced by Tanzanian banks for 1 year 
term deposit.  
Price: the premium payment would be the same as in the previous product presented = Tsh.3 
per person per month and the savings would be a fixed monthly amount of at least Tsh.10. It 
gives a total payment of at least Tsh. 12 per person per month. 
 
Saqware, PhD Thesis July 11, 2012 
224 
 
E9. How interested would you be in the saving 
(investment) plan function?  
   
 
1 – definitely not interested 
2 – rather not interested 
3 – rather interested 
4 – definitely interested 
 
99 – hard to say  
 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR KIND COOPERATION 
 
 
 
 
 
